



National Defense

Strategic Annual Journal – Issued by National Defense College – Issue 03 – June 2016

**Education, A Key To
National Security**

**Defending the Nation:
GCC and the
Restitution of the
Arab State System**

Tahnoon Bin Zayed:

The UAE Has a Model Diplomatic Vision and a Wise Foreign Policy

Editorial



**Maj. Gen. Pilot
Rashad Mohammed
Salem Al-Saadi
Commander of the
National Defense College
(NDC)**

The UAE National Defense College spares no opportunity to support its vision and to achieve its mission and our entire staff at all ranks is keen to play an active role in promoting the status of our college. They excel in working diligently and professionally to make our aspirations come to fruition. Moreover, in return to the country that provides their families with everything they need, our military servicemen also render altruistically and warm-heartedly to their country the most precious things they have without waiting for any personal incentive. This is why our armed forces have reached the highest levels of dedication to their home country and why there is only room in our armed forces for those with top commitment. Today, the most fervent wish for every one of our servicemen is to sacrifice all their most precious things for the sake of the UAE. This explains why we aim high and why we have lofty aspirations.

The year 2015 was exceptional, marked by the UAE's journey of sacrifice when our martyrs painted with their blood a new record of UAE achievements in the domain of supporting justice, humanity, religion and loyalty to Arabism. This journey was fueled by the distinctive values that characterize Emiratis, the values that were instilled in us by the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the wise leader of the Arabs (May Allah's forgiveness be upon him). We have set out on this journey full of good intent, with genuine deep-seated religious beliefs and absolute loyalty to our sagacious leadership.

The noble support of our country to justice is marked by the courageous decisions taken by our leadership to support justice. Indeed, the UAE nation's response to the call for justice is a real reflection of national solidarity, national zeal and the sincere intentions of the UAE community and institutions.

The UAE's rapid response in joining its Arab allies in the Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen plays a major role in achieving the strategic military objectives and countering the imminent threat that looms over the GCC States and the Middle East region.


For its part, the UAE's NDC has updated the curriculum of the third course 2015/2016 to include all current hotspots and regional issues. The aim is to enable our military and civilian participant –students to explore the consequences of the current strategic context and to understand and to implement the instruments of state power by keeping track of all regional events and changes. This will hone their planning and leadership skills and deepen their strategic knowledge, which will enable them to work in their respective institutions with a clear vision for planning, rethinking and developing national policies. Moreover, the NDC faculty members have played a crucial role in building a clear relationship between the academic program and the current situation in addition to managing the academic process by using an interactive methodology that exactly suits the expertise of the participants and ignites their learning and research aptitude. In this regard, the Yemen issue was the most pressing topic of this course.

The NDC progress indicators prove that the college has been successful in fulfilling its mission during its first three years of existence. This success can be attributed to the support of the NDC Higher Council and the UAE Armed Forces GHQ as well as the collaboration of government officials and institutions, and the proficiency and excellent performance of the college staff.

This issue of the UAE NDC Journal marks the unstinting efforts of the editorial board in providing diversified topics that enrich readers with distinguished contributions. To the reading audience, to all government institutions, and to all who have contributed to this issue with their notable articles and analyses, we would like to express our highest appreciation and deep respect. I would like also to convey my gratitude and best wishes of progress to all the college staff.

Finally, I would like to congratulate the participants of the NDC third course who have honored our college with their achievement in being an inspirational group that has strong self-confidence and high aspirations that aims at serving its home country and moving it forward confidently. I beseech Allah to guide them all to the benefit of the United Arab Emirates.

Cover Issue



His Highness Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, National Security Advisor, singled out National Defense Magazine with an exclusive press interview. He emphasized that the establishment of the Supreme Council for National Security is in line with the vision of His Highness the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the Founding Father of the UAE, may God rest his soul in peace, and the vision of President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, may God protect him, which enables the UAE to keep up with the developments and changes in the security and strategic environment in the region and the world at large.

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National Defense

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Editor in Chief:



Editor in Chief:
Abdulla Salem Al Zaabi
Staff Brigadier

Congratulations on this new issue of National Defense Journal, which hosts the best outcome of the intellectual work of participant-students and researchers at NDC. The issue coincides with celebrating the NDC graduation ceremony of the third course participants who have spent one full year of research. This issue keeps track of all hot issues in the Arab region and the world, which is an assurance from NDC that we will spare no effort to provide everything that may improve the quality and volume of the NDC research capacity. Moreover, the focused content of this issue proves that we are still working on building an intellectual hub for participant-students, researchers, thinkers from the UAE and worldwide, since we do believe that intellectual work is the mother of achievements, development and growth for nations. It is not possible for a nation to continue its development process or to be able to overcome formidable obstacles that impede the achievement of the desired national security level unless such a nation peruses the outcome of its strategic thinkers and avails itself of their intellect, perspectives and ideas.

Today, we at NDC believe that the UAE would not have been able to achieve its prosperity and civilization or to have such peace and security without our wise President who believes that development and prosperity cannot be achieved unless a nation has a clear vision and a plan for the future based on the legacy of our ancestors. This is the essence of wisdom in leadership, which is moving forward while carrying the legacy of our past. This issue includes a diversity of topics which are crucial for decision makers, researchers, participant –students and for all those who believe that it is impossible to get the essence of human thought unless this thought is not only articulated verbally but also well-documented and well-based on lessons learned from the past experience coupled with current valuable ideas of human knowledge.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the National Defense Journal is in harmony with the knowledge revival and intellectual movement initiatives launched by His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President, Prime Minister of UAE and Ruler of Dubai (May Allah Protect Him), particularly the “Arab Reading Challenge”. We beseech Allah that our journal will support such initiatives with innovative and constructive ideas to achieve the vision of our wise leadership. Moreover, I would like to refer to what Ludwig Wittgenstein said, «The limits of my language are the limits of my world.» This means that knowledge and language are inseparable and that human knowledge will not prosper unless it is conveyed using a meaningful language and vice versa. Therefore, we are keen to ensure that the language used as a medium to convey ideas in our journal is up to the standards of communicating ideas and perspectives addressed by researchers who have contributed to the current issue.

On behalf of the editorial board, I would like to express my deep gratitude and high appreciation to all those who have contributed to the enrichment of this issue with their valuable research and the essence of their thinking. Wishing all of our readers an interesting and entertaining reading experience, I invite all of you to submit your contributions to enhance our well-respected journal. I beseech Allah the All-Wise to guide us in this effort to make our journal one of the top international journals under the patronage of our wise leadership.



By:

**Staff Lieutenant-Colonel
Yousef Juma Al Hadad**

Editor-in-Chief

Nation Shield Journal

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Saudi-UAE Coordination Council

The Content, Goals and Political-Strategic Implications



The Saudi-UAE Coordination Council, which was announced on 16 May 2016, constitutes a new phase in the history of bilateral relations between the two countries. It reinforces their strategic partnership and, at the same time, highlights the special relationship between the leaderships and people in both countries. The time at which this council was announced reflects the wisdom of leaderships in both countries and The different reactions inside and outside the two countries indicate that this council

will support both GCC and Arab common action. This is based on the belief of leaders of both countries in the importance of strengthening GCC and Arab relations, and on their strategic, political and economic influence. is the strongest response to those who spread malicious rumors about the Saudi-UAE relations. The whole Arab world looks satisfactorily at the new council. It is like the “locomotive” which leads Arab solidarity and consolidates the regional peace and security. The council comes at a highly critical period of time in view

of the nature of challenges that face the Arab world. It represents a growing Saudi-Emirati role towards Arab issues, and a successful policy of countering extremist and terrorist movements which threaten regional stability.

- The Saudi-UAE Coordination Council is a new stage of relations and partnership The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates signed, on 16 May 2016, a MOU to establish the Saudi-UAE Coordination Council, in the presence of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,



King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and His Highness, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, in Salam Palace in Jeddah, KSA. He signing of this agreement highlights the depth of historical, social and cultural relations between UAE and KSA, and the eagerness of their leaderships to proceed with the bilateral relations to a new stage in all fields. The Saudi-UAE Coordination Council aims to at consultation and coordination regarding the issues of mutual concern in all areas. The council will hold periodical meetings alternately between the two countries. The Chairman of the council may set up joint

committees when needed and name their members. These committees hold periodical meetings alternately between the two countries.

While the two countries have a historical partnership with other GCC countries since early 1980's, the UAE-Saudi relations in particular have always been characterized by firm rapprochement. The UAE leadership sees in Saudi Arabia a strategic depth in a fluctuating regional environment. His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces stressed the depth of the bonds between the two sisterly countries based on a strong and common will to achieve

the interests of both countries and enhance their roles in achieving security and stability in the region. He pointed out that the challenges facing the region require double effort and continuous coordinated efforts on and consultation to face foreign agendas and dangers posed by the terrorism and extremism. His Highness Sheikh Mohammed applauded the central role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and his insightful vision of the events in the region. As such, the Saudi-UAE Coordination Council is a qualitative move which consolidates bilateral relations and reflects the shared vision of the



leaderships of both countries. The new council represents a mutual commitment to uphold the responsibility for defense of Gulf and Arab cause. Moreover, the new coordination council will reinforce the strategic partnership between the two countries. Since its formation, the Saudi-UAE Coordination Council has been welcomed by official and public circles, since it embodies the strong relations between the two countries. The tweets of millions of social networking users from both countries have reflected the depth of relations between the two peoples.

- the Saudi-UAE Coordination Council: Many Political and Strategic Messages
- The Saudi- UAE relations

have surpassed the traditional form and moved to a new stage of strategic coordination, which constitutes a quantum leaps in Arab-Arab relations. This council embodies an exceptional state of cooperation between the two states that have stronger mutual bonds than any other Gulf states. Anyone who follows up the evolution of relations between the two countries during the past two years will discover that the foundation of this council is a result of an unprecedented state of political co-understanding between the two countries which manifested itself on 26 March 2015 with the launch of Al Hazem Storm operation, then the strong solidarity between the UAE and Saudi

Arabia in the stand against Iran and Hizbollah after the aggression on the Saudi Embassy in Tahrán, and finally the coordination between the two countries against Al Qaeda in Yemen.

The goals of the new council in the future emphasize that partnership between the two countries is heading toward a new stage, because there is a mutual understanding by the leaderships of both countries of the importance of the unity of bilateral attitudes. This partnership is not limited to political and strategic aspects, it exceeds that to agreement about economic visions.

- The establishment of the Saudi-UAE Coordination Council is the strongest response to those who spread malicious rumors

about the Saudi-UAE relations. The whole Arab world looks satisfactorily at the new council. It is like the “locomotive” which leads Arab solidarity and consolidates the regional peace and security. The council comes at a highly critical period of time in view of the nature of challenges that face the Arab world. It represents a growing Saudi-Emirati role towards Arab issues, and a successful policy of countering extremist and terrorist movements which threaten regional stability.

- This council suggests that the two countries feel the importance of having a rapid mechanism to address urgent issues. Some think that the new council is an attempt to obtain a new tool to overcome the complexities of traditional action mechanisms both in the GCC of the Arab League. A GCC diplomatic source considered that the new

council “is an expression of an unannounced frustration condition on account of the action mechanism of the GCC, which forced the two countries to look for alternatives that expedite action.” Others think that the Saudi-UAE Coordination Council suggests that coordination between the two countries has moved to a very special stage in certain files which require close coordination which would realize quick response and execution of any political or security challenges.

- The new council sends a strict message to any foreign parties which try to disturb the good relations between the two countries or to cause trouble regarding their stands toward the issues of the region, especially to Iran which tries to exploit any differences or disputes between the Gulf and Arab countries. Therefore, the new

council confirms the strength of Saud-UAE relations and the unity of the Gulf countries.

- Having come in a highly sensitive period, the new council will naturally address rapidly many file which are a priority, not only for Saudi Arabia and UAE, but also for other countries in the region, including Yemen, as well as he Iranian intervention in the GCC countries, Syria, and Iraq.

- The Saudi-UAE Cooperation Council and its Impact on Joint Gulf and Arab Action The Agreement on the establishment of the Saudi UAE Coordination Council provides for an important point, namely that the establishment of the Council and the tasks entrusted to it do not affect the obligations and existing cooperation between the Gulf Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States GCC). This is a confirmation of the keenness of the two



countries on the GCC system. There are those who believe that this new council should not be limited to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia only, but must attract the largest possible number of Gulf states in particular, and Arabs in general.

The different reactions inside and outside the two countries indicate that this council will support both GCC and Arab common action. This is based on the belief of leaders of both countries in the importance of strengthening GCC and Arab relations, and on their strategic, political and economic influence. Ambassador Ahmed Ben Helli, Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, said in a statement: «The Arab League supports any rapprochement between any two Arab states in any frame, whether political, economic or social. This council serves the two

countries and the joint Arab action in general.» Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Jarwan, head of the Arab Parliament, lauded the establishment of the Saudi-UAE Coordination Council. AL Jarwan valued the leading role of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, stressing that Coordination Council between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi represents a pivotal support for joint Arab action. The whole Arab world looks satisfactorily at the new council. It is like the «locomotive» which leads Arab solidarity and consolidates the regional peace and security. The council comes at a highly critical period of time in view of the nature of challenges that face the Arab world. It represents a growing Saudi-Emirati role towards Arab issues, and a successful

policy of countering extremist and terrorist movements which threaten regional stability.

this seemed evident in the successful coordination between the two countries in the recent campaign against al Al-Qaeda in Yemen earlier this month (May), which resulted in their expulsion from the city of Mukalla in Hadramout. This confirms that both countries are in agreement on the management of the Yemeni file. This successful campaign against AL Qaeda in Yemen would not have taken place without the joint military action between the two countries, an operation which was described by Gulf observers as «the top of military coordination» between the two countries.



Tahnoon Bin Zayed: The UAE Has a Model Diplomatic Vision and a Wise Foreign Policy





His Highness Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, National Security Advisor, singled out National Defense Magazine with an exclusive press interview. He emphasized that the establishment of the Supreme Council for National Security is in line with the vision of His Highness the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the Founding Father of the UAE, may God rest his soul in peace, and the vision of President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, may God protect him, which enables the UAE to keep up with the developments and changes in the security and strategic environment in the region and the world at large.

HH Sheikh Tahnoon emphasized that the UAE has supported brothers in Yemen

under the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Alliance, based on the principle of supporting the fair and legitimate cause of the Yemeni people and their right to a secure, stable and honorable life.

HH added that our martyrs are a source of pride for us. They are the heroes who guarantee – thanks to God – our honor and glory and raise high the nation's flag. They sacrificed their souls to defend our homeland. They are a source of inspiration for the coming generations, teaching them the sublime meanings of self-sacrifice.

Moreover, the families of martyrs are factories of men of courage. They have brought up their sons and taught them to love and protect their homeland. The UAE prudent leadership is

proud of the nation's martyrs. HH added that the UAE has a leading role in the domain of humanitarian aid, inspired by the vision of His Highness the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the Founding Father of the UAE. This confirms the UAE's commitment, led by President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to its universal humanitarian mission, which encourages and backs all initiatives that help alleviate the suffering of people across the world, especially in areas of wars and conflicts. The UAE has ranked, for the third year in a row, as one of the biggest international donors in the field of development assistance, and the top of the ten biggest donors in the world.



When we talk about the UAE Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS), we mean Your Highness's role as a National Security Advisor. The role of the UAE SCNS is evident in formulating the state sovereign policy decisions and the comprehensive security of the federation has become an integral part of the UAE SCNS. Could you elaborate more on this issue?

The UAE SCNS was established in compliance with the vision of His Highness the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the founder of the federation, and the vision of the President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (May Allah Protect Him). This vision has paved the way for the UAE to keep pace with the changes and developments of the regional and international strategic and security environments. National security should be viewed as a comprehensive concept within the framework of countering challenges and threats at the national, regional

and international levels to ensure the solidarity and security of the federation in all security, economic, social, environmental and cultural issues. The council works on achieving this ultimate goal by coordinating and collaborating with various local and federal institutions to unify concepts and bridge the gaps. The UAE SCNS also focuses on the role of the individual, being the cornerstone of a society, to shoulder the responsibility of protecting national interests and in pursuit of achieving economic prosperity and welfare for the Emiratis, residents, and visitors under the wise leadership of His Highness the President (May Allah Protect Him).

Sir, the UAE is located in a region, which is very rich in natural resources. In turn, there are many countries within the same region, which are suffering unrest and sectarian conflicts in addition to the consequences of the so-

called "Arab Spring", terrorism and extremism. Your Highness, what are the most vital pillars of the UAE national security in terms of their stability and permanence?

The current challenges are no longer confined by any geographical boundaries. Rather, they cross boundaries to include neighboring countries, the region and the world at large. Based on this fact, the UAE philosophy of a comprehensive national security is based on embodying the spirit of solidarity between the wise leadership and the nation. This can be achieved by focusing on the development of the national human resources to ensure their ability to lead the federation's development process and to protect it from such challenges and threats. Moreover, this requires working on knowledge proliferation, economic diversification, building military capabilities, advancement, and establishing robust international relations based on the principles of non-interference in the internal



affairs of other states, peace, moderation, and tolerance of other nations, cultures and civilizations.

Based on an Arab regional consensus, and upon an official request from Yemen, and the international support pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution No 2216, UAE has participated in the Arab alliance "Decisive Storm" led by Saudi Arabia to restore the legitimacy of the elected government of Yemen. Your Highness, how do you see Yemen and what is its impact on the security of GCC States in general and the UAE in particular?

Led by Saudi Arabia and the Arab alliance, UAE has supported its brotherly Yemen based on the principle of supporting the right of the Yemeni people to have a decent life that is characterized by security, stability and dignity. This is the basis of the vision of our wise leadership to provide all types of support to our brothers to restore the legitimacy

of the state and to free it from the decoys of conspirers, as Yemen is an integral part of the Arab and Gulf security at the regional level. Moreover, the role of the UAE in the Arab alliance led by Saudi Arabia has contributed to neutralizing the main instability factors of Yemen such as foreign interference and terrorist organizations. These efforts seek to support security and stability of Yemen and, in turn, regional security. The aim of the UAE response to this case is to contain such threats on the short run and eliminate it on the long-run to ensure the stability of the Yemen security and to prevent such instability factors from spilling over into other countries in the region. I can say that "Decisive Storm" has changed the rule of the game. The Arab alliance has sent a clear message that defined red lines. A message that proves that we will not sit as passive audience towards the Yemeni situation. Furthermore, our message is that we have the

required capabilities and power to change the regional situation to the best, which guarantees the protection of our national interests and the prevention of foreign influence that threaten our national security.

Sir, the UAE has a distinguished foreign policy and diplomacy at the regional and international levels, thanks to the wise leadership of His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of United Arab Emirates and the Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces (May Allah protect Him). How can we invest in such achievement to support national security strategy and to achieve and protect national interests of the UAE?

UAE has an exemplary diplomatic vision and a wise foreign policy based on the vision of the federation's founder, may Allah's peace be upon him. It is characterized by being active, effective and dynamic and is based on principles of a moderate

and well-balanced policy. With these principles, the UAE diplomacy has achieved success pursuant to a well-organized and forward vision that contributes to managing regional crises and plays an active role in overcoming regional threats and challenges such as security and political turmoil, economic and humanitarian crises at the regional and international levels. The UAE has adopted a number of constructive initiatives within the joint Gulf and Arab frameworks. Moreover, it has established a number of regional and international partnerships to protect national security and to achieve the national interests and objectives of the UAE and the growth and stability of the other countries in the region.

Sir, concerning the p5+ 1 agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program, do you think that

this agreement is a step towards achieving stability and security? Is there any GCC reservation on this agreement?

The UAE has historical relations with Iran in addition to the trade and the geographical proximity. The UAE has welcomed the nuclear agreement between Iran and p5+ 1. It expressed its optimism that this agreement will open a new chapter of controlling the nuclear aspirations in the region. The GCC States have an agreed-upon view that Iran's compliance with this agreement should be reflected by its non-interference in the region's affairs. This will be a positive indication on Tehran's willingness to promote regional peace and stability and will address the aspirations of nations in the region of achieving development, growth and prosperity. Our mission is to continue observing the situation and the actions taken by Iran after

removing the sanctions. We hope that Iran will use such resources in developing its economy and infrastructure to the welfare and prosperity of its people.

Your Highness, the UAE youth has demonstrated an exemplary loyalty and sacrifice in serving their country. What do you say about martyrs who sacrificed their lives in the battlefield defending the high interests of the state?

We consider that our martyrs as our source of pride and honor after Allah. They are the heroes who inspire us with dignity, glory and pride. It is they who raised the banner of state high and sacrificed their lives to safeguard it. They are the source of inspiration for the future generation in their sacrifice; they are teaching our youth the highest values of self-sacrifice. Moreover, their families are the home of nobility. Their families



have instilled in them the real love of their country and how to protect its sovereignty and interests.

Our UAE wise leadership is proud of the martyrs of our country. The initiatives of taking care of the martyrs' families launched by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai and his brother, His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, is a model of the leadership's commitment to those heroes who wrote by their pure blood a new chapter in our history.

Sir, the UAE is one of the states which plans to promote economic diversification and minimize the reliance on oil as one of the national economy pillars. What is the status

of the UAE economy in the light of low oil prices and instability in the region?

Economy is one of the most important pillars of national security. UAE did not address this issue from a conventional perspective. Instead, the UAE has worked for many decades on promoting its economy by following new concepts such as sustainability, diversifying sources of energy and sources of income. In this context, it is important to refer to what His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai and his brother, His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, who said: "We will celebrate when we export the last barrel of oil and build a sustainable economy

for future generations." This saying inspires us and we infer from it an important aspect of security strategy from an economic perspective. This indicates the leadership's awareness of the necessity to diversify our sources of income from various means including tourism, trade, industry and investment to create a sustainable national economy that promotes the concept of economic security and contributes to national security from a strategic perspective.

Sir, the UAE is in the lead in providing various humanitarian aids to the world and supporting states and nations in need. How do you see the UAE role in relieving the agony of millions of people throughout all these years?

The UAE is in the lead of humanitarian aids. Its humanitarian vision is inspired by the principles laid down by His Highness the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the founder of the federation. This effort proves the commitment of the UAE led by His Highness the President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to the international humanitarian message which supports all initiatives of alleviating the agony of people around the world particularly who are victims of conflicts and wars. The UAE has ranked, for the third year in a row, as one of the biggest international donors in the field of development assistance, and the top of the ten biggest donors in the world. Our humanitarian efforts to support security and stability was reflected by our pursuit of relieving the misery of nations and reducing the poverty rate. The UAE has created a model for supporting all people whether close or far and without any kind of discrimination. These efforts earned the UAE worldwide respect and appreciation.



The Global Security Laboratory



By:
John R. Ballard, Ph.D.
Dean of the National
Defence College

Each year the National Defense College embarks on specialized strategic security benchmarking visits around the world designed to give our participants the opportunity to compare and contrast different strategic security approaches and to analyze innovative concepts of value to the UAE. This International Field Studies course provides an opportunity for participants to apply what they have learned from NDC within a wider international and multinational context. These trips are far more than orientation visits; they are in fact an effort to use the global strategic security laboratory to conduct research and test hypotheses in the most practical way possible. Participants travel internationally to meet with senior

government officials, visit ministries, universities, Think Tanks, and other national institutions similar to NDC, to evaluate best practices and make strategic recommendations to enhance the security of the UAE.

Practical application activities have to take a central place in the education process of experienced adults to ensure they can practice what they learn, both in the college and outside the classroom. Adults not only learn better by doing, they also enjoy learning by doing much more than simply reading and discussing ideas. Adult learners benefit from practical exercises and practice is a key element in ensuring they learn well and for the longer term. Every premier security

education program includes a mix of practical application, exercises, field visits and simulations of a practical nature. The South African Defence College, the UK Defense Academy, and the U.S. National War College all conduct visits during their programs, as do all three of the security colleges in the People's Republic of China. Every year NDC participants observe security events occurring around the world before their eyes; it would be a missed opportunity not to bring those issues into the learning environment and allow students to practice formulating solutions while at NDC before they have to do so as graduates with real world consequences.

Andragogy is the theory and practice of education of adults. The word is a combination of andro, "man" and ago, meaning to "lead" or "develop;" it developed from the practice of pedagogy (teaching children) to address the specific needs of adults as opposed to teaching children. Using andragogic approaches implies a belief that learners are self-directed; that they are responsible for their learning; that they value self-evaluation and experience and that they want an education that enhances their professional competence. It also implies that the methods used in teaching will be focused on problem solving and will have as a goal the kind pragmatic learning experiences that can provide opportunities to apply what they have learned to enhance work-skills or to effect positive change in the community. It requires a curriculum that is relevant to the issues of the adult's work and more application-based than lecture-based. Andragogic learning is designed to enhance the learner's ability to perform and solve real problems; it is driven by internal motivation and is intended to make progress towards self-actualization. Adults learn best by taking responsibility for what they need to understand and the particular goals it will achieve; learning in a

proper environment and serving as an active participant in the learning process makes adult learning more efficient as well.


Learning style refers to how a person categorizes and processes new information. A person may have multiple preferences in learning style, but the three primary ways people learn are: visual, auditory, and kinesthetic. Real world laboratory work enhances the ability of all three types of learners to analyze the complex modern world. Traditionally, a laboratory is a place where scientific or technological research, experiments, and measurement may be performed under controlled conditions. Laboratories used for scientific research take many forms because of the differing requirements of the various fields of inquiry. A physics laboratory might contain a particle accelerator, while a biologist might use a wet laboratory full of fish, and a psychologist's laboratory might be a room equipped with hidden cameras. The best kind of laboratory for a strategist or a student of national security is the real world; this can be challenging because the real world is an uncontrolled space (things happen that were not planned – such a North Korean missile tests) but such uncertainty is reality in the field of international security affairs.

Prior to departure on International Field Studies, our participants study the national and regional context, and the history, geography and culture of the nations to be visited in order to understand the conditions under which those nations have developed their unique approaches to national security. Our participants attend preparatory sessions at NDC to prepare themselves to analyze the countries to be visited; they then create country briefs to reflect on their analysis and provide input on the entities to be visited in each country and then they develop 25 to 30 informed critical group

questions to direct their inquiry. The country briefs inform the participants of the key elements of the national security situation and national strategies of the countries to be visited. These briefs utilize the framework of analysis taught during NDC's strategic security program to help participants assess and evaluate strategic issues. Then each group determines what gaps in understanding need to be filled for the group to have a full appreciation of the visited country's national strategy and approach. These gaps are addressed by further study but also through the formation of the 25 to 30 critical questions to be used during the trip to fill in those gaps in understanding.

Through finding the answers to their informed questions they can ideally gain the best, focused understanding of the similarities and the differences in the approaches of the countries visited and the UAE. The 25 to 30 Informed Questions are prepared by each group in advance of the trip. Each group's Informed Questions can be asked at multiple opportunities when engaging with country senior leaders and policy makers. The list of such questions is not prescriptive, and may lead to even more questions. Participants must expect to receive different answers to the same questions even in the same entity as many officials have different views. The group determines their questions by identifying the issues deemed most relevant to the improvement of UAE strategies. The key supporting documents used to inform their analysis include "Vision 2021"; UAE Government Strategy 2011 - 2013; Abu Dhabi Vision 2030 and the new UAE Innovation Strategy (1).

These activities improve participant understanding of the complex field of Security Studies.



Security Studies, also known as International Security Studies, advanced rapidly during the Cold War as an academic sub-field of the wider discipline of international relations. At its core, Security Studies seeks to understand the ways individuals, groups and states employ tools of statecraft to prosper and protect themselves from organized violence. Thus subjects can range from weapons and tactics, to individual and group motivations, to the causes of war, nuclear strategy, and multinational relations. Such issues are dynamic and highly complex – a reflection of the real world situations Security Studies attempts to address. In addition, there is wide divergence among scholars concerning security theory (2). Contemporary security studies is therefore as contentious as it is important (3). As Security Studies is an arena of adult practice, adult learning techniques are the most effective way of really understating its issues.


When they return from their travels in the international field study course,

NDC participants: brief the results of their benchmarking evaluation, and make recommendations for changes to UAE strategies in a formal presentation designed for national leaders. The term benchmark comes from the chiseled marks that surveyors used to make in stone structures to ensure that tools could be accurately repositioned in the future. Today, benchmarking is most commonly used to compare performance between two similar objects or processes using a common standard of comparison (cost per unit of measure, performance per capita, expenditure relevant to GDP, etc.) Security Benchmarking is the process of comparing one's own security processes and performance metrics to international best practices from other countries.

In our process of benchmarking, we seek to identify the best practices in a security category (defense, diplomacy, economics, information management, etc.) where similar circumstances or processes exist, and then compare the results and

processes of those studied with the efforts in the UAE. In this way, we can learn how well the others perform and, more importantly, the security processes that explain why other nations are successful. There is no single benchmarking process that has been universally adopted, but the strong appeal of benchmarking has led to the creation of several well-accepted methodologies. One seminal book is Robert Boxwell's *Benchmarking for Competitive Advantage* (4).

Robert Camp (who wrote one of the best books on benchmarking in 1989) (5) developed an approach to benchmarking that includes: selecting the topic(s)/problem area(s), defining the process(es), identifying sources of data, collecting data, determining gaps, identifying process differences, targeting future goals, communicating strategies and reviewing and adjusting moving forward. Benchmarking can be applied to any process or function, and a range of research techniques may be required, including informal conversations with employees,



exploratory research techniques using focus groups or marketing research, quantitative research, surveys, questionnaires, or even process mapping. Before embarking on any comparison with another nation, it is essential to understand its geostrategic context, national interests and strategy. Helpful hints for effective analysis include: identifying other nations that have similar problems, identifying nations that are global leaders in appropriate areas according to the World Bank or the United Nations, visiting the countries with "best practices" to identify leading edge approaches. Strategic benchmarking also involves understanding how others compete. This can be challenging as most nations don't want to fully reveal these strategies but it can be done with focused analysis. Functional benchmarking to improve the operation of that particular function (trade policy, innovation, information technology, education, healthcare) can also be accomplished with a bit more expert insight into the function itself even though complex functions may not

be easy to directly comparable in cost and efficiency terms.

There is a real need for this type of practical, global laboratory research. The world is increasingly competitive, resources are shrinking, populations are growing and the margins for prosperity require ever more sophisticated approaches. Those nations that innovate and ensure improvement will prosper whereas those who are complacent may be superseded and incur a loss of economic viability or even a loss of security. Effective security benchmarking can identify additional ways to reach national goals or better processes to improve the rate of performance. It could also identify weaknesses in our own security posture that we have not yet identified. Therefore, the outcomes could be vital for national prosperity and the benefits could be both tangible and significant. These are the kinds of improvements that graduates of the National Defense College should be marking for the UAE. Field studies international travel should remain a keystone of the adult educational environment at

the NDC, both in order to ensure the best, most relevant learning by our participants and for the betterment of the UAE.

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The Latest Nuclear Agreement:

Threat or Opportunity for the UAE?

How Can We Contain Iran After Lifting Sanctions?



After long negotiations, the P5+1 (United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, Germany and the United States) agreed to lift sanctions imposed on Iran in return for Iran's commitment to stop pursuing its nuclear weapon program. The agreement did not refer to Iran's hostile actions in the region, which is a vital consideration for the stability of the Middle East (Harvard Kennedy School, 2015). Frozen Iranian assets worth over 100 billion US dollars will be released (Garver, 2015); Iran will be able to trade freely with the world and to export its oil to other countries. The lifting of sanctions has triggered fierce debate internationally. Would this agreement create a more hostile Iran or a more integrated regime and thereby a more stable Middle East?

The United Arab Emirates, one of the GCC countries seeking a more stable and prosperous Gulf region, is struggling with Tehran's foreign policy. This is due to: Iran's occupation of the three disputed UAE islands, Iranian support for militant groups

in the region, their backing of Shi'a separatists in Bahrain and Kuwait, and not to mention the support of Houthis in Yemen which all constitute an ongoing concern for the UAE. At the same time, there is the potential for significant trade growth between the UAE and Iran, which can be an opportunity for more economic benefits for the UAE.

There are a number of interpretations among politicians. One side considers the agreement as a present with which the US is rewarding Iran despite its behavior in the MENA region, which will drive Iran in creating more volatility in the region by using the freed-up frozen assets. Others consider the deal as a way to re-integrate Iran into the international world, which will lead to a more open and less hostile regime. Economists, from their part, find sanctions lifting a great opportunity to move into the massive Iranian market, which is striving for goods and services. Energy enthusiasts are alarmed that resumed Iran oil production will strain the unstable oil market and in turn, it will create more tensions in the oil producing countries. For a long time, the containment strategy proved to be a viable alternative when dealing with pariah states, the UAE can benefit from the opportunities emerging from the deal and at the same time take a series of measures to prevent Iran from expanding its influence and supporting proxy wars in the region.

The lifting of sanctions and freeing frozen assets will provide Iran with the resources to increase military spending, step up support for local proxies and resume covert operations, including weapons' sales and training in the Gulf States. Moreover, Iran is expected to escalate its cyberwarfare against GCC and western countries' companies and government facilities. In addition, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander will have the assets to increase military support for the Assad regime. Moreover, it will create a near term nuclear arms race in the Middle East, especially with the GCC countries which feel threatened by the Iranian nuclear program, not to

mention the danger posed by Iran's long range missile program which it continues to test, despite international opposition.

The P5+1 deal, nevertheless, can open the door to Gulf business operations. Iran imports about 35 billion US dollars from the region, with most of this re-exported from the UAE. After lifting sanctions and integrating Iran with international markets, Iran's imports could soar to about 200 billion US dollars from 80 billion US dollars in 2014, according to Merrill Lynch predictions (Jones and Parasie, 2015). Sanctions lifting will create great economic opportunities for the UAE, with its superb location and world-class infrastructure. The UAE can play a vital role in connecting Iran with the world via its well-developed airlines forming an export hub. In addition, Iranian firms can conduct their financial operations through the UAE banking system, and the real estate market will be boosted since it is very attractive to Iranian citizens.

Developing a common GCC trade policy with Iran and creating some form of interdependence will influence Tehran on the long run to exchange perspectives and be less hostile over other issues such as their hostility in the region and the occupied three UAE islands. In addition, such a move could indirectly help to change perceptions of the sectarian divide between the GCC and Iran. Similarly, Oman and Qatar might be more in favor of such a policy given their cordial relations with Iran.

George Kennan wrote the following in August 1948, "Those areas of the world which...we cannot permit... to fall into hands hostile to us, and... we should put forward, as the first specific objective of our policy and as an irreducible minimum of national security, the maintenance of political regimes in those areas at least favorable to the continued power and independence of our nation" (Gaddis, 1952). Therefore, to match



ends with means and to establish sound security strategy especially in tough times where oil prices are declining, the United Arab Emirates should weigh alternatives on how to stop Iran's hostility in the region. Can the UAE get involved in every proxy war Iran initiates? On the other hand, can it pursue a strategy of containment to trigger change and benefit from the opportunities emerging from the deal? In addition, the UAE should prioritize what countries in the region could be protected against the Iranian influence or make them adopt pro-Tehran policies. That would mean stabilizing those countries and establishing political regimes which are consistent with GCC policies and integrate them within our system. In a world of declining oil prices and more stress on resources, the UAE should be careful where to invest in security and enter in confrontation to stop the Iranian expansion. The latest war in Yemen has proved that war is a prolonged and costly solution to stop Iran's hostility in the region, and opening new fronts such as the case in Syria will be even more costly and there is a question whether the UAE can sustain to be involved in two or more wars, on different fronts, at the same time. Hence, when dealing with Iran at a time when they will get more assets after the lifting of sanctions requires pursuing a sound and a



balanced strategy of 'carrot and stick'.

The UAE's containment strategy against Iran should be based primarily on preventing Iran from spreading its ideological beliefs and creating hostility in the region. However, this containment strategy can be coupled with ongoing military action such as in Yemen to show Tehran that their intrusive actions will not be tolerated in the region. So how do we apply containment? The UAE's first priority is to unite GCC foreign policy on regional stability issues. The latest alignment with Saudi Arabia has proven to be successful as a unified

effort against a common enemy. This unity will send a strong message to Iran and the world that when dealing with the GCC, its members hold one common viewpoint and close ranks in tough times. The Iranians cannot afford war but they would like to cause instability and benefit from the divide within GCC countries, as Winston Churchill acknowledged about the Russians that they did not want war, but they want "the fruits of war and indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines" (Gaddis, 2005).

Secondly, the UAE should develop a wider alliance by involving more powerful players which will



signal for a stronger Arab alliance in the future due to the fact that Egypt, for example, has a long history of leadership of the Arab world in troubled times. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already invested heavily to contribute to Egypt's stability and to build up its economy and military. This will enhance GCC power which is essential for Iran's deterrence, especially when it is supported by broader Arab alliances with Jordan and Morocco, for example, in the future. Turkey is another country that can be drawn closer to the GCC to benefit from its political and economic power and can advance the GCC's

foreign policy agenda.

Thirdly, to compel the Iranian will, the UAE should continue pursuing a powerful military to show Tehran that more hostility in the region can be costly and that the diplomatic initiatives the UAE is seeking to solve the issues is not coming from a weak position rather than a desire to promote peace in the region. Continuing military action to eliminate the spread of Iranian influence and power in key areas adjacent to GCC borders will help restore stability and economic development in the area. While at the same time, leveraging economic power can be waged to

pressure the USA and Russia to enter political dialog to contain Iran's influence in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. The latest Yemen campaign has proved the GCC unity of military effort, while Saudi Arabia is promoting a wider alliance to fight terror and Iran's atrocities in the region. Lately, Saudi Arabia announced that it was forming a new "Islamic military alliance" devoted to fighting global terrorism and conducted North Thunder Exercise which sent strong messages to Iran that their destabilizing behavior in the region will not be tolerated.

Fourthly, targeting the Iranian population by economic integration and attracting more elites to be impressed by the high standard of living in the UAE will promote a groundswell for democratic change inside Iran and will influence the Iranian government to show more flexibility to enter negotiations to ease hostility which will further democracy in the long term. Finally, more integration of the Shi'a population in the GCC society is required along with a prudent appointment to high positions in the government so the Shia communities within the GCC to eliminate their loyalty to Tehran and to ensure that they do not feel neglected and excluded from the countries' development programs.

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By:


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UAE and Russia Future Relations

Russia and the United Arab Emirates have auspicious diplomatic relationships since 1971; however, the development of bilateral relationships between the two countries has become evident since 2003. For the past decade, significant progress has been achieved in various areas of collaboration. In the





last few years, the total amount of the mutual investments between the countries has exceeded US \$18 billion. The non-oil goods exchange is considered to be of significant interest, and is regarded to be one of the indicators on further collaboration. The overall turnover in cross-countries trade has achieved US \$ 2.5 billion, and as the collaboration will continue, the financial indicators are expected to increase.

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East is unsettling. It calls for the UAE to take a defensive position, and at the same time seek to provide alternatives that help bring and sustain peace in the region. The US foreign policy in the region has become vague and the UAE needs to diversify its strategic partners to hedge against any changes in US policy in the region. A close relationship with Russia is critical to diffuse any threats from Iran against

the UAE and the region.

Russia is one of the major players in the Middle East, having a direct political influence on the countries in the region. Russia is capable of negotiating with parties involved in the Syrian conflict and can pave the way for negotiations with Iran. Another conflict hotbed is Iraq, where both Russia and the UAE are undertaking efforts to boost the governance capacity of the officially recognized government as they help to fight terrorism.

Investing in Russia is an alternative to relying on Western countries for economic growth and development. Moreover, it will help Russia strengthen its economy. The current pledges and actual investments are about 6 billion USD and the continuity of investments will help bolster the UAE interests. In addition to general infrastructure investments, the two countries could cooperate on energy-related investments because of their capacities as suppliers and





consumers of nuclear technology, natural gas and oil. Furthermore, a bilateral tax treaty also makes it easy for investors from both countries to work together in either country. The UAE offers room for growth in its real estate and tourism as well as energy, sports and defense industries, while Russia has excellent opportunities for infrastructure development in global projects of energy, transport

and tourism which will reduce the risk in investing in the Russian economy only.

Both the UAE and Russia see the Gulf region as a viable outlet for their excess capital gained from trade in natural resources. They are geared towards protecting this investment opportunity and will be willing to fight off any instability. The U.S. has been less elaborate in its participation in

trade and investment in the region and has concentrated much on political power expressions. The use of direct military action has only been successful in limited incidences, and there is an increased need to focus on economic development to counter the social pressures that lead to armed conflicts. Thus, investment and trade are the right opportunities for UAE-Russia relations to follow.



After Russia annexed Crimea, the EU and the U.S. imposed sanctions on it and this has affected Russia's economic prosperity. Russia was predicted to go into a recession as early as 2014 but it has somehow managed to avoid the threat of economic stagnation. Nevertheless, the threat looms. The major banks in Russia are operating under difficult circumstances because they have been blacklisted and cannot get credit from EU and U.S. banks and other financial institutions. On the other hand, small and medium sized enterprises in Russia have started to feel the heat of a tightening credit market and the number of loan defaults is increasing. Russian state banks have to look elsewhere other than the EU for raising long-term loans. Russia cannot also export dual-use equipment for military use to the EU. Notably, Russia is one of the largest weapon manufacturers in the world.

Reports show that sanctions could cause the Russian economy to shrink by as much as 9%. Other factors contributing to the shrinkage include the collapsing oil prices. This trend began in 2014 and seems not to have reached an end. Thus, the incentives for Russia agreeing to increased economic cooperation with the UAE are great. The country is desperate for alternative sources

of capital. The response by Russia to the economic crisis caused by sanctions has been to increase interest rates and to sell dollars and euros to improve the value of the Ruble. It has also cut government spending, but this move can only work in the short-run. Eventually, there will be a need for infusing more capital and that is where the increased investments from the UAE will be critical.

Russia and Iran have an alliance of convenience. Iran is interested in getting technologies for building its military facilities and equipment. It has even procured several ships from Russia. In addition, many Russian firms are investing in Iran's technology sectors given that Iran too is a recipient of Western sanctions because of its nuclear programs. Meanwhile, on the Syrian conflict, both Iran and Russia are interested in protecting President Assad's rule. Russian influence led to the inclusion of Iran in the talks to end the Syrian conflicts. However, their long-term interests are divergent. Russian military power and support of the Syrian president as well as its investments in Iran give it power over Iran.

One complexity of the UAE-Russia relationships will be the trade-offs in the current US-UAE relationships. The U.S. has been making inroads into Iran, seeking to lift restrictions on its nuclear program. This was in exchange for cooperation for its interests in the region. It will upset the UAE for going against its interests to support Russia, which is under sanctions from the U.S. This can lead to deteriorating diplomatic conditions which may reduce the incentives of U.S.-backed interests in the UAE.

A balanced approach between U.S. backed investment and trade in the interest areas of Russia will ensure that trade and investment relations are not affected and that the UAE does not have to make any trade-offs. However, given the position of the U.S. as the world's superpower, the political hegemony

in the region will be threatened and this will lead to political foreign policy conflicts between the U.S. and any Russian allies. Although currently the U.S. considers the UAE as an ally in its fight against global terrorism, this move towards Russia will create possible political tension. Therefore, the UAE needs to be ready to bear the political heat. However, the non-membership status of the UAE in NATO will help to cushion it against adverse effects of its strong relations with Russia when stating its support for peace and reconstruction in the Middle East such as the war against ISIS and the Syrian conflict.

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Cyber Security:

Controlling Insider Threats



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Edward Snowden was a former CIA employee and a US government contractor with access to highly classified files. He copied information from the United States National Security Agency (NSA) and United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and released it to several public news companies in 2013. The leaked information revealed amongst others numerous classified global surveillance programs and classified NSA and GCHQ intelligence capabilities. He was able to access the information since he had a high-level security clearance to do his work as a security analyst. The media has extensively covered these disclosures.

The incident with Snowden was not only one of its kinds. Recently released reports find that over the past ten years almost 50% of all organizations have faced cyber incidents by insiders. Globally 89% of organizations believe that they are not controlling insider threats well enough, and 34% of these

organizations believe themselves to be very or extremely vulnerable to insider threats. In addition, 55% of organizations believe that the highest insider risk comes from privileged users, such as administrators. This was the case with Edward Snowden as well. He had in practice an administrative level access to classified information for several years.

Malicious insider is defined by the US-CERT as "a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who meets the following criteria:

- Has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data
- Has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems "

According to the studies the most common crimes committed by insiders are:

- Unauthorized access to or use

of corporate information

- Unintentional exposure of private or sensitive data
- Viruses, worms, or other malicious code
- Theft of intellectual property

The US-CERT Insider Threat Center lists following 19 best practices base in analysis of over 700 case studies to help in preventing, detecting, and responding to insider threats. These best practices are not purely information technology, and communications focused but fall under other organizational functions as well, such as human resources, legal, and physical security.

The 19 best practices listed by the US-CERT for insider threats are:

1. Consider threats from insiders and business partners in enterprise-wide risk assessments.
2. Clearly document and consistently enforce policies and controls.
3. Incorporate insider threat awareness into periodic security training for all employees.
4. Beginning with the hiring process, monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.
5. Anticipate and manage negative issues in the work environment.
6. Know your assets.
7. Implement strict password and account management policies and practices.
8. Enforce separation of duties and least privilege.
9. Define explicit security agreements for any cloud services, especially access restrictions and monitoring capabilities.
10. Institute stringent access controls and monitoring policies on privileged users.
11. Institutionalize system change controls.
12. Use a log correlation engine or security information and event management (SIEM) system to log, monitor, and audit employee actions.
13. Monitor and control remote access from all end points, including mobile devices.
14. Develop a comprehensive employee termination procedure.
15. Implement secure backup and

recovery processes.

16. Develop a formalized insider threat program.
17. Establish a baseline of normal network device behavior.
18. Be especially vigilant regarding social media.
19. Close the doors to unauthorized data exfiltration.

The IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Quarterly Q42015/ report further adds weight to the required controls by raising insider threats and especially privileged users as the one of the four main security trends of 2015. Their recommendations to control this threat are very practical well known to all information security practitioners:

- All administrators should have their own username and password and always use them to perform normal administrative tasks.
- Password sharing between team members should be prohibited.
- If prohibiting shared administrative accounts is not an option, they should be limited to the bare minimum. Their usage and the activity performed by them should be monitored closely.
- Passwords should be reset periodically.

The US-CERT insider threat best practices are aligned with ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST SP80053-information assurance frameworks. These frameworks are the basis of UAE federal NESA Information Assurance Framework, thus allowing organization in UAE to easily align insider controls with the governmental information security requirements. The insider threat best practices are further described in Carnegie Mellon University and US CERT publication "Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats 4th Edition".

To conclude it must be noted that implementing controls to mitigate insider threats without considering the common pitfalls can have serious unintended side effects. An organization can become too aggressive in its insider monitoring and investigation. This can result

in employee disgruntlement and actually raise the insider threats. Disgruntled insiders can for example harm the organization's reputation by describing it as overly controlling and thus make hiring of qualified individuals more difficult. Or the organization might spend large amounts of time and money to insider threat protections only to find large number of false threat leads. This can cause management to eventually stop supporting the insider threat program, thus leaving the real insider threats without proper control. Communicating clearly and transparently enough to the staff and directors, and training the responsible staff properly can mitigate both pitfalls. Carnegie Mellon University and US-CERT publication "Effective Insider Threat Programs: Understanding and Avoiding Potential Pitfalls" describes the most common unintended consequences, pitfalls and their respective practical mitigation techniques.

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The Use of Urban Planning in Counterterrorism

Introduction

The recent terrorist attacks that targeted crowded places in Brussels, Paris, Istanbul and Ankara have shown that urban planning, shaped with a protective security approach, for such places is essential. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, urban planning has become increasingly the subject of various methods of control especially with respect to security measures, which are starting to take precedence over hitherto purely urban planning considerations. In recent years, growing concerns about international terrorism has led to rapid increases in security

measures and ideas of security and resilience have been inserted into urban planning best practice around the world.

Unfortunately, security issues and countering terrorism rarely gain adequate attention in city planning priorities. In the past, urban planners were mainly active in making decisions that cover land use and the design of community facilities, infrastructure, transportation and environment. The process of incorporating security measures into urban planning has a long history, but city planners can rarely get these priorities into city objectives. Accordingly, this capstone project

looks at the use of urban planning in countering terrorism and how this can add value to the state.

Effective planning of the built environment is central to community safety and protective security. Therefore, city planners need to be involved in planning to mitigate hazards and in reconstruction after catastrophes. According to the Policy Guide on Security (American Planning Association 2005), early efforts in this regard led to the development of several planning concepts such as defensible spaces, eyes on the street and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). After the terrorist



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High	This risk is the one which generates the highest concern. Comprehensive action is required as a high priority to reduce vulnerability, wherever possible and proportionate.
Medium-High	The consequences of the risk materialising would be substantial. Action is required as a priority to mitigate the risk, wherever possible and proportionate.
Medium	Local area is uneasy about carrying this risk. The risk is not substantial and can be managed via contingency plans. Status of risk should be monitored regularly.
Low	The risk should be addressed if possible and contingency plans are required. This risk should be managed at local level.



attacks of September 11, 2001, many security and counterterrorism measures were applied on an ad hoc basis without doing a proper evaluation of the impact of such measures on communities and developments within the cities.

Public spaces, transit points, streetscapes, urban buildings, energy infrastructure systems were all affected by exaggerated security measures such as having security stations at each entrance of shopping malls or public spaces, having concrete barriers to separate the roads from the important places majority of American cities and some European cities have exaggerated overt security measures. Good planning is central to community safety and protective security. Such exaggeration of security measures can also be seen in India, Turkey and several countries whenever you enter any mall or crowded places to see clearly the security arrangements were ad hoc security.

Counterterrorism is more than security/intelligence teams and police responses as such responses are insufficient to protect cities. For this reason, the state must also employ urban planning measures in order to defend its security. Urban planning, shaped with a security mindset, is increasingly vital to have secure cities and to counter-terrorism.

Protecting Urban Areas

The argument is that a state should never think that the process of urban planning is simply a task of urban planners. Important lessons can be learned from the Dutch use of a landscape plan designed as a defense line (1568 - 1648) – The Defense Line of Amsterdam. During the 80 Years War against the Spanish government, a large number of strongholds and forts were built on strategic locations. The Dutch connected a network of armed forts, locks, barracks, dikes and depots with a remarkable defensive ring to create a defense line against the occupying forces. According to

Counter-terrorism design principles	Examples of measures
Better blast resistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> external barriers or a strengthened perimeter to prevent a penetrative (ramming) or close proximity (parked or encroachment) attack; use of building materials which reduce the risk of fragmentation including blast resistant glazing and structural design which reduces the risk of building collapse; and install doors and locks which are better able to withstand entry from armed intruders and provide robust ground floor facade material, which together will help to provide cover for people caught up in a firearms attack.
Better building management facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> entrance arrangements which resist hostile entry; the separation of general heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems for entrance areas, delivery areas and mailrooms from those occupying the main occupied spaces; air intakes that are in a secure area and above first floor level; hazardous material stores that are at a safe distance from the building; and communications systems (eg public address systems) installed to pass on advice to those caught up in a firearms attack.
Better traffic management and hostile vehicle mitigation measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> structural measures that prevent access to, or close proximity of, unscreened vehicles to the building or space; and measures that reduce the speed of vehicles approaching the site or its defences, like bends or chicanes.
Better oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> clear lines of sight around a building; absence of recesses on the façade or elevations of a building; uncluttered street furniture; well maintained and managed litter-free building surrounds that reduce the opportunity for suspicious hidden items and suspect activity to go unnoticed; CCTV and security guarding to provide formal oversight; orientating the building so that it overlooks public space and neighbouring buildings to support informal oversight by those who use and visit the location; and well managed access points and reception facilities that offer less opportunity for intruders to go undetected and may deter them from taking further action.

Figure 3: Typical Counter-terrorism Protective Security Measures -

Extracted from HM


the World Heritage Centre “Since the 16th century, the people of the Netherlands have used their expert knowledge of hydraulic engineering for defence purposes. The centre of the country was protected by a network of 45 armed forts, acting in concert with temporary flooding from polders and an intricate system of canals and locks.” The defense line has different types of landscape and the landscape ranges from grasslands, lakes, rivers to sandy soils. Such varieties of landscape have tended to be important for military and urban planners. The defense line used water to slow down or prevent flooding and to deter potential enemies. It showcased the integration between military and security measures with urban planning. In such a case, the combination of technical, military and security skills led to an effective defensive urban environment. The combination of the needed skills will not necessarily lead to such

success unless you have effective coordination and collaboration between the agencies.

How to Tackle Terrorism

In general, the urban planning assessment will identify the risks and vulnerability ratings allocated to a crowded place but can the risks be tackled? An important step to deal with the risks is to have the following elements: effective involvement from the concerned agencies, effective monitoring and implementation agencies, responsive financial systems and political will. It is essential to set a clear vision of how the state will tackle the risks and share its vision with stakeholders. That vision will ensure that all agencies’ activities are coordinated and aligned to achieve the ultimate objectives. Such alignment and coordination will simplify the government’s role in prioritizing the risks and then tackling them. This will minimize the threat

Figure 4: Crowded Places Stages and Tasks



of terrorist attacks. Many agencies have reached the conclusion that supporting the government's "collective approach" will allow the community to enhance national security objectives.

It is essential to have a clear vision of how the state will look in the future to ease controlling challenges and threats. That vision will ensure that all developmental activities (city planning and defense planning) are coordinated to achieve the ultimate goal. Such alignment will simplify the government role in prioritizing the necessary basic measures and will attract investment across all sectors. Such attractions will lead us to reach our national policies; united in prosperity and united in knowledge.

Analysis

Urban Planning and Counter Terrorism

First, we need to identify the favorable target locations for terrorism. Crowded places are the most encouraging locations or environments that should be considered vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of their public

accessibility and crowd density. Urban planning role should start from the pre-planning stage of any development project in order to encourage the community to consider safety and security early in the development.

Second, the involvement for counter-terrorism should start with land use compatibility (instrument) at different scales. According to Abu Dhabi Safety and Security Planning Manual (SSPM): "Land use compatibility should be considered at all development scales, whether the project is a master plan involving numerous plots, a single plot development, or even when spatially planning a single building within a plot." It is important to consider the relationships between the types of land use, locations and adjacencies to determine if they create any security threats. Such involvement will lead to the identification of security risks, as shown in Fig 1, for each development phase and will generate risk severity estimation. Particular care is required when considering allocating land uses that tend to generate high risk. Third, assessing the risk is a vital stage

in countering terrorism and such assessment will be generated for the purposes of prioritizing counter-terrorism protective security activity.

Fourth, identifying the urban design principles will be a critical tool to do the above assessment, which is another instrument to assist in counter-terrorism. According to HM Government (2012), there are seven urban design principles for well-designed places and spaces; character, continuity and enclosure, quality of public realm, ease of movement, legibility, adaptability and diversity

By applying the above design principles, we can generate assessment for the purposes of prioritizing of counter-terrorism protective security activity. Upon completing the assessment, the government should tackle first the highest risks and the biggest impact. The urban design principles can be applied in any development (new or existing) and the result will determine the level of risk severity. The risk summary in Fig. 2 shows the risk matrix extracted from SSPM:

From the above risk summary, the most critical risk for the development



Figure 5: Proposed Structure and Process



Figure 6: Roles and Responsibilities

is risk 1 and it needs to be tackled first. Fifth, the concerned agency will identify the risks that need to be tackled and implement a plan to overcome them. The only way to reduce the vulnerability of any development is the coordination between the government agencies.

Sixth, the urban planning and security agencies will advise the developer to apply a range of

measures which reflects the risks that the development will create. According to HM Government (2012) there are four counter-terrorism design principles – see figure 3 – that will help to deter a terrorist, detect an intrusion, or delay an intrusion for a sufficient time to have a proper response:

The figure 4 summarizes the development stages and tasks that

need to be carried in order to have secure and resilient plan

From the above, we have been able to identify the role of urban planning in counter-terrorism and the urban design principles and we identified the development stages and the required tasks. There are six stages that will create secure and attractive places and sustainable environment and infrastructure (objectives).

Recommendation and Conclusion

A crisis or problem in Dubai is considered as a UAE crisis or problem. Countering terrorism should be addressed by the federal government instead of the local governments. The UAE Government needs to ensure that all entities are considering national security in a strategic way. The government needs to consider creating a new forum for urban planning security risk decisions. In this way the organization could advise the Cabinet Office "risk owner" on the most effective and resilient risk strategies. The risk owner could then delegate counter-terrorism issues to this new body as the main forum for collective discussion of the government's objectives for national security and about how best to deliver the objectives in the current situation. The new entity will be the "risk manager" and it will be responsible to keep the UAE safe and secure.

To succeed in counter-terrorism across the UAE, the state needs to identify proper and reliable chain of command. To do so, the ownership of such risk should be the highest authority in the UAE. The recommended approach is to let the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) to be the risk owner. The risk manager will be the new recommended agency will report to SCNS and will coordinate between all entities within the government (federal and local ones). Figure 5 below, illustrates the proposed workflow between agencies and the roles in handling the terrorism threat.

Recommended Roles and Responsibilities:

The risk owner will act as single intelligence committee and will ensure the crafting of strategy for counter-terrorism, develop national strategic assessment, and set strategic priorities. In addition, the risk owner gathers key ministers, intelligence chiefs and military personnel under the lead of National

Security Advisor in order to ensure that all ministerial and entities' strategies are aligned together and deliver a coherent strategic approach across the government on national security matters.

It is suggested that this new agency or committee will be in charge of the coordination and decision-making concerning crowded places and at risk sites (see figure 2). The team will help to better understand the risk; better linkage between all aspects and easing the planning processes; better integration of information; preserve adaptable knowledge philosophy. The mix of expertise will be a valuable tool for leadership to reduce risks, to improve their problem solving and to enhance the decision making process in city planning.

The lesson learned from the British experience is that the new organization's mandate will be to support the protection of crowded places and vulnerable or at risk spaces. The agency will consist of security, military, planning, economic, and political knowledge, as all are crucial to have secure and resilient cities. The new body will enhance the measures that need to be applied in city planning, as it will be coordinated across all members of the new agency. This coordination will help to minimize duplication of resources.

The implementation agencies for the new structure will be urban planning agency, municipalities, transport agency, and security agency. Their role will start from classifying the crowded places, land allocation, assist in risk management, reviewing the counter-terrorism principles, identifying the risks that need to be added to the threat analysis and implement a plan to handle it in coordination with the risk manager.

Roles and Responsibilities

The recommended body will act in a "red teaming" capacity for the state as it will be viewing the problem

from an adversary's perspective and act as devil's advocate in urban planning. Using red teaming varies in purpose and scope according to the context and situations (6).

Conclusion

One of the most challenging security threats in urban planning is the protection of crowded urban places from terrorism. Urban planners are active in the decision-making process that relates to city planning. However, they are rarely involved in security issues and countering terrorism in the city environment. Many counterterrorism measures have been applied on an ad hoc basis without a rigorous assessment of the impact of such measures on the public. The combination of the essential elements - planning, security/intelligence and political - skills, effective coordination between agencies across the government, craft strategy for counter terrorism and developing national strategic assessment are key to create a resilient urban environment. In order to have effective governance and to secure and resilient state, the UAE needs to establish a new organization that protects crowded places, coordinates a strategic and coordinated approach to national security matters and to act as a "red teaming" body. Lastly, the roles and responsibilities should be clear and the state needs to identify the "risk owners" and the "risk managers" and assigned responsibilities to the concerned agencies to contribute to the strategy using its capability. This research paper will provide the framework for an integrated national security policy that combines urban planning considerations with an identification of how to counteract the threat of terrorism without compromising the quality of life in the urban environment.

Demography Changes: Impact on UAE's Future Productivity Projection 2015 - 2050



By:

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Introduction

Globalization rise demands talented workforce to improve national productivity and achieve economic prosperity. Lööf, Hans. 2013 explained that globalization interactions and lifestyle threatens society's ability to maintain the supply for the global and local market demand of a talented workforce. At the same time building local economic resilience requires sustaining the knowledge sharing and nurturing innovation development. As consequence nations with rapid economic growth show a greater increase in the number of immigrants such as China and Brazil. Where national demography and aging increase another type of threat related to the workforce structure. For example, as a result of elderly population European countries are more than ever are in need to attract a more talented workforce to increase their market capacity and value.

UAE national productivity is threatened by the globalization impact and demography imbalance which decrease national total productivity. As an evolving issue it requires conducting future productivity forecast; analysis of economic activities magnitude, measure the of change in workforce demography and gross domestic production (GDP) expected growth. Consequently, workforce productivity (WFP) analysis requires future policy impact review.

Using the Global Millennium development goals methods, the study revealed a significant differences between the World Bank estimations and UAE citizens 2050 workforce demographics study results. This forecasting have implications on the economic investment strategies, retirement's policies, migrant market, and workforce talent policies.



Figure 1- Top five expatriate origin countries population in UAE

Problem statement

The security of the national productivity is threatened by globalization impact on demography imbalance. Therefore, as an evolving issue it requires deep review of the forecast GDP and future demography characteristics projection in order to enable for better assessment of the UAE grand policy strategy toward knowledge base society and economic prosperity.

The main threats associated with the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) are within two dimensions: demography and economy. From demography prospective the main concerns are: mortality, fertility rate, and change in age group structure. From economic prospective the main concerns are: GDP future value (real price), retirement investment, economic activity productivity.

Research question

- What are the national grand policy implications?
- What is the 2050 population & GDP forecast?
- What are the importance in Workforce population demography changes?
- What are the impact of taxation and inflation on GDP forecast calculation?

Literature review

The 2008 financial crisis made significant impact on the global

market productivity. Furceri and Annabelle, (2012) study proves that the financial crisis has impacted the output of the economies negatively and permanently. Over all the financial crisis lower the global economic output 1.5 – 2.4%. However, the productivity of the non-oil workers does represent a crucial global comparison indicator for the investment spending efficiency and long term development strategy performance.

UAE still remain one of the most attractive locations for foreigner workers and their families, which explains continues increase in foreigners numbers; the top five expatriate nationalities by origins in the UAE as reported by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in are India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt and Philippines as seen in the following figure:

Figure 1- Top five expatriate origin countries population in UAE


In comparison to the international migrant recipient countries the GCC countries productivity is performing the lowest where the non-GCC Oil countries are performing the best. The following bar graph describes the productivity performance of the non –oil per worker output from the year 2000 till 2013. In this case the figure shows that UAE is performing the lowest and Kazakhstan is performing the best.

Result and discussion

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) staff define it as “The growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per person employed is defined as the growth rate of output per unit of labour input”. (ILO, 2012). The interdependency of the national productivity on the forecasted GDP requires the exploration of the interdependency between forecast GDP, inflation and value added tax (VAT). On the other hand the study also to explore the interdependency of the workforce population growth on the population dependency and population fertility rate.

The performance of the total factor productivity growth is mainly effected by the country chosen development model that has employed less educated foreign workers and low paid in most cases (Staff of IMF, 2014). The nominator for the TFP is the GDP and the dominator is the number of population group 15- 60 years old. There are other methods that depends on sample survey that calculates the total labour productivity base on time and wages. This type of calculation is useful to calculate past or present but not seen used in projection and future long term estimates. Our study uses the productivity methods in line with UN Millennium Goal Development measures. The benefit

Figure 2- Workforce population projection 2015 - 2050



of this calculation are two first it uses it represent better the contribution of the activities to the GDP and uses the potential population age from 15 - 60 age group as the dominator which reveal better the potential country capabilities and recruitment limitations.

Population dimension

The national population is forecasted using software named Spectrum 4 to establish the lifetables and required configuration details. The following chart describes the potential nationals workforce forecast and foreigners and the UAE total population estimates from the year 2015 till the year 2050. The foreigners estimates based on WB data and the velocity of the forecast

suggest it will drop from about 87% to 67%. This study that Nationals forecast will increase from 61%-67% of the total national population. The outcome suggest there would not be that significant impact on future productivity as alerted by WB instead due to the normal population aging that will decrease the total population by 2050 to about 9 million. Which I reject and do not accept as explained previously because the total workforce does not represent normal population and partially replaced every two years.

Figure 2- Workforce population projection 2015 - 2050.

GDP Dimension

The following line graph describe the realistic productivity compared to the current using the adjusted GDP

after calculating the impact of constant tax at rate of 3% and constant inflation at rate of 2%. Base on the WB latest estimates and MS Excel software projections there is more than 50% decrease in the GDP at real price by the year 2050. Similarly the productivity could have smother curve if we limit the workforce projection to 8 Million. The decrease caused by the potential nationals workforce supply is not that significant as seen in the year 2040 at 67% and it will return to 64% by 2050.

Figure – 3 GDP Real vs. Current productivity forecast

However, during the last decade the highest employers sectors: construction, trade and real-estate performance anticipate that demand will not change (Table-1) unless the



Figure – 3 GDP Real vs. Current productivity forecast

Table 1- Expatriates in the private sector by Economic Activities (:000)

Economic Activities / Year	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010
Agriculture	34.4	28.9	26.2	24.6	27.4
Fishing	11.2	10.8	11.0	10.3	9.9
Mining	35.8	36.1	41.6	39.3	21.5
Industrial	470.5	440.0	442.4	431.2	446.4
Electricity and Water	5.7	5.3	4.9	4.8	3.4
Contraction	1,478.3	1,379.8	1,504.0	1,532.0	1,599.1
Trade	1,038.6	958.2	917.5	861.4	840.2
Hotels and Restaurants	214.8	191.2	169.2	152.2	150.4
Transportation and storage	346.0	308.0	284.0	269.7	264.6
Financial	50.3	45.2	43.7	42.3	39.1
Real state	496.1	418.1	385.1	341.5	322.7
Education	73.5	65.7	63.5	57.8	54.1
Health	57.3	45.7	42.2	36.7	33.0
Community social service	104.6	93.8	87.6	82.3	77.3
Total	4,417.2	4,026.8	4,022.8	3,886.2	3,889.2

Source : Ministry of Labour - LMSID

government introduce new policies and strategies to overcome technology integration, talented people supply and economic transformation.

Recommendation and Conclusion

The main finding of this research is that to build strong countries economic it is required to sustain economic growth and high skilled job opportunities. The government grand policy and spending strategies has extreme impact on the economic growth. Therefore, the government required to clarify grand policies that create the abilities transform the workforce productivity challenges.

Unfortunately, the Emiratization program achieved only around 10% of the total workforce at 2013; which means UAE still needs to review the development program policies and strategies. (Dedousis and Richard 2015). Second, the findings indicate that by 2050 there will be about 50% reduction in the GDP real price due to the inflation and taxation policy. Therefore, the grand policy must update the retirement investments resilience to future change and smart development goals.

The economic activities highest



workforce employers demand did not change during the last decade. Therefore, the policies and regulations of those economic activities must be technically reviewed and improved to integrate with other sectors services and

products smartly. There is a need for integration and monitoring to address to achieve three phases value added integration (Build, Smart, and Integrate).

Shades of Yesteryear:

Is the Middle East on the Path to Regional War?



By:

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The Middle East today is at its most turbulent since the 1990–91 Kuwait Crisis. The region is in such upheaval that it hearkens back to the period before World War I, when turmoil in Europe erupted into a cataclysm of industrialized warfare involving mass armies and widespread destruction. The Middle East today is not at that stage, but under what conditions could such a nightmare play out in the region?

Shades of Yesteryear

It is worth mentioning the similarities that today's Middle East bears to the Europe of 1914. In 1914, European countries engaged in a substantial arms race, marked especially by the great naval race between Germany and the United Kingdom. In the last ten years, military spending has increased dramatically in the Middle East, due in part to Iraq rebuilding its military after the US withdrawal, and then fighting the Da'esh criminal organization, but also to an increase in spending in the

Gulf (SIPRI, 2016).

Europe before 1914 was also a region of social and political unrest, with separatist movements and challenges to the social order across the region, from open rebellion in Russia and the Balkans to widespread labor unrest in Western Europe. It goes without saying that similar patterns have emerged in the last ten years in the Middle East, with the American occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, the unrest of the Arab Spring and ongoing, violent clashes from Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt to Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. These conflicts, thankfully, have so far not merged into a single regional conflict, but the trends are worrisome, with pervasive sectarianism, a rekindling of tensions between Turkey and Russia, between Iran and its Arab neighbors across the Gulf, and between Israelis and Palestinians.

Another telling similarity between Europe in 1914 and the Middle East today is the use of universal male conscription in Egypt, Syria, Iran,

and the UAE and an increase in ideological sentiment throughout the region. Taken separately, these two trends are fairly innocuous. Powerful nationalist sentiment can promote loyalty and cohesion in society, but blind loyalty, coupled with the means to send hundreds of thousands of men into battle, contributed to the shock of World War I in Europe. It also contributed to the tension of the Cold War, when millions of soldiers, many of them conscripted, faced off across the plains of Central Europe. Groups like the Da'esh criminal organization already employ blind-faith ideology to mobilize thousands to their cause, and ongoing efforts to reassert government control over media and information in the Middle East, after initially losing ground at the beginning of the information age, has the potential to give states a similar mobilizing power. None of Europe's leaders in 1914 expected the catastrophe that ensued, but once the battle was joined they could not easily back down, nor could they keep from putting more and more men under arms, demonizing the enemy and whipping up popular anger to mobilize support for war. A regional conflict on that scale has not broken out in the Middle East yet, but the conditions exist that make it possible: reinvigorated arms races after the so called American pivot to Asia, widespread social tension, and conscription with ideological fervor.

Some Differences

But there are also important dissimilarities between the Middle East today and Europe in 1914. In particular, players outside the region, like the United States, Europe, and Russia have tried to limit their investment in the outcome of conflicts in the Middle East. In general, they have not committed the level of resources that would make the outcome of any sub-regional conflict, such as those in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, a foregone conclusion. This resistance to being pulled in fully to these conflicts gives external players the flexibility to play a balancing or stabilizing role, something that Europe in 1914 did not enjoy. Then, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and China and Japan were too far away to influence the outcome of events in Europe. Perhaps the Middle East today will avoid the fate of Europe in 1914 because the United States, Europe, and Russia still have the opportunity to exert a peaceful influence on the players involved.

Like these external players, none of the states in the Middle East seems ready to attempt a rewrite of the regional map, as Germany seemed prepared to do a hundred years ago. Even calls for the break-up of Iraq seem to have subsided, especially since the non-state Da'esh criminal organization, and a pariah, has openly ignored borders. Most states in the region today are trying

to restore international borders, not undermine them. The one wild card is the Kurds, a nationalist movement that spans four states and that is not regarded as a pariah, at least by the US. If the Kurds overcome disagreements among the different elements of the movement, and make a claim to statehood that is not roundly condemned, especially by the US, then the regional map would be threatened.

Perhaps the most important difference between the Middle East today and Europe in 1914, however, is the alliance structure. Prior to World War I, mutual defense agreements, both secret and public, essentially dictated who would be on which side of any large-scale conflict. Most European countries chose a side. So far, this is only partially true in the Middle East. Sunni Arab states appear firmly committed to stopping the rise of Iranian influence in the region, and many states are fighting to contain, and perhaps eliminate, the Da'esh criminal organization, but the network of alliances is bewilderingly unclear beyond that. Israel and Turkey have focused on defending their perceived interests on their own, and the lack of coherence in the Kurdish nationalist movement keeps other countries from having to choose clear winners and losers.



The proliferation of frenemies might actually contribute to avoiding a regional cataclysm.

Some Forecasts

What might transform the bevy of small-scale military stalemates that characterize Middle East security today into a full-blown regional war on the scale of, heaven forbid, World War I? Conditions like persistent arms races, widespread social tension, and conscription with ideological fervor seem to cast a shadow of 1914 over the Middle East, but external players can still exercise a stabilizing influence, regional states have so far avoided redrawing the map, and alliance patterns are unclear. If things continue as they are, then a multiplicity of small-scale conflicts, with ambiguous outcomes, could be the shape of things to come, at least in the near-term. While this would hardly be a happy state of affairs, it would certainly be preferable to a region-wide war.

Perhaps understanding how security in the Middle East could worsen would help us understand how it could improve. As a heuristic device for illustrating possible futures, I use scenario planning techniques outlined by Peter Schwartz (1996) in *The Art of the Long View*. Schwartz' method uses two critical variables to identify scenarios that could unfold (see figure 1). Given the analysis above, two variables seem likely to have a disproportionate impact on future security of the Middle East: territoriality and political dualism. Territoriality refers to the stakes attached to territory in Middle East conflicts. So far, with the exception of the conflict with the Da'esh criminal organization, controlling territory has generally been of tactical, not strategic, significance in the post-Arab Spring conflicts. The Syrian civil war has been fought over who controls the presidency, not necessarily how many towns the different sides have conquered. In Yemen, fighting centers on how much influence Iran has in the country; gaining a few more square



kilometers of territory would be less significant for the Saudi-led coalition than agreeing to a deal that kept Iranian influence off the peninsula. If the Kurds make a play for statehood, or if Iraq fractures, or if a state in the region tries to annex the territory of another state, then it would dramatically raise the implications of territoriality and change the dynamic of security in the region, possibly precipitating a regional war.

The second variable, political dualism, refers to the extent that players inside and outside the region view security questions in black-and-white, good-and-evil terms. This with-us-or-against-us approach to political discourse reduces debate to a question of loyalty and limits policy options, with a concomitant increase

in the stakes of failure. So far, some trends point in a dualistic direction, while others point in a pluralistic one. In Libya, two sides are engaged in a rancorous military stalemate, but they are still negotiating in fits and starts. The conflict in Yemen is often cast in dualistic terms, but the sides are negotiating there, too, and a non-military solution is immanently possible. Still, leaders in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey have painted most opposition with a broad brush of terrorism, which could have the unintended effect of making failure more costly to political leaders, not less.

Figure 1 outlines how these variables could determine what the future holds for the Middle East. In the most frightening scenario, War Is



Hell, a series of ongoing sub-regional wars morphs into one consolidated, regional war, with two clear sides and extremely high stakes, as occurred in Europe a hundred years ago. This scenario would result if political discourse increasingly casts security challenges in good-versus-evil terms (political dualism high) and if territory itself acquires strategic stakes (territoriality high). In this scenario, political leaders would mobilize all the resources of society to defeat the enemy, and lifetimes' worth of blood and treasure would spill onto the battlefield, probably over the future of Iraq, Syria, and Kurdistan.

Two somewhat less frightening scenarios are Road to Martyrs' Square and Messy Break-up. Road to Martyrs' Square refers to the excellent book by Anne Marie Oliver and Paul F. Steinberg (2006), subtitled *A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber*. This scenario would result if territoriality reduces in importance, for example, if the Da'esh criminal organization is contained to a relatively small area and no other player makes a bid to claim territory (territoriality low). In Road to Martyrs' Square, political dualism becomes more salient, with conflicts increasingly cast in good-versus-evil terms. In this scenario, suicide terrorism would increase in frequency and, possibly, scale, not only in Europe but in the Middle East as well, as terrorist organizations try to replicate and outdo the notoriety gained by the Da'esh criminal organization. Increasing political dualism will do nothing to eradicate the idea of radical violent extremism.

In the Messy Break-up scenario, political discourse becomes more pluralistic (dualism low) and territoriality increases in importance, possibly as a result of a claim to Kurdish statehood or the fracturing of Iraq, or both. This scenario would entail violence, but not on the scale of War Is Hell or with the terrifying randomness of Road to Martyrs' Square. In this scenario, players external to the regional might negotiate a stable territorial solution

while regional players not directly involved focus on security and building political institutions at home. Alternatively, external players may be unable to negotiate or guarantee a reasonable territorial solution, but the conflict would essentially be contained. In this scenario, radical extremism might have less of a draw because governments in the Middle East would provide populations with outlets for peaceful dissent and allow the creation of civil society institutions.

In the final scenario, Getting to Europe, political leaders will have made security discourse pluralistic and maintained the stability of internationally-recognized borders. The "Europe" that the Middle East gets to, in this case, is not the Europe of 2015, awash in refugees and haunted by suicide terrorism, but the Europe of 1995, riding the wave of the post-Cold War peace dividend and regional integration. In this scenario, the Kurds do not get a state, but they might garner significant levels of peaceful autonomy, while Palestinians and Israelis may integrate into one state where all have equal citizenship rights. Perhaps most importantly, this is the only scenario that looks somewhat better than the current reality in the region.

Final Observations

If Getting to Europe seems far-fetched, then we should hope it is at least as far-fetched as War Is Hell. The Middle East has surprised us in the past, in both positive and negative ways, so it behooves us to consider the conditions under which security in the region could get better or worse. It seems unlikely that the current state of affairs can continue indefinitely. Something has to give. The question is whether leaders in the region can navigate the storms of territoriality and political dualism. One worries that the Middle East will have to go to hell before getting to Europe.

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STRATEGIC DECISION ANALYSIS

OPERATION BADR 6 October 1973 'The Crossing'



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'I want us to plan the offensive within our capabilities, nothing more. Cross the canal and hold every ten centimeters of the Sinai. I'm exaggerating of course, but that will help me greatly and alter completely the political situation internationally and within the Arab ranks.'

Sadat 03 June 1971

Following the humiliating defeat of Egypt in the Six Day War during the summer of 1967, Israel held the entire Sinai and including its oil fields. Egyptian revenue from the Suez Canal had ceased and Egypt was suffering economically.

During the years following the war, encouraged by its victory, Israel ignored a unanimous United Nations Security Council Resolution (242) requiring them to withdraw from the occupied territories in exchange for Arab recognition. This marked the end of diplomatic efforts and relations between Israel and Egypt to secure peace. A regional strategy of 'no war – no peace' stalemate evolved; a situation that heavily favored the Israelis.

The Egyptian President Anwar Sadat believed that Egypt's economic, political and military problems were as a direct result of the Six Day War and that regaining the Sinai was essential to Egypt's future. Under his leadership planning began to retake the Sinai.

Sadat's strategy was to use political and military power to conduct 'limited war' to break the existing stalemate in order to create conditions for peace within the region on an equitable footing. The key was to unite the Arab states to present a centralized power block within the region that could be balanced against the pro-Israeli international sentiments. In addition, it was a strife to change



the international political positions of the west, particularly the US, to view the Arab regional powers in a more fair and balanced manner so as to negotiate peace in the region.

Once the political support had been secured and extensive secretive planning, military rearmament and training was completed, on the 6th October 1971, 6 years after the Six Day War, an all-out surprise military offensive operation against Israel was launched.

Egyptian forces succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal and occupying a limited area of the Sinai. The crossing of the Canal was coordinated with a Syrian ground offensives on the Golan Heights, effectively establishing two fronts for the Israelis to defend simultaneously.

The initial objectives for the crossing were to cross the Suez Canal, to destroy the Israeli defensive line known as the Bar Lev Line and to establish bridgeheads to support ongoing operations to repel any Israeli counter attacks.

Despite the offensive faltering towards the end, the crossing was a

surprising success with all objectives being achieved and significant amounts of the Sinai being occupied by Egyptian forces. The success of the crossing led the way to the Israeli-Egypt Peace Accord of 1979, resulting in the withdrawal of Israeli forces out of the Sinai that was completed by 1988.

The offensive restored the Egyptian's confidence in the military and the Egyptian military forces emerged from the offensive as the preeminent military power in the region. Egypt's success has been credited with changing the US's foreign policy relating to the Middle East seeing the US entering the region in the 1980s and 1990s as the peace mediator.

The strategy adopted by Sadat was bold and decisive. At the time, with diplomatic and political efforts failing, it could be argued that Egypt was left without a choice but to adopt the highly risky strategy of military power projection. The strategy required a strong commitment from Sadat and his Generals. Initial estimates of losses if the offensive

was successful were put at 17,000 casualties by the Egyptians and 35,000 by the Soviet advisors. The actual Egyptian losses were 280 kills and 20 tanks destroyed, underpinning the success of the offensive.

Sadat's strategy of projecting military power in a 'limited war' showed that the application of military power to resolve a political or diplomatic stalemate (such as the 'no war no peace' stale mate) can be effective in its own right and perhaps inevitable when other forms of diplomacy and national power fail. The offensive provided a severe psychological shock to Israel resulting in the Israeli Government changing its stance to view that an equitable peace was the only way to guarantee Israeli security in the future.

(The 1967 pre-emptive victory was so complete and won so cheaply, Israelis viewed their military forces as invincible, their intelligence services as unmatched, and their Arab foes as inferior and incapable.)

Strategic Thinking: A Framework Based Approach

In my first year teaching at the National Defense College, a participant asked a very simple, yet extremely complex question: "What's the difference between 'strategy' and 'strategic planning'?" I have spent the last three years trying to develop as clear an answer to this question; however, understanding the difference between the two is essential for the success of any strategic leader. Strategic thinking and strategy development requires creativity, innovation, and change,

while strategic planning is more about operations and the allocation of resources. The absence of strategy and a strategic framework for high-level discussion has costs that a nation must bear. A lack of strategic thinking or capacity can become an obstacle to addressing some of our most challenging problems. The challenges we face are multi-faceted and require whole of government and intergovernmental coordination for integrated, cross-sector strategic

responses. Conceptual sloppiness hinders effective communication and strategic coordination across these varied sectors. One method to encourage strategic thinking, strategy development, and cross-sector communication is to use a common strategic framework across government for analysis, decision-support, and communication. In this paper I introduce the framework for strategic decision-making developed at the National Defense College.




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Strategy Development Framework

Frameworks provide the strategic decision-making community with a method and language for working through complex scenarios thereby providing a common language for analysis and action. Figure 1 presents a robust analytical framework to assist the strategic leader in strategy development. This framework is not the only model for thinking about security strategy, but it is a comprehensive representation of the elements necessary to develop a successful strategy. This model allows one to discuss strategy development in a consistent manner across government and industry. In essence it creates a language for strategic decision-making. It is important to note that this framework is a decision-making aid and not intended to be used dogmatically. This framework should be used to uncover insights about environments, assumptions, resources and objectives; it is not intended to be a rigid model for analysis and execution. There are significant differences between the strategic environments of different issue areas. This framework should be thought of as a guide for thinking about the complexity of strategy rather than a manual or checklist for action.

Figure 1. Strategic Decision-Making Framework

Our framework shows three levels of distinct tasks that a strategist or strategic leader must perform to develop a comprehensive strategy: assessment, analysis, and planning.

Assess

The first level describes the assessment phase of strategy development, which is the most fundamental task for strategy development. Successful strategy requires influencing other actors or changing the environment in ways favorable to the nation's interests. To do this requires an accurate picture of the domestic and international reality and an understanding of how politics, information and economics influence others' decisions. These dynamics are very complex and ambiguous and therefore require an assumption or theory of how they work. Due to this complexity, one's knowledge should be seen less as a set of facts and rather as a set of perceptions or "assumptions" that must be continually reassessed as reality changes or new evidence is discovered. All decision-makers have assumptions or theories about how the world works, but the important task is to expose these assumptions and be ready to repeatedly reevaluate them.

Domestically, one must consider the role of the government and the public in forming strategic decisions and strategy. Typically, security strategy is a "top-down" enterprise in that a few knowledgeable people at the top of government formulate the strategy and then successfully implement it through the policy process so that it becomes the plan of action for the government. However, the public will have a role in most policy decisions. Therefore, a successful strategy must consider from the onset the public reaction and the government's ability to implement the planned courses of action.

It is important to note that the nation's strategic interests should dominate the strategic leader's assessment of the environment, and the entire strategy process. National interest forms the foundation of strategy and strategic thinking and hence occupies a prominent place in the strategic framework. The national interest's role is to provide "the underlying rationale for the behavior of states and statesman in a threatening international environment." The national interest should answer the question, "why are we doing this?" In the end, a nation's strategy should be able to address prioritized national interests that are being serviced by a particular strategy. If a policy or strategy cannot be justified on the basis of the nation's interests, then it should be abandoned.

An assessment of National Interests is imperative at the early stages of strategy development. The arrows from the Domestic and International Assumptions blocks to the National Interests block in the model represent the need to incorporate this early review of interests into the strategy development process. Once an assessment of the environment is completed and the interests are

prioritized we move to the analysis phase of strategy development.

Analyze

The second level of the model is the strategic task of analysis. Once one has formed their assumptions concerning the strategic environment, and prioritized their interests, the strategic thinker must assess the threats, challenges, and opportunities that evolve from the strategic environment. The first analysis task is to identify threats from the international environment, challenges from the domestic environment, and the opportunities for advancing national interests in both the international and domestic environments. As discussed in the previous section, sound strategy requires that national interests be determined first and independently before linking to threats, challenges, and opportunities. If a nation's interests are not affected then there is little reason for a state to develop a strategy for an emerging situation. Additionally, analysis will require a means exploration that will link power and influence that originate from the domestic environment to serving the interests of the state.

In international relations literature, a threat is defined as a situation where one state or group has both the capability and intention to inflict an undesirable outcome on another actor or group. An important concept in this discussion is this concept of capability and intent. If an adversary has intent to attack but has little capability then its level of threat is fairly low. The same holds true if a state holds tremendous capability but is not threatening. For the Gulf Arab states, Iran's nascent nuclear capability is much more threatening than France's robust nuclear capability due to the intent (or lack of trust) of Iran to use its nuclear arsenal to coerce its neighbors. Threats are typically in the form of (1) military threats, (2) economic threats, or (3) cultural threats.

A similar concept to threat is the idea of challenge. A challenge is a

threatening situation that does not have human agency or intent. For instance, the GCC reliance on South Asian labor presents a security situation that needs to be addressed by individual governments, but there is no adversary that is driving this demographic trend. A challenge is typically something that emerges from nature, it may have a human element, but that human agent is not working directly against the interests of the state. Many Gulf security issues, such as water security, food security, and economic diversification fall under the category of security challenge rather than threat. Challenges are no less important to state security than threats, but they require different strategies because they lack an adversary.

Finally opportunities are situations where a state can advance its national interest. An opportunity is a favorable combination of circumstances that presents the state a good chance for advancement of its interests. Opportunity may have human agency like a threat or may be an environmental situation similar to a challenge. Quite often a situation can be seen as both a threat and opportunity. The formation of the Gulf States illustrates this concept. The British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s was threatening to the security of each of the individual emirates, but at the same time, this provided the opportunity for the UAE to band together as a federation, effectively changing each emirate's domestic and international environments and securing their interests.

The identification of threats, challenges, and opportunities does not complete the analysis of security strategy. For a complete analysis, the means of the state influence must also be considered. As seen in the Strategic Decision-Making Framework, the national interests of the state directly influence the means of state power. Strategists must consider power, influence and resources, the tools of the leader, to defend against threats or to take


advantage of opportunities. Power and influence are the currency of international relations and are necessary to accomplish the state's objectives and influence others in the international environment. Governments seek power and influence because they need them to achieve their goals. Quite often power is seen as having the ability or capacity to act.

An equally important concept is the ability to influence other actors and outcomes. Influence is different than power in that power is the capability to act and influence is the ability of an actor in international politics to affect intended targets. Power and influence are linked as concepts but in many ways act independently. Power does not automatically confer influence, nor is it automatically discounted if it fails to do so. It is important for one to understand this difference. The United States is a very powerful nation, militarily and economically, but often it does not have the will or capability to influence other actors. It is the job of strategic leaders to develop their nation's power in a way that the government can have the capacity to influence other actors in the international environment.

Once one has analyzed the opportunities, threats, and challenges inherent in the domestic and international environment, and developed state resources so that it has the power and influence necessary to promote its interests, the leader needs to develop a plan for government action.

Plan

The final and third level requires the strategic leader to plan for what he wants the government to say and do. Each leader must develop from the national policy and their concept of national interests a set of actionable objectives to define the specific ends of their strategy. They must select instruments of state power that will define the means of how those objectives will be pursued. And finally, they must



determine the statecraft, or the ways those instruments will be used to meet the state objectives.

Objectives (ends) explain “what” is to be accomplished in the final strategy. Objectives flow from national policy, national interests and the factors in the strategic environment (threats, challenges, and opportunities) affecting the achievement of the desired goals. Policy guidance, higher strategy, the nature of the strategic environment, the capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power also bound objectives.

The instruments (means) are the tools of strategy. The instruments available flow directly from the power and influence of the state. Choices for instruments of power occur at two levels. First, one must decide which instruments to buy and in what quantities for the state to convert its potential power into the means of action and tools of influence. This is an investment decision based largely on assumptions about the international environment and the threats, challenges, and opportunities predicted in the future. Second, strategic leaders must decide which available instruments to use to pursue their chosen objectives in the short term. This is the selection of the tools to accomplish chosen objectives. At the National Defense College we use

the DIME terminology to describe the instruments of state power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics.

Statecraft (ways) explains the big question of “how” the objectives are to be accomplished by using the instruments of state power. Statecraft links resources to the objectives by addressing who does what, where, when, and why with the answers explaining how an objective will be achieved. The linking of objectives and means provides a course of action that then can be assessed for validity and risk. While considering strategic options, one should develop several courses of action, giving national decision-makers a range of options for their desired strategy.

By linking objectives and instruments through statecraft, strategic leaders develop actions to be taken by the government.

Strategy and Strategic Thinking as a Process

One danger for the strategic leader is to think that strategy is a product rather than a process. Strategy, in its essence, is about creating a more favorable future for the state than might exist if left to chance. Strategy is continuous and the strategic environment is constantly changing. One must continually assess the actions of

both adversaries and other states that might affect our security; therefore, a nation’s strategy needs continuous re-assessment to ensure that it meets the needs of a changing strategic environment.

The Strategic Decision-Making Framework in Figure 1 shows a feedback loop from Strategy back to Policy to reflect the fact that the strategic assessment and strategy development should be reflected in future national policy based on the realities in the strategic environment.

Concluding Thoughts

Strategic leadership requires a mindset that embraces the complexity and chaos of the strategic environment and seeks to create favorable strategic effects supporting national interests. One must actively look for opportunities, challenges, and threats in the strategic environment and create strategies to protect against threats and challenges, and take advantage of opportunities. Using a decision-making framework will aid in developing strategies that will drive resource decisions and affect the national instruments available to execute policy decisions.

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EDUCATION, A KEY TO NATIONAL SECURITY

A strong education system is the key to maintain a successful national security program in any nation. Without a strong educational infrastructure, a country will not achieve prosperity and reach its potential in the global economic market a situation which will create uncertainty when it comes to national security.

Today there are additional goals being pursued within our education system. In addition to the traditional goals of education, it is expected that new challenges are undertaken. Areas such as innovation in a global economy and the ability to think creatively and to transfer

knowledge across various sectors have become fundamental building blocks in the development of a modern education. A knowledge-based economy is now considered a progressive approach in modern education. It is evident that when the education system is neglected, a functioning economy cannot be properly maintained. An example of this is the assortment of African nations which possess tremendous natural resources, but yet they have not been able to take advantage of these resources to fuel economic growth. These nations remain very impoverished, and they are unable to use the resources at their disposal to

improve their situation. The fact that these nations have been unable to invest in building a quality education system is a major factor in why this is the case. It has resulted in a critical shortage of the skilled labor required to attract investment, which will in turn start development and boost economic growth. An example of a nation that has invested in education and achieved prosperity is Singapore. In the aftermath of WWII, Singapore was not a wealthy nation, but it started to prioritize education and made large investments in improving the country's education system. Although Singapore does not have a wealth of natural resources or a



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large landmass to use for industrial scale manufacturing, it succeeded in rapidly bolstering economic growth by investing heavily in training and educating its young people. Today, Singapore is one of the most technologically advanced and economically prosperous countries in the world with a highly diversified economy. There are many lessons that can be learnt from Singapore's tremendous success in this area. One of the most important lessons is that having a highly skilled and technologically literate workforce is quite possibly the most important factor in determining a nation's economic success.

"Future generations will be living in a world that is very different from that to which we are accustomed. It is essential that we prepare ourselves and our children for that new world". H.H. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahayan.

A strong education system should create individuals who

possess the ability to critically analyze ambiguities with very valuable skills which can be utilized to further secure a country's national interests. It is becoming increasingly critical for a nation's education system to be intimately involved with the national security system in order to preserve the nation's independence and prosperity.

The success of a nation, both domestically and internationally, relies heavily on its development across several sectors of society: culturally, politically and economically. Culture primarily refers to the norms and values adopted and adhered to by the people of a specific region. The political sector of a nation deals with the government and infrastructure; together with any reforms recently enacted in the country. The economy, the backbone of any thriving and sustainable nation, remains integral in developing and cultivating a country. However, as a requirement for successful development in

each of these sectors, education must play a crucial role in building strong foundations in the younger generations.

Education includes the process of installing societal norms and values in children at a young age. It is critical that the government utilizes this opportunity to instill positive schooling, which can promote nationalism and develop young minds to serve the government's needs. We have previously seen unconventional threats to national security, such as terrorists influencing young people during vulnerable stages in their lives. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to manipulate the UAE's educational system, indoctrinating young people with their ideas at a vital stage in their education. Young minds should instead be utilized in a manner that would help serve the country by



encouraging innovation and the development of critical thinking. In the past, the educational system in the UAE was highly dependent on 'spoon-feeding' methodologies, where students were simply the passive recipients of knowledge and focused solely on retention and memorization. This style of teaching made students extremely vulnerable to being brainwashed with false information. The persistence of this problem was primarily due to outdated teaching methods and a lack of emphasis being put on the role of education. The development of critical thinking within children at a young age can not only assist in the development of knowledge, but can also be seen as a deterrent to terrorism's recruiting efforts – with more young people questioning and analyzing the information they are taught.


However, if the educational outcomes do not match the market needs this could cause instability. Unemployment amongst young people is not only a cause in the rise of crime and drug abuse, but could also be touted as a possible cause for uprising, as seen in Arab countries such as Egypt. An education system must develop a curriculum that caters to the job market in that particular country, not just in terms of its economy but also culturally and politically. Furthermore, it must be capable of preparing future generations with the skills and tools necessary to compete in today's global economy. Nations that are highly competitive in international markets are typically technologically advanced. This requires an education system that encourages innovation and critical thinking at a young age in order to develop a workforce that is technologically literate enough to accomplish this feat. The role of technology is becoming far more important to the economic prosperity of a nation than it ever has been in the past. The success of a nation's economy is no longer primarily dependent on its available stock of natural resources or its ability to



manufacture and export on a large scale. In the 21st century, ideas and innovation play a critical role in developing a prosperous economy with sustained economic growth. Hi-tech industries such as software, aerospace, and biotech have become an important component of the economies of advanced nations. The wealthiest members of our society are no longer those who inherited great fortunes, but rather the technology gurus such as Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg. Therefore, it

is critical that the education system of the UAE is capable of equipping its young people with the technical knowledge and critical thinking skills necessary to succeed in this hi-tech environment.

However, even in the era of modern technology, a lot of importance still lies within the preservation of traditional values and national identity. Typically, when a country engages internationally in an effort to improve its education system, it tends to adopt and



reconstruct foreign curricula in order to recreate one which focuses on its own cultural principles. An ideal education system should be one that is technologically advanced but still allows for distinctive cultural values to be cemented within the framework of its curriculum. We are a young nation where the majority of our population is under 25, the majority of which are currently in the educational system. Therefore, it is clear that reforms made today to the education system will have an enormous effect on the

future generations.

There is currently a gap in the way in which teaching and learning is offered in schools, and the quality of teaching is also an issue. Many places across the country lack highly specialized and qualified teachers and consequently many veteran teachers are stuck in traditional methods of teaching. The majority of UAE nationals attend state schools, where reforms have been implemented in order to challenge the old methodologies of teaching, including

new interactive forms of teaching and a focus on the English language. However, as with any challenge to traditional methods, there are challenges which have made the new reforms difficult to implement. Many teachers are unconvinced by these new interactive teaching methods, despite being told that such methods promote creativity and innovation in students. Teachers play a vital role in applying changes at the classroom level and thus are extremely important to success in education reform. By ensuring that teachers are highly qualified, the UAE can create a generation of future leaders who are capable of leading the country among developing nations. Training teachers in modern teaching styles and methods will ensure that the quality of education will be more than adequate to develop the competencies needed to develop today's students into the leaders of the future. A revamped education system with an added emphasis on the role of the teacher will help recruit well-educated university graduates to become teachers in the future. This new mindset should be reflected in their salaries, changing the way in which teachers are perceived in this country.

In conclusion, enhancing the level of education in this country is an integral step toward developing the nation as a whole. The more educated the population is, the more influential the nation becomes on a global scale, in addition to having increased economic prosperity. Our strategy to advance the quality of education must provide students with optimum learning opportunities that are administered by highly qualified teachers. Schools must receive the support of our entire society to best encourage unity and perseverance in the advancement of our nation and its education system.

Do Good Leaders Make Good Crisis Managers?



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Do good leaders make good crisis managers? The answer to this question seems obvious but with thought, one realizes that the attributes of a good leader and the leadership style best suited for crisis managers are not exactly the same. What are the attributes of a good crisis manager? And do good leaders make consistently good crisis managers? The answer is; it depends on the individual's leadership style and the leader's flexibility and creativity in getting the job done.

To address this question, one must first understand crisis management and what makes a good crisis manager. Next, there must be an understanding of the characteristics of a good leader, various leadership styles and their suitability during crisis situations. Perceptive analysis of the essential elements of effective crisis management and the evaluation of different leadership styles can help us determine what kind of leaders make good crisis managers.

Crisis Management

Knowing how to manage a crisis is a critical skill for any senior decision-maker. "Crisis" as defined by the National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority is "an incident or incidents that are more complicated than an emergency, and which threatens the stability of a large portion of society, and affecting the government's ability to carry out its functions." (p. 20) Traditionally, the management of crises in the most severe cases has been thought of as a military (or national defense) matter due to threats coming from foreign states. Other crises, attributable to accidents, nature, small groups or individuals, have usually involved law enforcement and local emergency response agencies. However, incidents such as the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster make clear that the management of crises spans across the whole of government to include local, regional, federal and international agencies. Moreover,

unlike crises for which governments have called upon military forces in the past, there have been increasing calls in many different situations for participation of nongovernmental organizations and individuals. A crisis, by definition, tends to be sudden--and it further increases the challenge of coordination.

When a crisis occurs, leaders must act rapidly, correctly, comprehensively, and objectively. Each crisis is different in nature and may call for a different plan of attack. Ignoring a crisis threatens the image and viability of an organization. How leaders react to crisis is the difference between a life saved and a life lost. So, then the follow up question is: what makes a good crisis manager? At the annual conference of the British Psychological Society's Division of Occupational Psychology in Nottingham, England, Christine D'Silva suggested that "The most effective crisis managers show strong preferences for variety at work and keep their cool when operating outside of their comfort zones. Those who demonstrate more self-discipline and stick to the rules are considered less effective at dealing with a crisis" (British Psychological Society, 2016, p. 2). In addition, the optimum skills required to handle crisis include stamina, a clear view of the situation and the leader's ability to focus themselves full bore on the problems at hand as noted by Elmer (2016).

According to Chughtai (2014), the first step of any crisis management plan is to find the right leader. He identified ten top characteristics required in an effective crisis manager: know the business, know how to navigate the organization, excellent communicator, excellent facilitator, decisive and thoughtful leadership; exudes confidence, calm and positive, proactive situational awareness, committed to the organization; and creative thinker and problem solver. Chughtai further stated that "By looking for someone with the characteristics described here, you'll ensure

that your crisis manager has the expertise, experience, confidence, commitment, creativity, and trusted relationships to get the job done right" (p. #). With a basic overview of crises and what is required for a good crisis manager, the next logical inquiry is; what does it take to be a good leader?

Leadership

Leadership manifests itself as the ability to convince and innovate in order to establish new and effective concepts that can help counter challenges. Leadership, in and of itself, is an innovative, persistent and dynamic skill that aims to efficiently manage the direction of available resources after knowledge has been recognized as an asset. Leadership is about having the motivating ability to shape a future vision and then translate that vision into action through innovative leadership. It can be said, therefore, that leadership is the ability to predict and prepare for future events or the ability to develop the necessary means and concepts that ensure active and effective actions under unstable and uncertain circumstances.

In a Forbes article, Tayna Prive discussed what she describes as the top ten qualities found in a great leader: honesty, delegation, communication, confidence, commitment, positive attitude, creativity, intuition, inspiration, and approach (2012). And in today's environment, leaders are required to deal with challenges, make decisions, and manage risk under ever more complex and vague circumstances.

Good leadership, considered on its own merits, is simply not enough. When dealing with crisis management, one must consider the leader's style of leadership. This is where good leaders are separated from bad leaders when managing crisis. In the early 1930s, Kurt Lewin developed a framework which identified three major styles of leadership: autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire. According to

Lewin, autocratic leaders made decisions without consulting their teams while democratic leaders consult with their teams but still usually made the final decision. The main characteristic of the laissez-faire leader is that they give their team members the autonomy to decide how their work is done; they see their primary responsibility as supporting subordinates with resources and advice. Since Lewin's original 1930's introduction to leadership, many frameworks pertaining to leadership and the various styles have been further developed.

For example in the early 1960's, Robert Blake and Jane Mouton introduced a managerial grid which was based on two behavioral dimensions: people-oriented and task-oriented. The premise of this framework is the degree to which the leader considers the needs and interest of the people versus accomplishing the task. The two frameworks described above, although very useful, are often very vague and do not always include situations involving a crisis.

Most leaders identify with one or more specific leadership styles: notably, bureaucratic, charismatic, servant, transactional and transformational leadership. Bureaucratic leaders are sticklers for rules and procedures (by the book). They are not very flexible, creative or innovative. Charismatic leaders' main trait is that they are good at inspiring and motivating their people. Leaders such as President Barack Obama and Dr. Martin Luther King have been called charismatic leaders because they both spoke with authority and were able to mobilize an entire country with a shared vision. Adolph Hitler was also considered charismatic (with bad motives) as he was able to create a massive army who carried out his evil plans.

Servant leaders are renowned

for their service to others. They place the needs and interest of their followers ahead of their own. Servant leaders are good at building teams, developing team members and sharing power. Also, they come across as being authentic in their actions. Some researchers identify Mahatma Gandhi as a good example of a servant leader (Barnabas & Clifford 2012). Gandhi never proclaimed himself as a leader and he did not have a desire to control others. He preached non-violence and dedicated his career to the achievement of a better life for the downtrodden. His sole desire was to help the people of India to realize their dignity and power.

Transactional leadership, the style of leadership most often used by managers, uses rewards and punishments to appeal to the follower's self-interest. The process is their main concern rather than forward thinking ideas. Transactional leadership is primarily passive and generally thinks inside of the box. They do not inspire critical or creative thinking. An Example of transactional leadership can be seen in the coaches of sports teams. Team and league rules for a sports team allow for little flexibility, and adherence to organizational norms is key. Coaches are renowned for motivating their teams to play win, even at risk to themselves.

Transformational leadership was introduced by James McGregor Burns in 1978 in his classic book *Leadership*. He defined transformational leadership as a process where "leaders and their followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality." (p 20) Bernard Bass further developed the concept in his 1985 book, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*. In it, Bass identifies transformational leaders as leaders that are: a model of integrity and fairness, sets clear goals, has high expectations, encourages, provides support and recognition, stirs people's emotions, gets people to look beyond their self-interest,

and inspires people to reach for the improbable (Bass 1985). A good example of a great transformational leader is H.H. Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan. He was able to awaken an entire society and elevate the hopes and desires of Emiratis whose life and personality were enhanced in the process.

So what is the intersection between good leaders and crisis managers? Baldoni (2011) offers five tips on how good leaders should react to a crisis. First, he says; "take a moment to figure out what's going on." Often times, crisis evokes chaos. This is the time to slow things down to get a good understanding of what is actually happening. The second tip is to "act promptly, not hurriedly." Because crisis is usually unexpected, we tend to want to react and solve the problem quickly. You have heard the slogan "speed kills;" this is also true in crisis. Acting deliberately with clear direction is not the same as out of control speed. Next, Baldoni says to "manage expectations." Because crisis disrupts the normal operation, people want to get it over as soon as possible. Here, it is up to the leader to inform the organization as to the size, scope and magnitude of the problem. It may be larger than thought and acting hastily may only exacerbate the problem. Fourthly, Baldoni says to "demonstrate control." During a crisis, things usually occur faster than normal. It is up to the leader to step in and control the response by bringing people and resources to bear. Finally, he recommends to "keep loose." When responding to crisis, leaders need to be flexible and have the ability to adapt rapidly. Leaders cannot be wedded to a single strategy but need to be ready to adapt as the situation changes.

Conclusion

To understand whether good leaders make good crisis managers, one must understand and analyze crisis management and a variety of leadership styles. Although



somewhat illusive, arriving at the answer to this question depends on the type of leader and his or her leadership style. It may also depend on the type and severity of the crisis. If the crisis is small and requires the leader to ensure that procedures are followed explicitly, than a leader with a bureaucratic or transactional leadership style may work best. Keep in mind that for these two leadership styles, the solution has to be found within the organization. Out of the box thinking is not a strong suit for these two leadership styles.

If the solution to the crisis requires that leaders inspire and motivate their people, then a charismatic leader may be the answer. While servant leaders are good at building teams, developing team members and sharing power,



which fits the traits of a good crisis manager, they generally do not like to take charge of a situation. Crisis situation requires that a leader acts deliberately and with clear direction; this is usually not conducive to the shared power characteristic of a servant leader. A leader who uses the transformational leadership style usually displays vision, confidence, courage and a willingness to make sacrifices. They encourage creativity by inspiring workers to find better ways of achieving their goals. Additionally, they are flexible and are not afraid to make changes based on the problem at hand. This type of leadership style seems ideal for the crisis managers.

Very few people have all of the skills necessary to be a great crisis manager. In the end, great leaders

rarely exhibit one particular style of leadership over the other. Good leaders are usually experienced and versed in several styles of leadership and are able to transition between the styles seamlessly to match the situation. This is known to most scholars as "Situational Leadership." The leader who is experienced and exemplifies multiple styles of leadership will more likely than not, be a good crisis manager. Remember, because crisis are generally unpredictable, so might be the leader. There are no guarantees when it comes to predicting how a leader will act when faced with a crisis. Knowing that the leader is able to adapt and engage the various types of leadership styles can help to ease the mind when in the middle of managing a crisis.

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
Of Boxes and Arrows



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“You will have to brace yourselves for this — not because it is difficult to understand, but because it is absolutely ridiculous: All we do is draw little arrows on a piece of paper — that’s all!”



In this famous, and perhaps misleading, passage, from his book the strange theory of light and matter Nobel laureate Richard Feynman contrasted the complexity of quantum physics and the simplicity, even absurdity, of the methods physicists use to describe and understand it. While physicists are notoriously dismissive of politics and its attendant disciplines - economics, international relations, even history - as at best interesting but in no way sciences, strategic decision-makers will graze in whatever pastures feed them, and in this case, there is much to chew on. To study strategy is to encounter myriad models, invariably consisting of boxes or circles, and always arrows, connecting eccentrically defined terms. Strategists talk in models, so it is reasonable to suppose that they think in models. To make strategic decisions, that is, to be a strategy practitioner, requires not only making sense of those boxes and arrows, but also

connecting them to that elusive thing, the real world.


It is easy to dismiss this observation as banal, or too obvious to warrant much reflection. Yet as much as the mind of a quantum physicist must grapple with great forces whose elements, when studied, are too small for human senses to apprehend, so also are strategic decision-makers unable to observe the forces that they study or aspire to direct. In both cases, the forces are quite real, in the sense that they have observable, and measurable, effects. Understanding and interpreting their behavior requires abstraction. In Feynman's case, he goes on to explain how data is communicated in the direction and length of the arrows he draws. His models not only contain data, but accurately reflect repeatable measurements, and predictable outcomes.

For the strategic decision-maker, neither the boxes nor arrows in the models are likely to contain

data, despite the extraordinary and continuing evolution of graphic displays in the so-called information age. An arrow might connect one box marked "threat" to another box marked "opportunity" but only in the rarest of cases will it record the size, scope or nature of the threat. Neither is there much evidence of standardization. While some schools of thought may codify strategic thinking, the broad consensus, in practice if not in theory, is that the elements to be considered and the dynamics among them are matters of opinion. What is of interest is not the presence or absence of data in these opinions, or even whether or not strategic practitioners use one particular model, or any model at all. Variant box and arrow models abound, for just about any managerial or executive process, strategic decision-making among them. Rather than subjecting these models to some hypothetical best-of-breed competition, or attempting empirical performance analysis, the more useful approach concerns their potential evolution from chart-based ideograms to formal languages.

A glimpse of this type of evolution may be seen in the rapid development and adoption of emoticons in character-constrained text formats for digital messaging. Their simplicity - and for many users, charm - distracts from the directional path they have opened, toward merging machine-processed coding languages with the logic structures of human speech. So too, is the case with the inevitable box and arrow formats of decision-making processes, strategic models, cause and effect analytics, and depiction of strategic approaches. Any and all of these are easily translated from flat file graphics to dynamic formats comprehensible to machine coding.

If the rapid evolution of machine intelligence such as competitive games (Deep Blue in chess, Watson




in a trivia game show, and AlphaGo in the strategy game Go) is an indicator, then it is plausible to forecast, and even more foolish to ignore, the potential for comprehensive and accurate strategic decisions where the boxes and arrows processes flash through silicon and not human brain cells. As much as the gross imperfections of machine processing may appall or amuse, (the flawed results of Google-translated Arabic text are perhaps the best current example) they also are on a steep development curve. At some point in the near future, the existing standard forms of any language,

Whether Arabic, English or Chinese, may be superseded by the brute force efficiency of whatever derived grammars, the machines will make useful and efficient to themselves as well as to their human operators.

There are obvious objections to these claims. First, that between them Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Kurt Godel's incompleteness theory rule out the possibility of calculating the future state of a complex system; and therefore, the utility of machine processing in making strategic decisions will always be potential never realized. Second, that the

inherently unstructured nature of strategic problems does not lend itself to exposition by formal language. That is, the subtlety and ambiguity of human writing and speech are not only the source, but inevitably the medium of strategic thinking. Finally, information theory itself, with its origins in the proposition that the structure of information is literally meaningless, that volume and efficiency are its fundamentals, is at odds with the function of strategy itself. Networks do no «care» what is transmitted. In this theory, is not the quality of information that determines the utility



to develop a formal language that better describes the elements of strategic decisions - better that is, than numbers or words. A formal language should aim to enable the useful integration of data calls that populate and quantify strategic vocabularies, as well as enable calculation of the energy and effect of strategic actions.

The rudiments of such a formal language already exist, in the boxes and arrows. In the crude grammar of process charts, a box is roughly analogous to a noun, while the arrow is a verb. What is missing, or what has not yet occurred, is what science historian James Gleick termed «a rite of purification» of the sort by which Isaac Newton revolutionized physics or Claude Shannon invented information theory. A simple formal language of strategy would, in theory, enable not so much its more precise calculation (likely a fool's errand), but its exposition with greater clarity, and by extension, more effective decisions in its processes. The implications in each arrow connecting each box are undervalued: it is connections that make a network, and from networks that the most powerful intelligence is generated, as in a brain. A formal language that simplifies, codifies, and to whatever extent possible, quantifies strategic logic, has the potential to extend both the power and the reach of strategic thinking. In the absence of such purification, strategy will continue in its current eccentric form, as the rag and bone shop of ancient ideas, arcane empirical studies and the vagaries of intellectual fashion.

Or, maybe not. Maybe the optimal path to better strategy remains as it always has been: more thinking, and more words, on the subject. This entire essay was written without recourse to a single box and arrow chart.

of a network, only its connections, and the resulting efficiency in handling information. Yet, strategy is fundamentally concerned with preserving or advancing subjective qualities, frequently characterized as interests, or it is nothing. These objections, however, make assumptions about the interaction between information and the physical world that are increasingly open to question.

If strategy is anything at all, it is a mental discipline concerned with determining the future and directing it onto paths that favor certain subjective values. In the past, it

was essentially the mental process needed in applying brute force, in the form of armies, to achieve that aim. It has evolved to where it now encompasses activities as diverse as nuclear deterrence, bureaucratic programming and international marketing. If the future cannot be derived mathematically, and human languages are imperfect means for describing current or future states of concern, then perhaps what is needed is not greater certainty in larger amounts of data to describe the current state, or more powerful tools to calculate possible futures. Perhaps the smarter approach is



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Defending the Nation: GCC and the Restitution of the Arab State System

At the Second Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate on October 30, 2015, Dr. Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, after listing the tribulations of the region, propounded a new vision for the Arab World: A vision of moderation, tolerance and cooperation among peoples and nations that will promote a secure and vibrant region. «This is not 1950s-style

Arab nationalism. It is not founded on anger or resentment. It is not exclusivist or divisive. But it should take advantage of the cultural, religious, economic and political ties that unify the Arab world.» He hastened to add that there will be no imposition on sovereign states and certainly no «trying to erase national boundaries by force,» but a step by step «of free

trade and constructive engagement between existing states, coupled with cooperation against terrorism and extremism.» (WAM, 2015)

Many questions were raised by the Minister's enunciation: what accounts for the shift from a GCC-centered approach to an Arab-centered one by the Arab states of the Gulf. Secondly, to what extent this shift heralds a revival of the Arab state system? Finally, what are the characteristics and the constitutive elements of this system?

The Ebbs and Flows of the Arab State System:

Scholars of Arab states have noted a pattern of inter-Arab relations distinct from any other state behavior. The formation of the Arab state system found its institutional expression in the formation of the Arab League in 1945. Maddy-Weitzman (1993:1) takes that date as the momentous event for the crystallization of the Arab state system. More importantly, the Arab state system mediated the sovereign independence of Arab states and Pan-Arab inspiration harking back to the Arab Revolt of 1916 against Turkish searing yoke. It preserved state sovereignty but simultaneously created a collective identity: an identity that provided opportunity, structured state behavior, and constrained the conduct of foreign policies of Arab states.

Working within the constructivist mode, Michael Barnett argued that the game of Arab politics has been contested around the norms that pervade inter-Arab relations. Domination of Arab politics requires not military capabilities but ascribing meaning to the events of a certain period, to forge norms for inter-Arab relations and chart a path for the future. (1998: 7)

It was the ideological polarization and lack of a center of gravity that gave way to a pragmatic trend in inter-Arab politics. (Khouri, 1982) A coalition of moderate Arab states led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states stole the march on erstwhile radical Arab states and won the October War in 1973. The rise of moderate Arab states

with petro-powers and their ability to take a deliberate and resolute action on behalf of the central Arab cause, i.e. Palestine, during the oil embargo, proved banding together a nostrum for Arab political emasculation, and restored a simulacrum of a new Arab order.

The wages of pragmatism, however, was a lack of vigor provided by the loss of ideological cohesion. The new norms and the triumph of local interests over Arab collectivity led to what Ghassan Salame has referred to as «the return of geography.» (Barnett 1996601 :1997/) The Arab order was split into regional groupings: The Gulf Cooperation Council, the defunct Arab Cooperation Council (North Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt) and Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). Glenn Perry (1984), on the other hand, was less charitable and spoke of the erosion of the Arab state system in the same period. Perry identifies many factors that led to such eventuation: The rise of political Islam at the expense of a common Arab identity, inter-Arab acrimonious relations, high level of regional and international intrusive system, and not least the decline of Pan-Arab revolutionary fervor contributed to the erosion.

The Travails of the Arab State System:

The Arab state system has sustained a lot of blows, but not as two portentous events: The one-two punch was the defection of Egypt as result of the Camp David Accords. In that the Arab body politic lost its rudder. But the second was fatal: Saddam's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990 delivered a resounding blow to whatever remained of the concept of collective Arab security. For the GCC, the invasion and the subsequent events, especially Desert Shield/Desert Storm, proved that the world system and its institutions are veritable guarantor of their security rather than any pan-Arab solidarity. The Gulf states hived from the rest of the Middle East, and became an autonomous region subject to independent dynamics (Gause, 2010:

45-). If even this was not true earlier on, it would seem otherwise at the fin de siècle. The invasion of Kuwait had shaken GCC confidence in Arab politics to its foundation. The late King Hasan II had asserted before the Moroccan parliament that Arab annals from now to a long time to come would have two dates: before and after August 2, 1990 (Maddy-Weitzman, 1993: ix).

GCC and the Redeeming of the Arab State System:

The two decades since 1990, a fateful year in Arab history, was the twilight of Arab collective action. A skein of events will, however, favor a return to a regional order led by the GCC states. Before discussing those events, why the GCC is poised to reconstitute the Arab state system and lead it is in order here. In other words, why this is the «Arab Gulf Moment,» to borrow UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla's turn of phrase, (2011).

Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel (1969: 36371-) in their discussion the structure of regional subsystem delineate a core and a periphery. The most salient features of the core sector (which tends to be opposite to those of the peripheral sector) are its relatively high degree of cohesiveness and greater degree of balance between intersector (core-periphery), intrasector and extrasubordinate system diplomatic relations.»(363). The core of the Arab system of yore had been Egypt and the Levant. The authors provide four pattern variables to distinguish core from periphery. They include a high level of cohesion, a robust degree of communication, a level of power and a solid structure of relations.

The GCC has a high level of cohesion as is represented by the institutional, organizational and treaty relations among the GCC countries, as well as a distinct Khaleeji cultural identity. The GCC states have far and away more communication amongst



themselves and are connected in terms of physical communication and diplomatic activities. Furthermore, in terms of power, the GCC states exhibit more economic prowess, having the two largest economies in the Arab World, and the most sophisticated military power. Last but not least, the structure of relationship, warts and all, is marked by a high level of cooperation and amity, as well as collaboration in wide fields of economic, political, diplomatic; and a defense pact to boot.

The question remains what prompted the change from a GCC-centered to a region wide purview? Four factors account for the strategic shift since the advent of the second decade of the twenty-first century. The scope and interests of the GCC states were impelled by:

The Arab Winter of Discontent: The obstreperous Arab streets turned against dysfunctional regimes that reverberated throughout the Arab countries from the shores of the Mediterranean to the seaboard of the Arabian Gulf. The events chronicled as the «Arab Spring» lent credence to Peter Mansfield's observation that «the Arabs are linked by a huge invisible nervous system. If you apply pressure at one point, the reaction may take place at some wholly different branch of the complex» (Cited in Khashan,

2000). The realization of this fact by Gulf Arabs hitherto oblivious to it reoriented the direction of the GCC. GCC took interest in the tsunami wracking the Arab region; and in due course has become an agent of that change such as in Libya and Yemen; and currently actively seeking to affect change in Syria.

Iran's Political Ambitions: Whether real or a perceived, the Gulf countries looked askance at the new revolutionary regime in Tehran. Likewise, Khomeini was outwardly hostile to the Gulf states. The eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, where GCC tilted towards Iraq and Iran's revolutionary rhetoric to export its revolution, did not endear the two banks of the Arabian Gulf to each other. The gulf between the two even widened as war-related events marred the region (Gause, 2015).

Despite a thaw in the relationship in the 1990's, especially with election of the debonair Seyyed Mohammad Khatami (1997/2005-) as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But two significant episodes would make short work of the rapprochement: First, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003; and secondly, the election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). The combination of these episodes opened the door wide to Iran political expansionism, especially in Iraq and

beyond. Iran's political and/or military presence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and finally Yemen, the GCC backyard, in addition to meddling in Bahrain, Kuwait and the Saudi Eastern Province confirmed the suspicions harbored by the GCC towards Iran. An Iranian official, «Alireza Zakani, a loyalist of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, boasted that Iran now controls four Arab capitals - Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and now Sana'a» (Hearst, 2014). The GCC's feeling that Iran is running wrings around them in the geopolitical game promoted them to intervene in Yemen avowedly to restore the legitimate government and to staunch Iran's expansionist policies right in its tracks.

Perception of US Disengagement from the Middle East: Long before the Obama's affirmation to pivot to Asia, the US position in the Middle has seemingly eroded. The botched invasion of Iraq and the chaos that engulfed that hapless country made the US look ham-fisted. The inability to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israel's consonant defiance of its patron corroded whatever credibility Washington had in the region. The failure or lack of resolve, to contain Iran's ambitions impressed upon Gulf allies a collusion or ineptitude on part of the US. Signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

between the P51+ with Iran, without consulting GCC states, weakened GCC confidence in the US.

The impression of US state of perplexity in the Middle East is shared by US scholars and policy wonks. James Bill and Rebecca Bill Chavez (2002) bemoaned US overreliance on force in an article presciently called «The Politics of Incoherence: The United States and the Middle East.» Yahya Sadowski and Fareed Mohamedi (2001) had penned an article declaring «The Decline (But Not Fall) of US Hegemony in the Middle East». In a similar vein, Richard Haass (2007) President of Council on Foreign Relations argued that «[t]he overall impression is of a Middle East spinning out of control and the United States unable to do much about it.» And added that «one thing is certain: the American era in the Middle East is over.»

The Threat of Religiopolitics: That Islam is the zeitgeist of the historical and contemporary life in the Middle East is an incontrovertible fact, nay, a truism. But political Islam has become a force to be reckoned with since the past four decades. All the same, political Islam remained largely an opposition force and hemmed in by various Arab governments. It was the Arab Spring that lifted the lid on these movements and brought them to power. A fact that threatened Arab regional order, and allowed intrusive non-Arab states to hold sway on the region under the guise of religion.

A corollary to the Islamization of politics is political sectarianism. Sectarianism has been variedly part of the fabric of Arab societies for quite some time. The Lebanese Civil War (1975-90) was largely fought, though not exclusively, on sectarian basis. But of late, sectarianism has become the time-honored political identity in spades of major forces within the Arab system. Sectarianism has become the explosive belt of the region writ large and a menace threatening to dismember the Arab states.

Conclusion:

The GCC states today represent

the most cohesive and powerful actor within the Arab state system. The Arab system faces the greatest challenge since its inception. The Arab winter of discontent has shown that any problem in the Arab region metastasizes to other parts. The GCC realizes that its scope and vital interests extend beyond its borders. The growing interest in the restitution of the Arab regional system is the consequence of the perceived disengagement of the US from the region by the GCC. The Arab regional system will fill the vacuum and the Arab system has gained a breathing space with the superpower retreat.

From a GCC perspective, the intrusive regional powers masquerading under political Islam or sectarianism provided ample opportunity for the Arab system to reemerge as an impregnable fence to external intervention and an antidote to pernicious sectarian forces. Emphasis on Arab identity, as the political currents have it, plays a significant suppressant role against hidebound and parochial zealots. The GCC is acting here as the core of regional system to defend the nation from what it perceives as domestic and foreign onslaught.


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Iran's Strategic Choices Post-Sanctions:

What They Could Mean for the UAE

A lot of debate has been provoked on the outcome for Iran of the lifting of sanctions following the P5+1 agreement. It focuses on whether Iran will use this windfall to rebuild the economy and invest domestically or will the Iranian regime direct these resources into actions that destabilize the Middle East region, by increased financial support of paramilitary groups? The strategic implications for the UAE of Iran's post-sanctions policy direction will be discussed in this article.



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The Case for Domestic Reform

Many analysts, such as (Katzman, 2015), argue that the Iranian economy needs substantial investment after years of sanctions, with the following five areas a priority:

The high inflation rate has to be tackled.

Government subsidies are estimated at \$70 to \$100 billion annually for energy, basic foodstuffs and medical products (Nikou & Glen, 2015).

Unemployment levels increased in 2014 to 11.4%, yet, following the lifting of sanctions, people expect the government to increase salaries and create more jobs.

The banking sector has reduced credit to an already weak corporate sector while increasing it to the government. If the Central Bank intervenes to support banks, this might affect its capacity to reduce

inflation and further drive up the cost of living.

The private sector needs government support to compete with state or semi-government industries for major contracts by helping entrepreneurs and smaller businesses secure credit (Erdbrink, 2016).

In a survey conducted on what Iranians want the government's priorities to be following the lifting of sanctions, 8 out of 10 respondents identified «investing in improving the economy and creating employment» as a top priority (Figure 1), which indicates pressure for the Iranian government to fulfill domestic expectations (Zogby 2015).

Figure 1. Poll results from Iranian public on how much priority different factors should take following the lifting of international sanctions. Source: Zogby, 2015



Figure 1. Poll results from Iranian public on how much priority different factors should take following the lifting of international sanctions. Source: Zogby, 2015

The Case for Increased External Destabilizing Behavior

Since 1979, a feature of Iran's foreign policy has been support for a number of armed factions and hardline governments in the region, some of which have been categorized as terrorist organizations by the United States and other Western countries. The main groups or parties supported by Iran include; Hezbollah, Al Assad regime, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shia militias in Iraq, Houthis rebels in Yemen and Gulf militia cells in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Several writers argue that additional money from sanctions relief would enable Iran to increase its foreign adventurism in the region and expand its support of proxy activities (Eisenstadt et al., 2015; Zarate, 2015). Naame Shaam (2015) estimates the Iranian regime's expenditure on financing terrorist groups in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine as totaling US\$ 80 billion since the 1980s and continues unabated as per testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Brian Katulis (2016). Iran had also significantly increased financial

support for Hamas and Hezbollah since the signing of the Iran Nuclear Agreement according to a report by the Foreign Relations Bureau in Iraq (2015).

Research & Analysis

In order to determine whether the windfall from sanctions relief could cause Iran to further fuel proxy groups in the region, financial data on the estimated support that Iran has provided to four main paramilitary groups was compared to macro-economic indicators between 2007 and 2014. This period was chosen because it represents a time frame before and after the application of the majority of nuclear-related international sanctions (2010-2012-) and as such serves as a baseline for comparison.

As depicted in Figure 2 there was a sharp increase (around 1500%) in the financial support provided to military groups from 2010 onwards compared to previous years. That is despite the sharp economic contraction that took place during the same time period.

Figure 2. Financial support of paramilitary groups in proportion to Iran's GDP

Interviews were also conducted with a number of experts in the field which also yielded some interesting results:

None of those interviewed believed Iran would decrease its financial support of proxies or destabilizing activities in the region following the lifting of sanctions, but both His Excellency Saif Al Zaabi, UAE Ambassador to Iran, and Dr. Abdullah Toukan, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Strategic and International Risk Assessment (SIRA) Center, did mention that Iran's domestic economic situation required immediate attention as key sectors and infrastructure is in dire shape, and because there are projections of relatively low GDP per capita and high youth unemployment through to 2020. A couple of those surveyed asserted that Iran is already using the windfall to support proxies

Most experts were of the opinion that the strategic objectives of Iran are to become a regional hegemon and increase influence, and thus




Figure 2. Financial support of paramilitary groups in proportion to Iran's GDP

levels of financial support to proxy groups would vary depending on developments in areas or countries considered of strategic importance to the current regime. That said, Alex Vatanka, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute and Jamestown Foundation, believe Iran's strategic orientation will very much depend on how the internal dynamics play out between two key groups. Namely the 'moderates', who place greater value on international legitimacy and economic integration, and the 'hardliners' whose main priorities are the export of the Islamic revolution and self-preservation.

Karim Sadjadpour, Senior Associate for the Middle East Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who specializes on Iran, believes Iran hold strong the image of once being a great power and thus its policies will not change and it will have more resources to pursue them. He also said he was more than 50% sure the deal would not last because it was signed as a result of economic duress related to the price of oil, sanctions, and involvement in Syria, and as such was tactical compromise and not a strategic shift. Therefore in two to four years from now the deal would probably collapse.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Research findings lead us to conclude that Iran's financial support of proxy groups is not dependent upon the availability of funds but remains a strategic priority of the regime. A three-pillar strategy is recommended which seeks to minimize any negative implications to the UAE while maximizing opportunities from the lifting of sanctions and maintaining the UAE's image as a model state in the region

UAE Strategy for a Post-Sanctions Iran

Short-term (15- years) – Greater Security Collaboration and Guarantees from the United States

The UAE and GCC countries could push for greater overall security collaboration and for more US security guarantees. A GCC partnership with NATO could also be beneficial. Subject to all GCC states' agreement, a collective security architecture together with the NATO's expertise would allow for inter-operability training and collaboration This could deter not just Iran but other potential threats in the future. If the partnership with NATO does not come through however, the UAE should still take

a larger, more assertive role in promoting GCC security versus Iran, including integrated missile defense capabilities, improved maritime cooperation, cyber defense and joint exercises.


Furthermore, the UAE needs US support on targeted economic sanctions that do not fall under the Iran deal, particularly against the IRGC and Quds Force, as well as making it difficult for Iran to access the global banking system) unless it reduces aggressive activities such as ballistic missile tests and support of proxies.

Medium-term (110- years) – Counter Sunni—Shia rhetoric and put a spotlight on destabilizing behavior in the region

The 400,000 Iranians living in the UAE could serve as a link and counterbalance against regional sectarian rhetoric. This can be achieved by sport and cultural events that could provide an opportunity for exchange that would signal support for the aspirations of the Iranian people.

Long-term (10+ years): Increase Economic Integration through the Private Sector

A long-term policy option could be for the UAE to unilaterally increase economic ties with Iran through the



private sector by increased trade, investment, stock purchasing, or joint projects that are driven by mutual benefits. Such increased economic integration could put pressure on the Iranian government over issues of UAE interest while also allowing the UAE access to the opening Iranian market. By not being government driven, this policy is less likely to be opposed by Saudi Arabia or even viewed skeptically by the Iranian government.

The UAE needs to ensure that there is a conducive business environment to encourage private sector participation with effective counter-measures and safeguards to protect against financing of terrorism and money laundering, particularly in Dubai, which is likely to remain the cynosure of economic activity with Iran. The UAE would also need to enact measures to support businesses if the Iran deal does not last.

In conjunction with the above policy recommendations, it is important that the UAE continues to push Russia and China to stop supplying weapons that enable Iranian aggression. His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, has developed a strong personal relationship with President Putin which could be a channel to seek greater cooperation on Iran. Moreover, China is interested in projecting power in the region and has just set up a base in Djibouti, and so the UAE could be more assertive in helping to guide China's policy in the region.

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National Resource Management in the UAE:

A Framework for Resource Security

As the UAE seeks to grow through a diversified, knowledge based economy, it is vital that resources such as raw materials, human capital, food, energy and water, required to drive this growth are secured effectively and sustainably. Without ensuring adequate supplies of raw materials, water, food and energy and without proper labor efficiency and productivity, the UAE will face challenges going into the post-oil era. This article reviews these challenges, assesses opportunities and provides recommendations for a framework for resource security in UAE. These resources, vital to UAE's success and therefore its security are being consumed unsustainably and increasing population, both domestically and globally, places further pressure on their supply. The research question is "How can UAE secure its national resources for the future?"

Since the UAE population is rising and resources are limited, there is an urgent need for action. To secure resources, countries are looking at improving resource productivity (a measure of whether economic growth (GDP) is de-coupled from resource use). We consider five key national resources vital for UAE's prosperity and security: Raw Materials, Labor, Water, Energy and Food.



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Situation Assessment

By 2050, World population will be 9 billion (United Nations, 2015). Already there are resource conflicts e.g. Sudan for land, oil and water (Suliman, 1999; & Caas, 2007) and economically e.g. China's dominance of the rare earth metal market (Yan, 2015).

Water use has grown by twice population growth in the last 100 years. By 2025, 1.8 billion people will suffer from water scarcity (National Geographic, 2016). By 2050, the world needs to produce at least 50% more food (World Bank, 2016). This means there will be increasing competition for food supplies.

In terms of labor resource, projections indicate shortages in health care professionals due to aging populations and low fertility rates (Lang, 2011) and a shortfall of 25.8 million teachers in 33 countries to provide primary education by 2030 (UNESCO, 2015).

The UAE's population is 9 million (1 million UAE nationals) growing to 11 million by 2020 (UNDES, 2015). UAE has limited and dwindling supplies of freshwater. Domestic supply comes from desalination, while groundwater is primarily for irrigation and agriculture. UAE consumes 550 liters/person/day, amongst the highest consumption rates globally (Abdul Kader, 2014). The UAE's agricultural sector contributes <1% of GDP, uses 75% of available water and contributes only 15% of the demand for food, leaving UAE heavily reliant on food imports (Bitar, 2015). UAE also has one of the highest kcal/capita/day with 3,125 kcal/capita/day c.f. global average of 2,859 kcal/capita/day (FAO, 2016). This has health implications with UAE's obesity rate twice the world average and 19% of the population has diabetes (Rizvi, 2015). The UAE energy demand is increasing 9% annually but it is committed to diversify its energy mix to 24% from renewables and low carbon by 2021 and working to reduce demand by 30% in government buildings (UAE State of Energy Report, 2015). The

UAE is diversifying its economy through different industries e.g. aluminum and iron smelting, silicon chip manufacturing, and aircraft part manufacture. These require raw materials, so while the economy is being diversified, economic growth is not necessarily de-coupled from resource use. This risks reliance on raw materials (Yap, 2015). Furthermore, recycling is not being utilized efficiently, only 35% of waste of recycled c.f. Germany 62%, Belgium 58% and Netherlands 51% (EAD, 2013).

The labor force comprises of 90% foreigners (4.5 million unskilled). Although salary costs are low for the private sector, it has a high cost for government. In 2010, overall social cost of workers to UAE government was estimated to be 50 billion dirhams (Al Awad, 2010).

Physicians and Teachers are vital for the prosperity of any nation. UAE lags behind OECD average for both with 2.5 physicians/1000 population and 17.5 students/lecturer c.f. OECD averages 3.0 and 14.6, respectively (UNESCO, 2015).

The UAE's strengths include political and social stability, competitive economy and one of the largest sovereign wealth funds (Behrendt, 2008). It has high levels of international standing in social and economic indicators such as adult literacy rate which is 94% (UNESCO, 2015). Its infrastructure makes it one of the most advanced countries and it has strong military defensive capabilities coupled with strong strategic alliances, both regionally as well as internationally.

The UAE's influence is demonstrated practically through world class humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and military interventions. It has positioned itself as an international hub, with airports, ports and financial centers. UAE is an influential player in the international arena, and a leader in renewable energies e.g. Masdar initiative.

The UAE has two vital national interests. First, "a nurturing and sustainable environment for quality

living" and second, "a competitive economy driven by knowledgeable and innovative Emiratis" (UAE Vision 2021).

The first national objective is UAE should work towards securing supplies of key resources such as water, food and energy to sustain the population and economy. Secondly, UAE should work on securing key raw materials for industries to transition its economy. Finally, UAE should work on increasing labor efficiency and productivity. The main threat for the first two national objectives is resource scarcity, simply through resources running out or by being denied by others. Threats associated with the third objective are social unrest and demographic imbalance.

Recommendations

To achieve the first national objective requires:

Reduced consumption of water, food and energy. Accommodating economic and population growth requires reduced consumption through economic instruments e.g. incentives, tariff changes, awareness campaigns, and labeling/packaging schemes. A food needs assessment is required to identify the quantity of food adequate to sustain the population.

Increasing renewable energy supply and energy efficiency measures. In addition to a nuclear energy program and solar power; an energy strategy committed to increasing low-carbon/renewable energy provision as well as efficiency measures is needed.

Establishing food production facilities. UAE should establish agreements with countries such as Madagascar and Ethiopia who have suitable areas to secure food supplies for UAE.

Establishing international food shipping and storage depots. UAE should use economic

instruments such as free-zones to incentivize multinational corporations to build food shipping and storage depots in UAE to secure supplies.

Positioning UAE as an international hub for R&D.

Investment in R&D will position UAE as a regional knowledge economy and develop technical solutions to challenges of water, food and energy.

Protecting critical infrastructure. UAE needs to protect critical infrastructure both technically (e.g. Aquifer Strategic Reserve) and militarily (e.g. Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority).

Agriculture master plan. A plan based on rational water, land and energy consumption and proper per capita needs assessment should be put in place.

The second national objective of securing raw materials for industry requires:

Increasing economic ties with China and North Korea. China's domination of rare earths is a threat UAE needs to address. As part of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) program, UAE should persuade China to position UAE as a regional hub for importing rare earths through preferential trade agreements. UAE can persuade China to set up a regional headquarters for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to fund projects that China is looking to pursue. Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has large reserves of rare earths, therefore UAE should seek relations with DPRK. Since DPRK has a marine strategic location to China and Russia, UAE can persuade DPRK to open doors for UAE Port Companies to become established in DPRK.

Reducing consumption of raw materials in industry. UAE should review the portfolio of industries requiring resources into which it is seeking to diversify. Working with industry to reduce their consumption of raw materials is important and this can be done by introducing appropriate regulations and incentive schemes.



Introducing nation-wide e-waste program. Each year 101,000 tonnes of e-waste is generated in the UAE. Introducing appropriate regulations and collection and recycling of e-waste can spur economic development and make UAE a regional hub for e-waste, helping to increase economic interdependence and enhance security and stability.

Increasing research and development in raw materials and manufacturing. UAE can benefit from increasing R&D relations with countries which are advanced in strong industrial R&D, to increase interdependency.

The third objective of increasing

labor productivity and efficiency requires:

Increasing Emiratis in key sectors. Emiratis are scarce in key sectors such as health, education and science. Incentive schemes for degrees should be established to encourage Emiratis to study these specializations. To increase numbers a scholarship program should be implemented to encourage Emiratis to become physicians and teachers. Favorable salary structures with financial and societal incentives will attract Emiratis to these professions.

Reducing unskilled jobs. R&D to drive forward robotics and artificial intelligence will reduce unskilled labor in certain sectors, reduce



social imbalance and demand on resources. UAE should focus on a knowledge economy as a means of driving innovation, diversifying the economy, improving the employability of UAE Nationals and improving resource efficiency.

Introducing a licensing system for all jobs. UAE should regulate job markets by issuing licenses to ensure the appropriate quality of all workers.

Conclusion

Through the projection of future global challenges related to resources, as well as the UAE, a need to look at resource efficiency and security at a federal level is vital for social and economic prosperity

after the oil era. Without reducing consumption and increasing efficiency, economic and social development UAE will face difficulties from stresses on resources over the next 30 - 50 years. It is critical to secure resources for the continued economic and social well-being of UAE.

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Regional Power Race: Where Does the UAE stand?



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With the contemporary international and domestic environment we will notice a significant transformation in the current international system, the world started to witness the gradual fading of a unipolar system -where the US was the only superpower-, and the emerging of a multipolar system with new global players. As a result, a new focus on regional powers is increasing; where states share similar threats and can have an impact on their region's security dynamics. In the Middle East region, we notice serious situations accompanied with instability due to rapid changes in the environment such as failing states, newly emerging powers, and new non-state actors. These recent fluctuations have had a noticeable impact on UAE national security in recognition of the importance of performing a different role in the region by adopting different foreign policies. Therefore, adopting a more assertive role in the region has become one of the UAE national

interests. This transformation raises a question whether the UAE has the potentials to become a regional power within the gulf region in the coming ten years and how far the UAE is progressing towards this end.

Regional power status means having the aptitude to pursue national interests in effective ways by emphasizing on regional common threats, and the ability to develop a mechanism whereby these threats can be managed. However, traditionally speaking, power was previously defined based on many tangible elements that the UAE does not possess such as location, population, and natural resources. State size is important because it provides a platform where elements manifest themselves based on different regional contributions. Population, another key element, depends on the education level and skills that people possess. There are many other intangible elements and potential power the UAE possesses, such as social



coherence, leadership, political stability and a prospering economy. When the various elements are used appropriately they will strengthen the UAE's position and facilitate its advancement towards becoming a regional power.

Through the past decades, the UAE has simultaneously adopted different means to meet different ends. It implements statecrafts that are either cooperative or defensive and at times both are implemented to gain influence, power or gain strategic ground to reduce the risk level. A more defensive security strategy was clearly seen in the country with more independent foreign policies especially after the conflict in Egypt and the failed attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to control it, and then was followed by the Decisive Storm operation in Yemen and the determination to combat Iranian proxy wars and restore the balance in the region. Consequently, after the Arab Spring, the increasing conflict in the Middle East region, and the gradual backing of US intervention in the regional conflicts, the UAE started flexing its muscles and paying more attention to its military power by increasing military expenditure from 3.3 percent of GDP to reach 5.7 percent in 2015.

According to the Balance of Trade Study conducted by the UK-

based IHS Jane's, an intelligence provider to militaries, government, intelligence agencies and industries, the UAE was ranked as the second-biggest defense importer in the Middle East, right behind Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it showed a strong ambition to increase its military power by acquiring top notch air defense systems such as THAAD and AN/TPY-2 radar. Yet a general accepted fact is state with a small population may lack the critical element of power that provides ability to protect its territory by preventing attacks; this is one critical factor that is relevant when considering the UAE's potential regional power status.

Nevertheless the UAE start to implement several statecrafts to overcome the challenge; where we can see the ongoing work on the UAE navy force strategic vision to be achieved by 2020. It aims to enhance the UAE capabilities to be able to fulfill its duties and responsibilities, by using the latest technologies to attain continuous development in the UAE's navy force. The aim is to improve their sea surveillance capabilities to gain full control of national sea borders and build capacity that goes beyond the UAE's territorial waters. On the other hand, as much as the UAE is trying to rise as an independent

power it still maintains its traditional security arrangement to preserve a strong alliance with the USA, France and the UK. A strong commitment to international organization and regional alliances forms a basis within which the UAE plays its role in the international arena.

Another effective step was the national military service law, Conscription in the UAE case was considered the most feasible solution to increase and mobilize manpower resources in the country by using the military aspect that can be applied to the new National Service law. Conscription also has another spiral effect on individuals; it provides them with required discipline, teamwork and leadership, developing necessary skills that can make the future generations more competent, confident and capable in their chosen path after their military service has ended.

Furthermore, UAE leaders were able to see the importance of power and how wealthy states can adopt various instruments to influence external players. This is evident with the current international environment, with regard to the political implications of the Arab Spring, the shift in U.S geostrategic priorities in the region and the rise of Iranian influence. Yet with the new threat of declining oil prices, the UAE has started to implement new economic strategies to diversify its income and preserve the wealth after oil era that the state enjoys. The economic sector was thus prioritized, as one of the UAE strongest means to become a regional power.

Globalization has also played an important role and the UAE sees a great opportunity to start domestic restructuring to facilitate growth in the economic sector empowered by the vision of being a self-sustaining and market-driven economy. As a result, the UAE has put into action a series of reforms in the labor market,

education and economic policies. Moreover, there is the geographic position which the UAE enjoys and gives the country a unique influence in the region acting as a bridge between Europe, Africa from one side and Asia from another. Therefore, the UAE can use this unique geographical position to empower trade and strive to dominate the shipping lines in the region; besides shipping, the UAE took advantage of its location to boost tourism and cultural influence. Additional part of the UAE formula for success lies in the collaboration with emerging economies as His Highness Abdulla bin Zayed said: "The UAE looks forward to bolstering our relations with the fast growing countries, such as India, Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa." These alliances represent strategic partnerships and pool the rising power of emerging economies giving all the states a boost. In particular, it gives the UAE a presence in major international forums and therefore a voice in global affairs.

There is no current evidence or research that shows whether it is possible to consider the UAE as a regional power; however, it is visible that international media have increasingly started to notice the an unexpected change from previous practice, the UAE manage to become one of the most influential players in the region, by using its economical tools and military power combined with smart foreign policies, and so the UAE has been able to participate vigorously in shaping events in the Arab world. This growing influence was sensed when the US government decided to stop military aid to Egypt and the UAE lobbied with Saudi Arabia against that direction and succeeded in influencing the USA to reverse its stance.

Another considerable demonstration of the enhanced nature of the UAE's political influence was by taking a strong and clear standpoint in fighting terrorist. While the UAE shows strong commitment in fighting terrorism using military means, the country supplements its efforts by taking the lead and creating a softer face to combat the threat, and placing itself as





a role model for an Islamic country that advocates peace rather than violence.

Alternative way to leverage influence is through foreign aid, it has always been one of the main pillars of the UAE foreign policy. In 2015, the UAE announced that between 1971 and 2014, government and non-government organizations, charitable and humanitarian institutions in the UAE, provided Dh173 billion in foreign aid to 178 countries across the world. Aid-based diplomacy enables the UAE to build institutional friends such as the United Nations and test its capabilities in terms of political diplomacy. However, aid disbursement must also be viewed as a security strategy especially when tied to military force or given in the context of conflict and/or conflict resolution. Furthermore, UAE aid distribution enables it to access the global political stage, balance internal and external pressures and maintain security. The UAE is not only a strong responder to humanitarian crises, it plays a major role by taking the advantage of its location and has established a Humanitarian City:, a leading global humanitarian logistics hub that connects East and West, empowering the international communities to reflect change in the lives of people in need.

During its formative years, the UAE developed a clear foreign policy and its principles have been consistently applied ever since. The main tenets are to support moderation, peaceful resolution of disputes, renounce violence, uphold the inviolability of national sovereignty, promote security in the Arabian Gulf and participate in international organizations and agreements, (ESSR: 2010) and partake in multinational peace and stabilizing missions. Through consistency in pursuing such policies and focusing on increasing the country's capabilities, the UAE has been recognized as a key player in the region. In 2009 the UAE succeeded in beating Germany and Australia in hosting the International

Renewable Energy Agency. This victory can be considered as the first indicator for the UAE to have a noticeable footprint on the international map. It also indicates the acceptance of the UAE as a powerful, capable state and an equal partner in the international decision making structure. Subsequently, the UAE won the right to host EXPO 2020, one of the most prestigious events in the world, opening the door for huge opportunities for the country. Even when the event is over, the legacy will remain, which businesses will be able to take advantage of.

Another measure of recognition that we can rely on is the Country Brand Index. This measure is issued by the Future Brand Organization and it reflects how the international world views different countries, and the UAE was the only Arab country which made it to the top twenty and acquired the nineteenth position worldwide. The strength or weakness of perception of a country can influence peoples' decisions to choose them as places to visit, live in or invest in. This is assumed to provide a competitive advantage in the global market for tourism, education and investment.

In 45 years the country managed to transfer into a wealthy, secured and internationally recognized state. With a strong economy that provides enough capacity for state to pursue a more dependent foreign policies. Despite the challenges that usually go together with small states, the UAE confronts these challenges with constructive and assertive policies and was able to earn a reputation as a new and important player in the Gulf region. Accordingly, with the Emirate leadership determination to success and current statecrafts that combined hard power with soft power, the UAE will be able to stand out as a regional power in the coming future.

The strategic concept of Coordination in Crisis Management

Introduction.

1. Everyone should admit that crises are inevitable and that no nation in the world is immune to them. Disasters have plagued civilizations since ancient times, and since then man has tried to use available resources to reduce the effects of these disasters. To ensure the effectiveness of response plans, a scientific and collaborative crisis management approach must be applied to optimize the coordination of efforts.



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2. The responsibility of coordinating crisis response efforts is not limited to state agencies. It involves all private sector entities including business enterprises, civil society organizations, charities, non-government organizations, and regional and international agencies. Effective crisis management procedures require the integration of emergency resources in order to achieve the predetermined goals. Coordination and integration mechanisms are a prerequisite for ensuring a systematic crisis management approach; however, in order to ensure effective control over available resources there should be in place a robust communication network that can create shared understanding and situational awareness across various actors.

3. Generally, in any given crisis management system, its success heavily relies on coordinating and integrating all its components. It cannot be said that leadership is the only tool to achieve coordination;

however, coordination and leadership are two inseparable concepts. In other words, when one talks about leadership, coordination is already there in the mind of the speaker. It is extremely important to point out here that identification of powers, regular review, testing and efficient communication system are the key elements of successful coordination in any crisis management structure.

The Concept of Coordination

4. For Monet and Rally, coordination is an act to achieve the unity of action or an act of organizing, making different departments or entities work together to achieve the pre-planned objectives of any organization. Coordination is a managerial process according to which the various roles and tasks of a given establishment are appropriately adapted and intertwined. It can be defined also as a function according to which an administrative manager can ensure that various subordinate



units operate in perfect accord with the aim of achieving the main organizational objectives and avoiding unintentional conflicting or contradictory goals at various levels. The successful manager is the one who undertakes coordination efforts within his organization by defining the powers and responsibilities of subordinate departments in a manner that helps accomplish the organization's or state's objectives. If coordination is considered one of leadership functions, it is also one of the important tools to achieve the

goals of an organization or state. Contrary to Monet and Raelly , others perceived coordination as the coordination and integration of all operations , tasks, and command and control structures in a manner that guarantees the most efficient use of a given organization's capabilities and assets towards achieving it preplanned goals. One should not mistakenly think that coordination and cooperation mean the same. However, these two expressions have two different meanings. Cooperation refers to

the sum of efforts of individuals who work together by free choice to achieve certain goals. It simply refers to the desire of people to help one another. However, coordination is much more demanding as it requires more than just the wish of individuals to cooperate with each other. Rather, it requires a deliberate and sincere effort to unite the efforts of all the concerned people to ensure the unison of action. It requires concurrence of purpose, harmony of effort and concerted action.



Coordination Objectives.

5. Coordination primarily aims to achieve harmony and synchronization in the performance of planning, operational and regulatory agencies involved in crisis management where objectives are accomplished away from duplication of efforts and overlap of jurisdictions. This absolutely facilitates the effective deployment of resources and better use of efforts in pursuit of predetermined goals by cost-effective means. Other objectives of coordination include:

a. Preventing overlap of jurisdictions among various agencies involved in crisis management.

b. Preventing duplication of administrative and operational tasks. Multi-role agencies may perform similar duties to achieve a common goal. Coordination mechanisms help unify these efforts to achieve such common goals by less effort and cost.

c. Preventing rivalry among agencies involved in crisis management. Different agencies may compete to obtain necessary human and material resources. Coordination mechanisms help meet the unique needs of each of these agencies and set the right priorities.

d. Accomplishing tasks in less time and at less cost.

e. Eliminating root causes of

conflict and friction among various agencies on the crisis scene.

f. Implementing regulatory decisions with the best way possible.

g. Achieving a balanced implementation of administrative and operational activities which enhances the confidence of community and public opinion in the state's ability to tackle the crisis.

Types of Coordination

7. There are several types of coordination that can be summarized as follows:

a. **Internal Coordination.** It is the kind of coordination that is conducted between different departments and sections that work together under crisis management structures with the aim of achieving harmony and synchronization of collective efforts. The coordination mechanism established between the crisis management team and media offices operating under crisis management structures can serve as a good example of internal coordination. These offices provide the crisis management team with media requirements and coordinate media releases in a manner compatible with operational requirements.

b. **External Coordination.** It refers to the coordination that exists between the crisis management structure and all other actors

involved in crisis management efforts. For example, this includes all coordination efforts with government and non-government organizations (national and international) regarding any shortfalls in national resource as well as other coordination activities designed to ensure a well-defined concept of operation for all actors in crisis management including trans-boundary bodies.

c. Vertical Coordination.

This refers to the coordination that exists between the highest and lowest levels in a crisis management structure. A good example of this coordination mechanism is the one that exists between the operation centers at the operational /strategic levels and the front-line operation room.

d. **Horizontal Coordination.** It refers to the coordination that exists between organizations working in crisis management at the same level. Operational coordination between army and police elements during a crisis can serve as a good example in this regard.

e. **Logistic Coordination.** It refers to the process of planning, deploying, and controlling the flow of resources as well as the proper and effective storage and distribution of these resources in the field. The effective deployment of resources during a crisis is crucial in the strategy of crisis management.



f. **Coordination of Plans and Operations.** This kind of coordination aims to ensure support for decision-making and effective task implementation of various government agencies involved in crisis management through situational awareness, shared information, integrated and synchronized operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels and continued implementation of plans in place.

Principles of Coordination

6. Scholars in the public administration discipline argue that there are some guiding principles that should be applied when initiating the coordination process during crises. These principles can be applied no matter what type of coordination is. Such principles can be summarized as follows:

- a. Coordination efforts should start as much early as possible and in parallel with plans development.
- b. Coordination must be flexible.
- c. Coordination must be commensurate with response procedures during a crisis.
- d. Coordination must enhance jurisdictions and powers vested in crisis management structure by law.
- e. Coordination must ensure efficient means of communication.

Obstacles to coordination.

8. As other functions of

management, coordination may face some problems. These problems or obstacles are associated with organizational structures, orders, instructions, and people who are involved in the coordination process. Among the prominent obstacles to coordination are:

- a. Inefficient communication and databases.
- b. Inability of leadership to control the coordination rhythm between various units involved in crisis management.
- c. Arrogance of some people involved in crisis management which adversely impact the performance of various agencies in pursuit of planned goals.
- d. Conflicting orders and random actions.
- e. Unserious leaders or those in charge of coordinating crisis management efforts.
- f. Bad organizational culture which necessarily leads to coordination failure.
- g. Lack of coordination authority due to inefficient legislations and regulatory policies.

Factors for successful coordination

9. To ensure an effective coordination of crisis management efforts, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

- a. Managers must understand the nature of coordination function

and the goals their units are trying to achieve.

b. Coordination is necessarily a communication and information exchange process, and the person in charge of this function must meet these requirements.

c. Coordination should start as much early as possible and during the planning phase in order to avoid conflicting decisions and policies.

d. It is important that individuals engaged in the implementation of plans take part in the coordination process in order to emphasize the importance of their roles and the utility of information exchange between various agencies and units.

e. There should be a kind of harmony between various departments to ensure effective horizontal coordination. Rivalry to achieve personal or departmental gains among managers could lead to a duplication of effort and inability to achieve the ultimate goal.

In summary, coordination is one of the key functions of management in any organization particularly during emergency and disaster. It determines success of any collective effort of various agencies.

11. Countering emergencies and disasters is not an individual responsibility. Rather, it is a collective effort in which various public and private sector actors play supportive and complementary roles to achieve the predetermined goals. As such, there is a need to establish a coordination model during crises that can ensure smooth and balanced performance of different agencies involved in crisis management.

12. A coordination office must be established in every crisis management center that can take care of all coordination issues according to the crisis management structure and other administrative divisions.



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