



National Defense

Strategic Annual Journal – Issued by National Defense College – Issue 05 – June 2018

**Focusing Events
as a Catalyst to
the Development
of U.S. Homeland
Security**

**The Islamic
Tradition of
Diplomacy**

Mohammed Bin Rashid:

“Mohammed bin Zayed oversees attentively the curriculum development process of the National Defense College.”



Mohamed Bin Zayed Receives the 5th NDC Course Graduates

Editorial

In our beloved country, we proudly celebrate the Year of Zayed, the great leader, and the eternal symbol whose achievements and vision have shaped our meaningful thought, dedicated work, and high principles. Those high principles have forged a country that moves steadily forward with an unmatched resolve towards more prosperity. Under the guidance of our wise leadership, the UAE people are travelling on a long journey towards a prosperous future, the pillars of which are the UAE security, stability, constructive cooperation, peaceful coexistence with neighbors, brothers, and friends, in decency and sustainability for the well-being of the UAE's future generations, by the blessed grace of Allah's will.

Following the approach of the Founder, Sheikh Zayed, and the UAE has become the country as a regional and international exemplary model to the whole world by achieving unmatched records using innovative methods, approaches, and inspiring efforts. An example of such innovation can be seen in the achievements of this government, which cares about tolerance, happiness, food security, soft power, and artificial intelligence, in addition to education, health, community development, infrastructure, various services, space exploration, clean energy, and economic diversification.

In keeping with other state institutions, our Armed Forces strive to meet the requirements of the modern age, to perform their roles efficiently, and to strengthen their abilities to ensure victory and deter all those who might undermine our achievements, sovereignty, capabilities, and resources. Moreover, they play critical roles in achieving international peace and regional stability, in addition to establishing the required strategic secure environment for the overall development process.

Following more than five years and after graduating five National Defense College courses, the NDC has moved towards achieving its vision, mission, and objectives to have a well-established national, regional, and international status with the help of Allah the Almighty. Indeed, a number of factors have helped in turning dreams into reality. One of those critical factors is the support of our wise leadership, followed by the clear vision and close oversight of the NDC Higher Council and the UAE Armed Forces GHQ. The dedication of NDC officers, other ranks, and civilian staff have also supported this dream.

Nothing could illustrate the success of the NDC mission more than successfully graduating five NDC courses. Military and civilian participants have successfully and proficiently acquired knowledge and skills required for understanding the strategic environment and its associated strategic variables, as well as the instruments of state power by keeping pace with current events and understanding the motives and forms of such variables and anticipating their impact on national interests. This has enabled them to gain strategic knowledge, leadership skills and a comprehensive vision and horizons towards more professionalism and leadership traits to implement national strategies that are part of the national security strategy. Moreover, NDC faculty have a critical role in linking the academic programs with the current situation and guiding the academic process in an interactive methodology that exactly matches the participants' level and experience. In each year, the successive performance indicators have proved the success of the NDC throughout its first five years. Thanks to the support of the NDC Higher Council, the UAE Armed Forces GHQ and the collaboration of the state's officials and institutions as well as the proficiency and motivation of all NDC staff.

In this current issue of the NDC Journal, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all those involved in the preparation of this issue and to express my due respect and appreciation to the editorial staff for their persistent efforts in providing diversified and distinguished articles to address the needs of various readers.

In this current issue of the NDC Journal, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all those involved in the preparation of this issue and to express my due respect and appreciation to the editorial staff for their persistent efforts in providing diversified and distinguished articles to address the needs of various readers.



**Major General Staff Pilot
Rashad Mohamed
Alsaadi**
Commander of the
National Defense College
(NDC)

Cover



His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai, attended the graduation ceremony of the fifth Course of the National Defense College in Abu Dhabi.



Leadership Reflection Paper

16

Focusing Events as a Catalyst to the Development of U.S. Homeland Security

24



32



Gearing up for Peace Potential Conflict Scenarios in the Gulf

48

The Islamic Tradition of Diplomacy



52



“Easy to Win?” Strategic Implications of a U.S.-China Trade War for GCC States



64

Climate Change and the UAE's Strategic Interests



A Specialized Yearly Journal
on Strategic Affairs
Issued by UAE National Defense College
Established In June 2014

General supervisor

Maj. Gen. Pilot /
Rashad Mohamed Al Saadi

Editor in chief

Staff Brigadier / Abdulla Al Zaabi

Editorial Manager

Staff Lt. Colonel / Yousef Al Hadad

Sub-Editors

Sameera Naser Basaloom
Salwa Mohammed Al Marzooqi

Editorial Board

Lt. Colonel Dr. / Rashid Al Dhaheri
Lt. Col. Staff Dr. Salim Al Zaabi
Lt. Colonel Ali Abdulla Al Mazrooei

Copyright

Awni Abdulrahim Al Khatib

Layout & Design

Khalil Ismail Al Hosani
Ahmed Mahmoud Ahmed

English Proofreading

Firasse Beale

Coordination

Mona Khalfan AL Abdulsalam
Mohammed Saeed Al Awad

Photos Archive

Liam Clayton

National Defense Journal

A Journey of 5 years



Editor in Chief

We feel proud upon recalling that we belong to an exemplary leader and upon realizing that this exemplary leader is Zayed (May he rest in peace), our pride is mingled with greatness and highness. Indeed, all the great personal traits are of the same source and naming this year as the “Year of Zayed” is an affirmation on the great personal traits of this exceptional character. A man of boundless giving, goodness, and bountifulness since birth until the current celebration of his 100-year anniversary.

He was a model of humanity (May Allah bless him). Science was the main focus point of Zayed’s thought and a pillar for the new state. He (May Allah bless him) believed that developing the nation should start with education and that the next generations must realize the importance of science in their coming journey of building and maintaining the country, and that science is the only path to development, progress, prosperity, and facing the latest challenges and changes.

Today, the National Defense College celebrates the graduation of the participants of the 5th NDC Course. This celebration is an affirmation of the vision of Zayed (May Allah bless him) for the importance of science. It highlights the role played by the college since its inception in 2012 to date in preparing and qualifying military and civilian leaders and developing their skills in identifying and assessing national, regional, and international security challenges in order to protect national interests and to support the country in the path of sustainable development.

Issuing the National Defense Journal annually coincides with the graduation ceremony of the NDC Course. As usual, the journal has an ample space for those elite writers to share their diverse themes with interested readers. Today, the National Defense Journal has become a forum for articles, research, and studies presented by intellectuals, ministers, senior officials, NDC faculty members to shed light on the most important and latest developments and changes.

We are proud that our current journal contains a myriad of informative topics for both students and readers in several areas such as security, strategy, military, management, and space science. Moreover, the journal highlights all activities of the NDC Course by word and image.

Finally, I wish that our valued journal continues to progress and succeed on the path of a sincere word and a targeted media side by side with its national mission.



Staff Brigadier
Abdulla Al Zaabi
Editor In Chief

He Praised Khalifa's Sponsorship of the Nation's Youth and Attended Mohamed bin Rashid: Mohammed bin of the National Defense College



His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, UAE Vice President, Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai, praised the generous patronage by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, may God protect him, of the nation's youth. He also lauded the patronage of the National Defense College, which he described as the lofty national edifice, by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al

Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, who is following up with great interest the development of its curricula to keep up with the development requirements of our beloved country and to provide the nation with educated and knowledgeable young people who will continue to build a modern state and contribute to UAE Vision 2021 with their minds and arms.

His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum congratulated the young sons and daughters of the nation for their outstanding academic achievements and their attainment of Master's Degree in Strategic and Security Sciences from the college. He wished all of them success in their scientific and practical journey to serve the interests of the homeland and the citizens, and to ensure a promising future for generations.

the Graduation Ceremony of 33 Master's Degree Graduates Zayed Follows up the Development



تخريج دورة الدفاع الوطني الثلثاء 5



His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, attended the graduation ceremony of the UAE National Defense College 5th Intake, which was held under his patronage in the presence of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Lt. General Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The ceremony began with the rendition of the UAE National Anthem

and recitation of The Holy Quran. Then Major General Staff Pilot Rashad Al Sa'adi, NDC Commandant delivered a welcoming speech in which he welcomed the patron of the ceremony, His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, and the audience. He also expressed thanks and loyalty to our wise leadership, led by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE President and Supreme Commander of the UAE

Armed Forces, may God protect him, for its guidance and unlimited support for the National Defense College. This unparalleled learning edifice in the region was established in 2013 under the gracious patronage of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces and was inaugurated in December of the same year. He added that the fifth batch



has acquired qualitative sciences and outstanding skills in the national defense course, which included high-level study themes, materials and methods, focusing on outputs that include concepts related to the implementation of the national security strategy. This makes this intake a solid building block of national strategies and a tool that contributes effectively to the planning of national goals.

Major General Staff Pilot Rashad Al Sa'adi emphasized that «Our path in the National Defense College to achieve the national goals and the interests of the nation lies in the earnest and sincere giving and true rallying around of our leadership, led by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, may God protect him... Hence, we are eager to identify the areas of development of the College in line with the approach of our leadership, the progress of our homeland and the principles of our Armed Forces in order to maintain the achievements, arm ourselves with determination and seek perfection.»

He extended his thanks and gratitude

to His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum for his presence and gracious sponsorship of this ceremony, which included a constellation of sons and daughters of the nation, who are working in our national civil institutions and our Armed Forces.

Staff Brigadier Rashid Mohammed Humaid Al Dhaheri delivered a speech on behalf of the graduates, in which he thanked His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the Patron of the ceremony, for his attendance of the graduation ceremony of this elite group of the Nation's youth and handing them the Master's degrees they deserved after a full year of study, scientific research and acquisition of experience in the domain of strategy and national security. «Your attendance at this ceremony, Sir, is an honor for the graduates of this intake. It embodies our prudent leadership's support of our UAE people,» he said. In his speech, he pointed out that the graduation of this batch coincides with the Year of Zayed Al-Khair, to bring to light his achievements and directives, which

resulted in building a fully modern state. He stressed that he and his colleagues were availed of the opportunity to join this national edifice to acquire diverse sciences and knowledge, practice various intellectual skills, develop concepts of joint national action and enable students and teachers to share experience. He expressed his thanks and gratitude to His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, for his kind and lasting patronage to the sons and daughters of the nation in all fields of science and knowledge. He also paid tribute to His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, for his relentless follow-up and his keenness on the success of the National Defense College.

At the conclusion of the ceremony, and after His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and the audience had watched a short film about the course of the fifth intake, and the knowledge, theoretical and practical expertise, and training courses received by the students at



home and abroad, he distributed the Master's degrees to the 33 graduates. Memorial photos were then taken of His Highness Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid with the graduates, together with His Highness Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, HE Mohammed bin Ahmed Al Bowardi, Minister of State for Defense Affairs, HE Lieutenant General Hamad Mohammad Thani Al Rumaithi, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, And the Commandant of the National Defense College.





By:

Thomas A. Drohan Ph.D.
Dean, UAE NDC

Air Forces and the Integration of Air, Space and Cyber Power:

The Need for Resilient Orientation

Today's information-rich environment requires air forces that integrate air, space and cyberspace capabilities across all operating domains. Ultimately airpower needs to serve national strategic goals. While computer processing, information distribution, intelligence analysis and stealth can create precise destruction, it takes integrated diplomatic, informational, military, economic and social effects to win wars.

Airpower began with innovative ideas that led technology. The claims of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell were outrageous at the time. Imagine aerial bombardment devastating cities; battle-planes sinking battleships; and an airpower industry projecting national influence.

Contemporary airpower theorists continue to challenge conventional thinking with John Boyd's OODA loop, John Warden's concentric-rings, and Dave Deptula's effects-based operations.

Thinking Beyond Doctrine

Innovation created the cyber domain, where apps expand warfare's operating space. The prevailing model of military operations, combined arms, is insufficiently adapting to non-military tools of strategy.

The purpose of combining arms is for the "organize, train and equip"-oriented military services to provide capabilities to an interdependent joint force. Combatant commands and task forces are then tailored to the needs of regions and



functions. Accordingly, military doctrine dutifully describes cyber capabilities as a military arm. US Air Force Basic Doctrine, for instance, defines its cyber-inclusive update of airpower as “the ability to project military power or influence through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.” The problem is, again, combined arms may win battles but are unlikely to win wars. Therefore in thinking about how to integrate cyber capabilities into strategy, let us consider airpower theory and cyber technology.

Thinking Theoretically

John Boyd originated a way to create advantage, the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide and Act. He advocated

fast, accurate decisions to out-think and out-maneuver adversaries. His eclectic approach emphasizes an open systems architecture. Cyber, then, can enter an OODA loop at any stage. For instance, as we Observe perceived reality, cyber-processing gives data meaning as we Orient to our environment. Irrelevant data can skew Observations just as software manipulation of information can impact Decisions. Adversaries try to reinforce confidence in false information, or cast doubt on accurate information. The Orientation phase is key as we contextualize what we Observe, which affects Decisions and Actions. John Warden provided one orienting construct, analyzing the adversary as a system.

John Warden’s Instant Thunder air

campaign plan (1990) in Iraq analyzed the Saddam Hussein regime as a system with functional centers of gravity, strengths and weaknesses. His five-ring model placed leadership at the center, with organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces in successively less important outer circles. He advocated simultaneous attacks on vital linkages to paralyze the system. Increasingly, human interactions have become cyber connections, which complicates the identification of key nodes. With globalization of information technology, the need for a coordinated yet flexible strategy is acute. Dave Deptula broke through this complexity by focusing on the purpose of strategy.

Dave Deptula’s effects-based



approach to operations re-purposed the ways of warfare. Recognizing how communications, precision, stealth and remotely operated systems rely on cyberspace, Deptula redefined principles of war as principles for effects. Mass, for instance, required fewer resources than before, which clarified its contribution to desired effects. Information, too, became a tool that could create its own effects. Deptula also fused intelligence and operations, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) functions.

All three theorist-practitioners broadened airpower's orientation on interdependent capabilities to achieve more effective operations. From this perspective, let us imagine how to use cyber technologies and advanced analysis.

Leveraging Technology

Four related capabilities present opportunities to create effects: secure processing; intelligence analysis and synthesis; software routing; and low visibility maneuvering.

Secure processing ensures encryption in network-penetrated situations, denying adversaries syntactic deception. The systems involved would employ secure-enclave technology that provides assured information. Applications in the secure enclave would run as expected, yet still be vulnerable to uncertainties and manipulations of intelligence.

Advanced analysis of the information environment to seize and maintain the intellectual initiative influences adversary observations of reality. Collected data, derived information,

and developed intelligence drive operations. Doing this requires changing trusted paradigms to re-orient how to make sense of different situations.

Software routing assures integrity of data, information and intelligence. Such router bricks with multiple servers and distributed algorithms reduce vulnerability to cyber attacks. This capability facilitates collaborative network adaptation that detects intrusions and provides warning.

Low-viz maneuvering by a redundant array of sensors, emitters and strikers hosted on stealth platforms enables persistent orientation. Collaborative networks mitigate attacks and lead reconfigurations that are difficult to detect. Mobile secure clouds deliver cyber effects without network attribution.

how we orient to a context, then faster OODA loops risk reacting



Overall, network resilience and flexibility require adaptable, timely, effects-oriented decisions. We must identify risks and uncertainty, and take action to minimize them. We need to communicate requirements in terms of probabilistic effects, then develop ways and means to achieve them by influencing human and artificial actors, and their perceived conditions. Now we return to our three theorists to distill a concept of resilient orientation.

Resilient Orientation

Boyd aims to win by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities. Lack of situational awareness can lead to disorientation, and failure to even think about adapting. In cyberspace, this challenge is compounded by distributed threats. If opponents skew what we observe and shape

to induced problems. Such uncertainties highlight the need to detect changes, learn from mistakes, and make adjustments. We may only see the same problem twice if we are looking at it the same way.

If we adopt Warden's systemic perspective, then cyber information can most affect enemy decisions in the leadership ring. In a system of networks, however, we need to identify linkages and nodes that matter most, and those we can affect. Discerning which groups and individuals structure interactions and influence relationships is key to identifying targets. Warden's ordered rings may at least require rearrangement. Changes can be rapid, as social networking well illustrates.

Deptula's integration of capabilities for desired effects focuses on the

outcomes we want to achieve. As we consider how new cyber technologies may improve feasibility, we also have to anticipate effects in networks filled with the uncertainties of human and programmed actors. This challenge requires flat organizations and empowered decision-making. In cyberspace, predictable behavior quickly becomes a critical vulnerability.

Resilient orientation consists of at least three key capabilities, first, we need to perceive the full extent of the operational environment, broader than a combined-arms perspective. Our expanded view should inform effective courses of action based on clear assumptions about how we model systems, and about how real and virtual leaders and groups behave. Second, we need secure integrity of information. This requirement includes detecting and adapting to change, and risking proactive effects in contested environments. Third, we need to recognize failed orientation and innovate alternative ways of understanding.

The concept of resilient orientation can be applied to any military service, joint force and other instruments of national power. In order to exploit the potential of emerging technology, we need to invest in our human ability to think and to lead change.

Frans Osinga, 'Getting' A Discourse on Winning and Losing: A Primer on Boyd's 'Theory of Intellectual Evolution, Contemporary Security Policy, 19 Nov 2013, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20>.

John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988).

Brigadier General David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001).



By:

**Staff. Col Dr. Sarhan
Mohamed Saeed Al Neyadi
Participant, UAE NDC**

Reflections on Leadership



This paper will discuss the role of Sheikh Zayed (may God have mercy on him) as a successful leadership in making and establishing and bestowing the legacy of a successful country. It will give a short background on his leadership strategy as a city ruler and how he succeeded to establish a country and hand it over to the next generation.

Sheikh Zayed started his leadership role when he was assigned as the Ruler's Representative in the Eastern Province in 1946, where he was directly involved in government affairs and began practicing his experience in governance from the city of Al Ain. In the course of two years, he became a strong and influential figure in the region, characterized by effective-




ness, firmness, determination, and decisiveness. He also emerged as a listener, reformer and mediator in the resolution of disputes between competing tribes and even solving the problems within families– which is very uncommon for a leader to have a narrowed down scope, but that kind of unique charisma and personality attractiveness enabled

him to influence the small community at that time by building trust and winning the hearts and minds of his followers by using the power of relationship. However, at that time he had little power of punishment or reward because there were no state instruments that he could use in his mission, neither police nor army.

After succeeding in the devel-

opment of the city of Al Ain in the 1950s and 1960s, despite the lack of resources, Sheikh Zayed undertook a bigger leadership responsibility– the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in August 1966 and put it on the road to sustainable growth and development. His strategic acting showed by a planned diplomatic activity to build up relationships horizontally with the neighboring countries and tightened the relationship with the other Trucial States emirates, vertically with UK and USA. In this endeavor, he developed a full picture of the domestic environment, international environment, and the opportunities, threats, and challenges it represented. The most important opportunity Sheikh Zayed is credited with is exploiting the oil revenues that had been increasing every year to drive growth and development. In doing so this benefited all the people living under his rule, as well as framing the new government structure which includes police and army that laid the foundations of governance in Abu Dhabi. By then his leadership influence had increased by having the powers of reward and punishment, in addition to the other bases of influence he had before.

In 1971, upon the imminent withdrawal of the British forces from the region, Sheikh Zayed analyzed the domestic environment and insisted to act on his strategic thought to create a union with the other Trucial States emirates after Bahrain and Qatar decided to leave the proposed union. Sheikh Zayed insisted on pursuing his clear vision of un-



ion, and so with the cooperation of the late Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, (may God have mercy on him) the Ruler of Dubai, they led the efforts to establish the Federation of the United Arab Emirates which came into being on 2 December 1971 under very difficult circumstances and lots of concessions from Shaikh Zayed. In recognition of his efforts, leadership, influence, and wisdom, their Highnesses the Rulers of the Emirates chose Sheikh Zayed to become the first President

of the UAE, the position he earned as the founding father.

The late Sheikh Zayed realized that in order to promote internal cohesion, unity, tolerance and national coherence among his people, he first needed to cultivate and build trust through personal interaction with all citizens. He was known for his closeness to his people and his enjoyment of meetings and gatherings with the local community. His government was mandated to build and strengthen the state's capaci-

ties in the areas of health, education, justice, social welfare, and to provide opportunities for all Emirati citizens to play an active role in the success of the nation. He strongly believed in investing in human capital and coined a famous slogan, "human development is more important than building factories" all that gave him an unprecedented influence.

In order to accomplish community prosperity, Sheikh Zayed succeeded in using oil revenues to



build a strong and cohesive economy, and a well-established infrastructure placing the UAE among the economically developed countries in the region. Due to his vision, the UAE now ranks second in the GCC after Saudi Arabia in terms of the size of the economy and third in the Middle East as a whole. According to many international reports, the UAE is the most important financial and economic center in the region. This has been reflected in the standard of living of citizens.




At the external level, Sheikh Zayed established a distinctive foreign policy characterized by wisdom, moderation, advocacy of justice, and giving priority to the negotiation and understanding in dealing with most issues. To this day this balanced policy has earned the UAE widespread respect at the regional and international levels. Sheikh Zayed, (may God have mercy on him), was accorded high prestige among all Arab leaders. This enabled him to have the influence to act as a me-

diator on more than one occasion, and his honorable and original intentions were notable at every occasion. In term of humanitarian action, the UAE has earned an international reputation for humanitarian and charitable work by supporting a number of humanitarian issues around the world, an approach still being pursued by the state leaders to this day.



By:
Sheikh Mohammed Bin
Maktoum Al-Maktoum
Participant, UAE NDC

UAE Water Security



In the past few years, water security has increasingly become an urgent issue that needs to be dealt with on the world stage. Different countries have approached this topic with varying degrees of urgency. The UAE, a country that is threatened by a severely dry climate in an increasingly unstable region, has realized early on the importance of having a strong water security strategy.

Defining Water Security

UN-Water defines water security as “the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human

well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability” (UN-Water 2013).

UAE Water Security Issues

Looking at the UAE in particular one needs to fully understand the internal UAE social economic environment and the external geopolitical environment. Externally, the considerations are more related to the unstable political environment the UAE finds itself facing with the constant shift of the balance of power towards more hostile actors in the region. Internally, water security's impact

on the UAE is measured more at the economic and social level as the lack of a coherent water security strategy



can have a negative economic effect on society in the long term.

Internal Environment

Looking at the water security in the internal environment of the UAE, one can see that there are several challenges and possible opportunities. There are different measures to look at when considering the internal risks on UAE water security. Most maps indicating the water risks on the UAE color the region in general and the UAE in particular with the darkest color available, usually dark red. This indicates that the UAE and the region suffer the highest risk in the world when it comes to water risk.

The World Resource Institute is “a global environmental and development think tank that focuses on the intersection of the environment and socioeconomic development.” It produced an indicator named Aqueduct Global Maps 2.1. The indicator shows both the region and the UAE as high risk (red) or extremely high risk (dark red) areas (World Resource Institute 2015).

Risk of Water Availability

In the UAE, water demand and availability of water are considered as major risks due to the ever-increasing reliance on underground water. There are three major sources of water in the UAE. The first and the least used major source is treated and waste water, which constitutes around 14% of the total water usage in the UAE. The second major source of water used in the UAE is desalinated water, which accounts for 42% of the total usage. The third and most used water source is underground water, which is 44% of the total usage (The Ministry of Environment and Water 2015, 25). Treated and waste water are typically reused after they have been through the town or city’s water system. Desalinated water comes from either the desalination plants operating on the Arabian Gulf or the desalination plants operating on the Gulf of Oman. The position of the desalinated plants is a risk factor as they are on the coast which exposes them to potential assault from an adversary seeking to disrupt the country’s water supply. The underground water supply satisfies inland demand and is usually renewable. However, the growing extraction of underground water has increased the risk of lowering the ground water supply. Ground water levels have started to decrease because the extraction of this resource has exceeded the renewal of the supply (EWS-WWF 2017, 48).

The Complications of Desalination

As mentioned earlier, desalination plants can be an easy target for an

adversary looking to disrupt the water supply of the country. There are other general issues to consider when looking at desalination in the UAE.

With climate change and the increase in water temperatures and extreme weather conditions, desalination plants are under threat of constant interruptions. Harmful algal bloom, which causes red tides, is also a risk. In 2008, a desalination plant in Ras Al Khaimah was forced to close and the water supply was cut from a number of homes because of a red tide that had reached the shoreline. With the increase in water temperature as a result of climate change, the severity and repetitiveness of the algal bloom are likely to increase, thereby creating more disruption to the normal functions of the desalination plants (Harnan, 2008). The other effect of climate change in the future is the increase of extreme weather conditions that can have an adverse effect on desalination operations.

Desalination plants are also very expensive to build and operate. They consume a lot of resources in the process of producing sweet water that is mostly consumed by the municipal sector (The Ministry of Environment and Water 2015, 29). This poses a challenge in the long term for policy makers. The need of weighing up the options where the government wishes to spend its limited resources, and this becomes harder as time passes, with the consumption and usage of desalinated water constantly increasing.

The Arabian Gulf is the hottest body of water in the world. It has the most concentrated amount of desalination plants, dumping large amounts of heated saline water and chemicals — which stress the volatile and diverse sea environment (Byung Koo Kim, 2013). Adding to this mix comes the threat of climate change which causes marine life and coastal ecosystems in the Arabian Gulf to be unstable and fragile. The increased

salinity and chemicals that are constantly being dumped in the Gulf are threatening valued and rare species living in the Gulf ecosystem (EWS-WWF 2017, 56).

Iranian Military Policy as a Threat to Regional Water Security

In May 2016, the US Navy decided to stop accompanying commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz after Iranian threats to close the waterway to US and allied vessels (Yeranian, 2016). This followed a long history of similar Iranian threats to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz — the chokepoint of the world oil, to interrupt the flow of the world oil. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, this led to the halting of oil exports from both countries, which caused oil prices to skyrocket (Talmadge 2008, 82,83). However, Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz is a highly unlikely unilateral move as the world, including Western super powers and super powers allied with Iran, would be hurt by such action and would be greatly alarmed by the consequences of this scenario.

Iran has also been able to develop an Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2/AD) capability learning from the wars that have taken place in the region. The Iranian A2/AD capabilities varies, “[and] can be grouped into four broad categories: ballistic missiles, some of which could be armed with WMD warheads; unconventional warfare and terrorism by proxy, possibly made more lethal by G-RAMM weapons; maritime exclusion systems such as mines, ASCMs, and fast attack craft; and air defences” (Gunzinger and Dougherty 2011, 33).

One needs to remember history, as Iran laid mines in UAE waters during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and also deployed anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) batteries facing the Strait (Talmadge 2008, 87). Given this background and Iran’s illegal occupation of three UAE islands since 1971, the UAE considers Iranian military policy a security threat in general and a mar-





itime and water security threat in particular. The threat is not just limited to the UAE maritime domain, but the onshore infrastructure as well which includes key commercial, private or public water factories and plants in the country.

References

1. Byung Koo Kim, Yong Hoon Jeong. 2013. «High Cooling Water Temperature Effects on Design and Operational Safety of NPPS in the Gulf Region.» Nuclear Engineering and Technology Volume 45, Issue 7 961-968.
2. EWS-WWF. 2017. UAE Climate Change Risks & Resilience: An overview of climate change risks to 12 key sectors. Accessed Feb 2018. <https://greenarea.me/wp-content/themes/divi-child/reports/WWF.pdf>.
3. Gunzinger, Mark, and Christopher Dougherty. 2011. Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats. Accessed April 6, 2018. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154637/CSBA_SWA_FNL-WEB.pdf.
4. Harnan, Eugene. 2008. RAK homes without water. November 2. Accessed February 2018. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/environment/rak-homes-without-water-1_552652.
5. Talmadge, Caitlin. 2008. «Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz.» International Security Vol. 33, No. 1, Summer 82-117.
6. The Ministry of Environment and Water. 2015. State of Environment Report 2015. Accessed Feb 2018. <http://www.moew.gov.ae/assets/download/c73a4ab6/state-of-environment-report-2015.aspx>.
7. UN-Water. 2013. What is Water Security? Infographic. May 8. Accessed December 2017. <http://www.unwater.org/publications/water-security-infographic/>.
8. World Resource Institute. 2015.

Aqueduct Global Maps 2.1Indicators. April. Accessed December 2017. <http://www.wri.org/publication/aqueduct-global-maps-21-indicators>.

9. Yeranian, Edward. 2016. US Navy to Avoid Hormuz After Iran Threat to Close Strait. May 5. Accessed Feb 2018. <https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.uaeu.ac.ae/docview/1787140671?accountid=62373>.



By:


**Staff. Lt. Col. Salim
Rashid Al Zaabi, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC**




Focusing Events as a Catalyst to the Development of U.S. Homeland Security

Many countries see the United States of America as a model example with regard to approaches to national security. This status is attributed to the vast range of security events the US has experienced. These events, which are depicted by Birkland (2007) as “Focusing Events”, have contributed greatly to security experts’ understanding of the concept of homeland security. According to the National Strategy of Homeland Security, issued by the

Homeland Security Council in October 2007, “Homeland security is defined as a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (2007, p. 3). There are a number of focusing events that the US has experienced domestically and overseas which led to the formation of the structure below:



U.S. Department of Homeland Security



<https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs>

The American Revolution, which lasted from 1775 to 1783 (Marshall, 2015) followed by the Declaration of the United States' Independence in 1776; in addition to the First and Second World Wars; the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR; and finally, the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—were all major events that shed light on the homeland security concerns of the United States. The US has an advantage given the fact that it stretches between two oceans—the Pacific and the Atlantic. The US is the fourth largest country in the world, with a total size of 9,629,091 sq. km. According to Marshall, 2015, "Geography had determined that if a political entity could get to and then control the land from sea to sea it would be a great power, the greatest [the world] has known". However, this vast area places a burden on the government and the security organizations to preserve the security of the nation.

Figure 1. Map of the United States of America

Source:

<http://www.worldmap1.>

Attacks by external forces, which in the 18th century were the European colonial powers, were the major threats to the fledgling US government. Despite the withdrawal of European powers from the US main-

land, they still represented a threat. The main threat was directed to the sea lines of communication by the powerful Spanish fleet in the nineteenth century (Marshall, 2015). Despite their cautionary measures, the Americans were destined to witness a surprise attack by an external force. This was the attack by the Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The lesson learned from this



Figure 1. Map of the United States of America

Source: <http://www.worldmap1.>

attack was that countries have to expect the unexpected. This traditional threat remained even after the two world wars. It was represented in the Soviet Union, the present day Russian Federation. This threat lasted from 1947 to 1991. It represented a traditional threat, which was the attack by another state. Despite the arms race between the two political poles, it did not transform into a direct armed conflict between the superpowers. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was the tensest incident during the Cold War. (As depicted in the cartoon below.) The United States worked very hard to get rid of this threat and succeeded with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.



Figure 2. U.S. and USSR presidents during The Cuban Missile Crisis.

Figure 2. U.S. and USSR presidents during The Cuban Missile Crisis. The location and the geography of the United States present additional threats compared to the above-mentioned ones. The US has been preparing in an unprecedented way to

one of the fiercest challenges—that of climate change. The latter has caused a major impact on homeland security, which was obvious from the impact of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, (Figure 3 below):

Figure 3. Hurricane Katrina Impact.

Source: Mike Vainisi, 2015.

The consequences of the hurricane were devastating. The death toll was 1,833. Moreover, the great destruction was not prevented by the engi-




Figure 4. New Orleans Levees.

Source: Mike Vainisi, 2015.

neering defenses designed to protect cities such as New Orleans, as shown in Figure 3 above. “The levees in New Orleans failed to protect the city not only because the storm was so big, but also because the levees were not very good” (Vainisi, 2015).

This is what the former FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller drew attention to in the Cyber Security Conference held in San Francisco on March 2, 2012, when he said, “There are two types of companies: those that have been hacked, and those who don’t know



Figure 3. Hurricane Katrina Impact.

Source: Mike Vainisi, 2015.

they have been hacked. And even they are converging into one category: companies that have been hacked and will be hacked again". Finally, the terrorist threat is considered the top-most risk not only to the US, but also to many other countries.

The Development of the US Homeland Security System

The above-mentioned threats and the concomitant rising apprehension over natural disasters and transnational criminal activities for example, have broadened the concept of homeland security (Sauter.M.A., 2015). According to the latter, the focus of the government was on the external threats not the domestic ones. There was not a role for the federal government in civil preparedness and disaster responsiveness. And because of the deep-rooted distrust in the power of the federal government there were obstacles to strengthening internal security (Sauter.M.A., 2015). In the first one hundred years since the formation of the United States, "ad hoc legislation was passed more than 100 times in response to hurricanes, earthquakes,

floods, and other natural disasters" (Sauter.M.A., 2015, p. 11). In 1906, a destructive earthquake struck San Francisco. This incident witnessed the use of armed troops as a response force for the emergency.

Figure 5. Soldiers guarding relief supplies San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake.

Source:<https://history.army.mil/documents/SFEarthquake/1906Earthquake.hm>

World War One also contributed to the development of the homeland security concept in the US. The government created an ad hoc security system, which encompassed army, navy and intelligence and the Department of Justice. Both World War Two and the Cold War also impacted the formation of the homeland security system of the US. Whereas in World War One the focus was on the collection of intelligence at the domestic level, in the Second World War, the focus shifted to critical infrastructure protection, especially the industries that supported the war effort. Espionage was the most significant threat

to homeland security during the Cold War (Sauter.M.A., 2015). It is obvious that US homeland security was of the reactive type and was far from being preventive in scope.

In conclusion, the past US experience in addressing different focus events has contributed to its understanding of the homeland security concept. Yet despite attempts to define the concept of homeland security and national strategy goals, there remains "no consensus among practitioners and the public as to what the term homeland security means..... homeland security means different things to different jurisdictions depending upon that jurisdiction's particular hazards, risks and level of preparedness" (Alperen.M, 2017).

References

- Alperen.M. (2017). foundations of homeland security law and policy (second edition ed.). Hobken, USA: john wiley and sons.
- Carafano.J, J. a. (2015). A complete Guide Homeland Security. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Marshal.T. (2015). Prisoners of Geography, Ten maps that tell you everything you need about global politics. London: Elliott and Thompson Limited.
- National Strategy for Homeland Security October 2007. (2007, October). Retrieved February 8, 2018, from <https://www.dhs.gov>: <https://www.dhs.gov/national-strategy-homeland-security-october-2007>
- Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press,2007)
- Vinaisi, M. (2015, August 24). attn. Retrieved from attn: <https://www.attn.com/>
- <https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs>
- <https://www.bl.uk/the-american-revolution/articles/american-revolution-timeline> accessed 21:38, 30/1/2018. Published, 17 June 2016



Figure 5. Soldiers guarding relief supplies San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake.

Source:<https://history.army.mil/documents/SFEarthquake/1906Earthquake.hm>



By:

Daniel Baltrusaitis, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC

Understanding Uncertainty:

Using Scenarios to Aid Strategic Decision-Making



One of the hardest issues for corporate or government leaders is trying to understand the uncertainty of the future while making decisions based on rapid change. Will oil prices rise or remain steady? What situations will drive a rapid change in commodity supply or demand? Will regional instability affect local markets? Typical planning begins with forecasts based on historical trends and current placement on these trend lines. In this approach, strategic planners identify and extrapolate critical long-term trends allowing an assessment of their impact on strategy.

Examples of this type of analysis include historical analysis and projection, causal modeling, or qualitative techniques such as using expert opinion. (Chambers, Mullick, and Smith 1971) This method works well for short planning horizons because planners can adjust to the predicted change. These methods have clear advantages when the planning horizon is short and when unknowns are limited and manageable. Unfortunately, these forecasts will fail when they are most needed — in anticipating major shifts in the strategic environment (Wack 1985a). As

time horizons expand, uncertainties grow and assumptions about the future become less credible, traditional tools such as business forecasts and war games become less reliable and the decision-maker needs a more sophisticated set of tools.

Scenario planning is a useful and practical tool for exploring and anticipating future long-term challenges. For scenario planning to be successful, one must accept uncertainty, try to understand the issues that will significantly influence the future, and make decisions based on those key drivers. Scenario planning exercises challenge planners and decision-makers to fully consider how internal and external environment issues such as demographics, political development, laws, climate changes, and so on, will shape the future. The goal for businesses and government agencies is to be optimally prepared for the future, no matter what it brings, in terms of both risk and opportunity and scenario planning is a tool for considering the risk and opportunity inherent. According to Pierre Wack, the father of Royal Dutch Shell scenario planning, “[U]ncertainty today is not just an occasional, temporary deviation from a reasonable predictability; it is a basic structural feature of the business environment.” He further states, “by carefully studying some uncertainties, we gained a deeper understanding of their interplay, which, paradoxically, led us to learn what was certain and inevitable and what was not.” Shell’s former group managing director, André Bénard, highlights the importance of scenario planning: “Experience has taught us that the scenario technique is much more conducive to forcing people to think about the future than the forecasting techniques we formerly used” (Wack 1985a).

Peter Schwartz in his seminal book on scenario planning, *The Art of the Long View*, describes scenarios as, “Stories that can help us recognise and adapt to changing aspects



of our present environment. They form a method for articulating the different pathways that might exist for you tomorrow, and finding your appropriate movements down each of those possible paths” (Schwartz 1996). Scenarios create a story-line so that analysts and decision-makers can understand the flow of trends and shifts that are taking place in the environment. Schwartz describes scenarios as a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative environments where future decisions must be played out. It is not a formal methodology and it does not generate predictions, but rather helps decision-makers understand the future. For instance, very few predicted the rapid fall of the Soviet Union, most assessments saw a continuation of Cold War trends. By using scenario analysis techniques, analysts and decision-makers could have explored opportunities and risks presented if the demise happened. Instead most Western defense planning infrastructure was caught unprepared for the changes ushered in by the fall of the Berlin Wall (Liotta and Somes 2004).

Unlike planning based on forecasting, scenarios focus less on predicting outcomes and more on understanding the forces that would eventually compel an outcome. Sce-

nario development typically occurs in two stages. The first stage is the development of exploratory scenarios that are aimed not at decision-making action but rather understanding. The goal of the first stage is to discover interrelated factors in the system and uncover market or system forces that may predetermine outcomes. For example, Wack’s scenario developers in the early seventies determined that most oil-producing countries would reach their production limits by 1976, while those countries with additional capability would be reluctant to increase output further due to their inability to invest the additional oil revenues. Consequently, oil prices would increase substantially by the end of 1975, curbing demand and generating an economic shock to oil importing countries. This worldview varied sharply from the implicit worldview that had prevailed for the previous twenty years at Shell (Wack 1985a).

Wack found, however, that he needed to generate a second set of scenarios that could link macro level drivers to management level problems. He discovered that his first scenario set failed to generate substantive action by large portions of the company. No more than a third



of the critical decision centers had adopted strategies based on the rapid price increase scenario. Although managers had ultimately agreed with the driving forces uncovered by the scenario, the operational managers were hesitant to change direction from strategies that had been successful in the past. The scenario team had failed to change the company's perception of the business environment. According to Wack, the first set of scenarios landed "like water on a stone." (Wack 1985a) In response, they had to develop scenarios that come alive in "inner space," the manager's microcosm where "choices are played out and judgment exercised."

Managers will only accept scenarios when the drivers and uncertainties affect their current business problems. Wack identified predetermined elements, which are those events that have already occurred (or that almost certainly will occur) but whose consequences have not yet unfolded. In the Royal Dutch Shell scenario, the predetermined element was an un-



folding fuel crisis. Many companies were making trend-line predictions rather than looking at the influence of multiple elements, especially the capacity of production states to invest oil revenue. The macro observation that an oil price spike was imminent was then explored for tactical consequences for individual business units. It was not until these mini-scenarios were explored that managers built strategies for change. The scenarios

could then sharpen manager focus on key environmental questions that affected their operations.

In summary, scenario analysis is an excellent tool for uncovering critical uncertainties that are often very different from those that seemed obvious to managers at the beginning of the process. They fundamentally serve two purposes. The first is to anticipate and understand risk. The second is opportunistic; to discover



strategic options of which you were unaware (Wack 1985b). The target of scenario analysis is mental images of how the world works in the decision maker mind. Decision scenarios describe different worlds, not just different outcomes in the same world. The goal of the process is not necessarily to develop a scenario that accurately predicts the future, but rather to have a set of scenarios that illuminates for managers and deci-

sion-makers the major forces driving the system, their interrelationships, and the critical uncertainties.

Works Cited

Chambers, John C., Satinder K. Mullick, and Donald D. Smith. 1971. «How to Choose the Right Forecasting Technique.» *Harvard Business Review* 49 (4): 45-70.

Liotta, P.H., and Timothy E. Somes. 2004. «The Art of Reperceiving: Scenarios and the Future.» In

Strategy and Force Planning. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.

Schwartz, Peter. 1996. *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*. Reprint edition. New York: Currency Doubleday.

Wack, Pierre. 1985a. «Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead.» *Harvard Business Review* 63 (5): 73-89.

——— : 1985b. «Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids. How Medium-Term Analysis Illuminated the Power of Scenarios for Shell Management.» *Harvard Business Review* 63 (6): 139-50.




By:

Nathan W. Toronto, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC

Gearing up for Peace?

Potential Conflict Scenarios in the Gulf



Political tensions in the Gulf region have heated up over the last ten years, so it is worth asking what the future holds. What futures should strategists in the region prepare for? The Gulf has witnessed disturbing trends in arms purchases, military engagements, and the implementation of compulsory military service, but a fuller examination suggests that, while war is unlikely, strategists should prepare for a more complex future.

Four recent trends give pause for thought. First, Americans have lost interest in the region. Figure 1 shows word clouds for major foreign policy speeches while Barack Obama and Donald Trump were candidates. Words that deal with the Middle East are circled. In 2008 Obama had plenty to say about the region, but in 2016 Trump mentioned the Middle East only a handful of times. This marked decrease in interest among Americans corresponds with an unprecedented withdrawal of the US from regional involvement. When a great power loses interest, conflicting powers could step into the void, not always to beneficial effect.

Second, the price of oil has undergone dramatic swings (Figure 2). Many Gulf economies have relied on hydrocarbons to underwrite development. Beginning in 2001, the price of oil began an exponential climb towards \$140 per barrel. This seemingly inexorable rise evaporated in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, then oil made a comeback until the price once again dropped in 2014. Oil has rallied since then, but it is unlikely to attain the stratospheric heights it enjoyed in 2008, since current supply has glutted the market. A slow oil market creates uncertainty for countries in the Gulf, which could lead to unexpected conditions in the future.

Figure 3 provides the backdrop for a third trend, which is that a number of countries in the Gulf have defied a global trend away from compulsory military service. After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the number of countries using conscripts decreased dramatically, but after 2011 conscription made a comeback in the Gulf. Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE have all announced National Service programs. While these programs seem to be aimed at both developing human capital and provid-

ing military manpower, the fact remains that larger military forces would make an all-out war in the Gulf very destructive, as European leaders found when they entered the Great War a hundred years ago.

The final trend is, perhaps, the most unsettling: the increase in arms acquisitions by Gulf countries (Figure 4). Arms transfers to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait increased substantially after the 2008–09 financial crisis. Interestingly, they tapered off after the 2014 oil price drop, likely attributable to an emphasis on domestic arms production, a key industry in many Gulf countries' economic development strategies. It should also be noted that although it has not imported large quantities of arms from abroad, Iran has invested heavily in domestic arms production, especially ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial systems.

The political situation in the Gulf is thus fraught with peril. The last time the world witnessed a similar set of conditions—increased arms production, increased compulsory military service, uncertainty in energy markets, and a withdrawal of interest from the United States—the world experienced the cataclysm of two world wars. Worry persists that such a cataclysm could be in the offing.

This worry is overblown, at least in the Gulf. The Gulf region is different from the rest of the Middle East. Economic ties link Arab Gulf economies and Iran, so all parties would have a great deal to lose in the event of a full-scale conventional war. In addition, Arab Gulf countries have realized the essential importance of developing knowledge economies integrated into global networks since the oil price drop of 2014, and war would fundamentally undermine these efforts. There is also a sense of exceptionalism in the Gulf, a competition to be world-renowned, such as the UAE aspiring to be the best country in the world by 2071. A war with Iran is a distinctly unpleasant prospect because it would imperil

Figure 1. Decreased American Interest in the Middle East






Figure 2. Changed Price of Oil, 1986–2017



Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve



Figure 3. Compulsory Military Service, 1989–2004



Source: Author


these grand ambitions and economic designs.

This does not mean that the Gulf region will remain free of conflict, but what causal pathways might violent conflict in the Gulf take? Scenario planning, as described in Peter Schwartz' *Art of the Long View*, can describe how possible futures might develop, albeit not predict which futures are more likely. Scenario planning examines changes in key variables of interest, then generates plausible causal stories for how those futures could develop. If said futures do in fact develop, then strategists would better understand the causal pathways at work.

Figure 5 identifies two key variables that are relevant to future conflict in the Gulf. Iranian behavior could continue to be as assertive as it is today in exporting its revolutionary fervor to other countries and in using opportunities such as that in Yemen to challenge Saudi influence, or it could become more cooperative, as unlikely as this might seem now, such that Iran enters the community of nations. On the other hand, oil and other hydrocarbons could continue to be the backbone of the world economy, or a complex of alternative technologies—solar power, battery capacity, artificial intelligence, electric powered vehicles—could achieve scale and fundamentally challenge oil's dominance. Other factors could certainly influence future Gulf tensions, but changes in one or both of these variables would challenge fundamental causal assumptions.


Four interesting scenarios could result. The first, state-led growth, describes a continuation of the status quo. States on both sides of the Gulf might engage in proxy conflicts, but generally speaking states would continue along an incremental path away from oil dependence. In the flush with cash scenario, Iranian behavior becomes more cooperative and oil still dominates, so Gulf states would have an abundance of resources that they would no longer need to expend on turning back Iranian influence. Such a

Figure 4. Arms Transfers, Select Gulf Countries



Source: SIPRI, Trend-Indicator Values (TIV) database

Figure 5. Possible Conflict Scenarios



resource-rich environment would likely lead to stability and peace. A change in Iranian behavior coupled with a fundamental shift away from hydrocarbons, however, would trigger a human capital race as Gulf states race to establish genuine knowledge economies, without oil wealth to underwrite bumps in the road. These conditions would strain economic ties in the Gulf and could augur trade wars as opposed to

proxy wars. The most violent scenario would be the tepid war scenario, where Iran continues its assertive behavior but hydrocarbons lose their importance. Conflict in this scenario would be more intense than the cold war the Gulf is experiencing today, but all-out conventional war would not necessarily break out (although it could), since competition across the Gulf would be fierce for both ideological and econom-

ic reasons.

A reading of recent political history in the Gulf could lead one to conclude that war is imminent, but there are good reasons to believe this is not the case. Changes in Iranian behavior and the importance of hydrocarbons, however, could lead to conflict tendencies that differ from one another in interesting ways.


References

- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 2018. "Crude Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate." Accessed 1 March 2018. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DCOILWTICO>.
- Guardian. 2008. "Full Text: Obama's Foreign Policy Speech" (16 July 2008). Accessed 1 March 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/16/uselections2008.barackobama>.
- New York Times. 2016. "Transcript: Donald Trump's Foreign Policy Speech" (27 April 2016). Accessed 1 March 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html>.
- Schwartz, Peter. 1996. *The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Yourself and Your Company* (Crown Business).
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2017. "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database." Accessed 1 March 2018. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.
- Toronto, Nathan W. 2014. "Military Recruitment Data Set, version 2014." Accessed 13 March 2018. <http://www.nathantoronto.com/research>.



By:

Gerard W. Hall, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC



Leadership and Negotiation:

Why Leaders Should Put More Emphasis on Developing their Negotiation Skills



organization has the right personnel to do the job. In order to accomplish these tasks, the leader has to scan the environment for opportunities and threats and lead people. Hughes, Beatty and Dinwoodie (2014) in their book, "Becoming a Strategic Leader," note that because we live in a fast-paced world where change is so pervasive, strategic leaders must be able to think, act and influence. In this context strategic thinking refers to the cognitive dimension of strategic leadership and strategic acting covers the behavioral dimension or the implementation of the strategic plan. Strategic influence however, referred



There are many definitions for leadership and if you happen to google "define leadership" you will find that there are almost four million results. If you were to google "task of a leader," you will find the results equally as daunting. When thinking about leadership, most people think about the person or team of people who are able to motivate people to act willingly in desired ways for the benefit of the organization or the person who is charged with making decisions for the organization. In its simplest form, the job of a leader is to create a vision for the organization and to develop a strategy to get there. This includes making sure that the organization is aligned to achieve the strategy, resources are available and that the

to "the ways in which leaders influence others and the ways they open themselves up to influence from others." (Hughes, Beatty and Dinwoodie 2014, 5) The above implies that good negotiation skills are an essential part of a leader's toolbox.

We live in a globalized world where leaders face complex problems. Most scholars note that complex problems require a team effort to succeed. Leading a team is about more than simply achieving milestones and goals. It is about inspiring, problem-solving, and ultimately leading a group of people towards a common goal. Forming a team allows leaders to take advantage of collective strengths, perspectives, skills, and experiences to achieve

commonly desired goals. Browning (2013) notes that members of a strategic team contribute diverse experiences that can help to advance innovative and creative ideas which in turn, allows for more effective and successful organizational decisions. Teams are not without problems since these diverse experiences contribute to varied opinions which can sometimes cause conflict amongst the team members. Additionally, because we have continued to flatten leadership structures we are now required to work more closely with colleagues to ensure that resources are allocated to the proper priorities. From this, it can be concluded that leaders cannot succeed on their own and have to be able to influence others including those outside of their immediate supervision. Hughes, Beatty and Dinwoodie (2014) state that leaders who attended the Center for Creative Leadership course on average identify "gaining endorsement of and commitment to their ideas" as one of their main challenges of leadership (p. 146). This poses a significant challenge for the leader to resolve the conflict or to gain a consensus. In order to accomplish this, leaders must have knowledge of human behavior as well as develop interpersonal skills to include consensus building influence and persuasion. So, how do good leaders succeed in this demanding environment since few people are born with the ability to influence others or to solve conflict? Most leadership development focuses on training leaders how to analyze the environment, looking for threats and opportunities and developing a strategy to achieve their goals. Along the way, the leader is required to communicate their vision and persuade people to follow them on the journey. Again, this shows that good negotiation skills are an essential part of a leader's toolbox.

Leaders are often told that leadership development is a constant



learning process. But one of the most overlooked parts of leadership development is negotiation skills training. Some leaders become complacent in developing these skills because they are used in daily life. Whether it is at home with the kids trying to convince them to do their homework, at the car dealership for the purchase of a new car or in the office trying to negotiate the resolution of a conflict between two coworkers or two division heads, negotiation is done on a daily basis. Additionally, leaders use negotiation skills to influence superiors, peers and

subordinates, suppliers and customers, competitors and allies. Effective negotiations can improve outcomes for everyone involved while ineffective negotiations can sometimes result in failures to agree even when agreement is possible. The MarketWatch Center for Negotiation conducted a study using a controlled negotiation scenario. The participants included over 1,000 managers and executives with varying skills and backgrounds. The results of the study showed that only 2/3 of the participants were successful in closing the deal. A more in-

teresting result from this study is that the participants who close the deal left on average 40 percent of potential value of the deal on the table. (Jensen 2012) The results of poor negotiation skills can cause an organization to lose millions of dollars.

Negotiation is one of the most widely used skills of a leader but probably one of the most underdeveloped skills in the leader's toolbox. The results of the above study show that negotiation skills training is not at the forefront of leadership development in many organizations and the result-



ing cost can be astronomical. When it comes to leadership, authority has its limits and leaders must develop a skill set to assist them in reaching the desired outcomes of the organization. This paper has provided ample evidence to support the addition of negotiation skills training as a part of all leaders' leadership development programs. Providing leaders with the tools needed to influence, motivate, persuade and resolve conflict is key to a successful organization. This is easily done through negotiation skills training.

References:

1. Browning, James W. 2013. Leading at the Strategic Level in an Uncertain World. Washington DC, National Defense University.
2. Hughes, Richard L., Katherine Colarelli Beatty, and David L. Dinwoodie. 2014. Becoming a Strategic Leader: Your Role in Your Organization's Enduring Success, 2nd ed. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
3. Jensen, Keld. 2012. "Good and Bad Negotiators: Which

One Are You?" Forbes, April 3. Accessed March 5, 2018. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/keldjensen/2012/04/03/good-and-bad-negotiators-which-one-are-you/#cda44a95fbaa>



By:
Grigol Mgaloblishvili
Faculty, UAE NDC

Diplomacy - Between Continuity and Change

"The world is a strange cocktail of continuity and change ... and the task for students of world politics is to build on the past but not to be trapped by it – to understand the continuity as well as the change."

Joseph Nye



The practice of diplomacy is as old as human history. Many official 'ceremonies' that modern day diplomats exercise today — e.g. presentation of credentials — date back to the earliest days of recorded history. This makes diplomacy one of the most conservative professions where traditional practices are guarded and kept unchanged. The profession of diplomacy, however, has undergone fundamental changes. Today's diplomats have to perform tasks and cope with challenges that reflect the unprecedented shifts in international politics. In this regard, to fully grasp the concept of diplomacy, it is essential to comprehend the dynamics be-

tween continuity and change.

As Joseph Nye rightly pointed out, "The world is a strange cocktail of continuity and change ... and the task for students of world politics is to build on the past but not to be trapped by it – to understand the continuity as well as the change." Some aspects of diplomacy have undergone radical change, others have not changed since we started writing history. We will briefly review both aspects of diplomacy — those that have fundamentally transformed international politics as well as others that have remained constant throughout time.

One of the most important chang-

es that has had a profound impact on diplomacy relates to the number and the nature of actors within the international system. Although nation-states are still the primary actors in the international arena, their influence has been significantly constrained by the expansion of other players such as non-state actors, international organizations, terrorist networks, transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations, international criminal syndicates, and so on. Moreover, the number of states has swollen dramatically, reaching almost two hundred nation-states, which has significantly altered the dynamics of international relations. Diplomacy has ceased to be the exclusive domain of state representatives managing international relations and has expanded to various non-state actors who have acquired significant influence over the conduct of diplomatic activities and the setting of political agendas.

The expansion of non-state actors is also directly related to yet another aspect of the transformation of international politics: the growing importance of public opinion. As mentioned previously, statecraft throughout most of human history has traditionally been regarded as the exclusive domain of government officials and professional diplomats. This prerogative of state officials has gone forever. A multiplicity of stakeholders in the international arena and the growing role they play in setting political agendas challenges today's diplomats to be ever attentive to those factors that were of little importance throughout history, most notably public opinion. "This ... explains why so much attention is now devoted to what is called 'e-Diplomacy,' 'cultural diplomacy' and 'public diplomacy'." Shaping and influencing public opinion has become one of the key tasks of modern-day diplomacy.

The process of the growing importance of public oversight has been accompanied by the increasing





trends of interdependence and integration, described as ‘complex interdependence’ or ‘globalization’. The world has become increasingly interconnected and no state is capable of providing security in isolation. Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan, laid down the idea of mutual vulnerability and ‘indivisibility of security’ in a clear and succinct manner — “in our globalized world, threats we face are interconnected ... what threatens one, threatens all.” The inability to provide for the security of one’s own country in isolation from external factors, has fundamentally altered the mindset of political and diplomatic decision-makers.

And finally, one of the most impactful changes has come from revolutionary technological advancement. In this regard, of particular importance is the so-called ‘digital and information revolution’ that has profoundly altered the modern political landscape. It has not only decreased

distances and shortened the required time for communication but has also significantly empowered other actors and challenged the monopoly of nation-states and those responsible for statecraft. All of these factors, albeit not the complete list of changes, have revolutionized the international political landscape.

These transformational changes notwithstanding, the core ‘tasks’ and ‘means’ of diplomacy have not changed. Hans Morgenthau identifies four tasks of diplomacy that are the perennial elements of foreign policy. These core tasks of diplomacy read as follows,

“(1) Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. (2) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. (3) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these

different objectives are compatible with each other. (4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.”

Failure to pursue any of these tasks may undermine the national interests of any country and lead to conflict. These four tasks of diplomacy are the main elements of foreign policy and the necessary performance of these functions is as old as international politics itself.

The conduct of effective diplomacy, as Morgenthau highlights, requires the appropriate selection of ‘means’ suited to the pursuit of strategic objectives,

“The means at the disposal of diplomacy are three: persuasion, compromise, and threat of force. No diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can claim to be both intelligent and peaceful. No diplomacy that would stake everything on persuasion and compromise deserves to be called intelligent. Rarely, if ever, in



the conduct of the foreign policy of a great power is their justification for using only one method to the exclusion of the others.”

These ‘means’ of diplomacy have endured the course of history and remained the core aspects of diplomatic tradecraft throughout millennia. The careful examination of historical examples that we cover at the National Defense College clearly demonstrates that the conduct of effective foreign policy requires careful selection and in most cases, simultaneous employment of all ‘means’ of diplomacy. The most challenging part for those who exercise statecraft is to put the right emphasis at the right time on each of these means of diplomacy. As Hans Morgenthau wisely remarked, “The art of diplomacy consists in putting the right emphasis at any particular moment on each of these three means at its disposal.”

In conclusion, understanding the dynamics between continuity and

change is crucial for the conduct of effective diplomacy. The task of today’s diplomats is to be ever mindful of challenges presented by fundamental shifts in international politics, but also to be fully cautious of ‘constants’ that have endured the passage of history.

Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflict: an introduction to theory and history*, New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005.

1. Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflict: an introduction to theory and history*, New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005.
2. Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, Alexander L. George, *Force and statecraft: diplomatic problems of our time*, Fifth Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 289
3. Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, Alexander L. George, *Force and statecraft: diplomatic*

problems of our time, Fifth Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 289

4. Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig, Alexander L. George, *Force and statecraft: diplomatic problems of our time*, Fifth Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995 p. 290
5. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
6. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
7. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.



By:

Jean Loup Samaan, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC

The G5 Sahel:

A Crucial Test for Regional Defense Cooperation





On 13 December 2017, the UAE attended the international meeting convened in France to support the build-up of the military component of the G5 Sahel, a joint force composed of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger aimed at fighting terrorist organizations and illicit traffic networks in the Sahel. While Saudi Arabia announced supporting the initiative with 100 million euros, the UAE declared that it would provide 30 million euros, making the two Gulf allies the key financial supporters of the G5 Sahel Joint Force – the total amount of international aid is estimated at 414 million euros as of 2018.

Security in the Sahel has become one of the major priorities in the fight against terrorism. The 2013 French military operation in Mali — Operation “Serval” — evidenced the need to intervene against Islamist groups in the area as they were swiftly advancing

towards the capital city of Bamako. If the intervention allowed Mali to degrade the power of terrorist groups, it also called for an urgent redefinition of regional security for the Sahel. A zone of transition between the Sahara and the Sudanese Savanna, the Sahel is a long belt that crosses several African countries, whose size equals the European continent, and which therefore has always constituted a tremendous challenge for border security. In particular, the collapse of Libya following the civil war of 2011 and the subsequent proliferation of arms in the region emboldened non-state actors such as Boko Haram, MUJAO, and Ansar al Din.

In the years following the 2013 French operation in Mali, the region saw a new momentum for collective security, with the creation of the G5 Sahel in 2014. The scope of the G5 is comprehensive and includes devel-



opment and humanitarian initiatives but given the close and immediate threat posed by violent extremist organizations in the area, the security pillar of the G5 — in particular its Joint Force launched in February 2017 — has so far been at the forefront of the diplomatic agenda.

Only one year old, the G5 Joint Force is still in its force generation process. A concept of operations has been issued which provides a specific roadmap for the five contributing countries. Its mandate includes the fight against terrorism, organized crime and human trafficking; the restoration of state authority in the Sahel region; support to displaced persons; and contribution to humanitarian operations.

In light of the situation on the ground, the military posture of the Joint Force is one that relies on counterinsurgency operations rather than UN-style peacekeeping operations. It divides the Sahel into three areas of operation: the eastern zone where Niger and Chad are to deploy two battalions (of approximately 650 men); the central zone where Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger would provide three battalions; and the western zone where Mauritania and Mali would send two battalions. Each zone would have a tactical headquarters with one unique operational headquarters located in Sevre, in Mali. In total, the concept

of operations aims to deploy 5 000 men to fulfill its missions.

The first operation of the G5 Joint Force, named “Haw Bi”, was conducted in late October 2017, with military units from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The main goal was to deploy 750 men along the Mali-Burkina Faso border. As of today, the initial operational assessment of “Haw Bi” has been cautious: the ability of the joint force to concretely conceive, command and conduct an operation only a few months after its creation was praised by international partner countries but military commanders, such as Malian General Didier Dacko, the Head of the Joint Force, emphasized the need to improve the information and communication support between the operational headquarters and the units on the ground. A second operation “Pagnali” (meaning “thunder” in Peul language) was initiated in early 2018.

As the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other international partners become major financial contributors to the G5 Joint Force, it is worth looking at two of the key challenges this initiative will have to address in the near future. The first one relates to the operational demands. The latest threat assessments, either from local countries or Western allies such as France and the US, underline the resilience of terrorist organizations in the Sahel

and the need to sustain a long-term military commitment to the region. To address this issue, the members of the G5 Sahel have modest military means. Mauritania has significant skills in intelligence while Chadian armed forces have a credible warfighting experience. But the three others – Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali – have much more limited resources. The Malian army in particular is still in the process of a vast reform following the 2013 operation which will require time before seeing concrete and enduring results. Moreover, the force generation requirements as stated in the concept of operations have to be considered in the broader context of the multiple missions the armed forces of these countries are committed to. For instance, Chad and Niger are simultaneously involved in the Multinational Joint Task Force launched in 2015 to fight against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Multiple operational commitments may overstretch



the capacities of the Sahel countries. This leads to the second challenge for the Joint Force which relates to the coordination of its mission with the other initiatives in the region. There is today a myriad of different entities involved in the Sahel. The French Army remains engaged through the Barkhane operation with a headquarters in Ndjamena and its airbase in Niamey, in Niger. The US

and Germany also have a significant footprint in the region while the UN and the UE have launched their own missions, respectively the MINUSMA and the EUCAP Sahel Niger. Meanwhile, another initiative, the Nouakchott Process, started in 2017. Similar in its scope to the G5 Sahel, the Nouakchott Process was initiated by the African Union and includes eleven countries. Perhaps more importantly,

Algeria, a key actor of regional security, conditioned its support to the G5 on the basis that the latter would be integrated to the Nouakchott Process. It is premature to venture on the future diplomatic arrangements stakeholders may make but these should be considered with their ultimate goal in mind: the fight against terrorism and the long-term development of the region.

Navigating through these operational and diplomatic challenges of the G5 Joint Force will surely require agile statecraft but the stakes are high. Restoring security and stability in the Sahel should not be understood solely as a regional issue: with terrorist groups like the Islamic State being ousted from Syria and Iraq, it is likely that they will regroup in any area free from government authority such as the Sahel. This is why providing support – whether financial, operational, or political – to initiatives like the G5 Joint Force is crucial in the broader fight against terrorism.

References

- Chivvis, Christopher, *The French War on Al Qa'ida in Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- International Crisis Group, "Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force", Report no.258, December 2017.
- Hanne, Olivier, Larabi, Guillaume, *Jihad au Sahel : Menaces, operation Barkhane, cooperation regionale*, (Paris: Editions Bernard Giovangelini, 2015).
- Notin, Jean-Christophe, *La guerre de la France au Mali*, (Paris : Tallandier, 2014).
- Robinet, Cyril, "Genese de la force conjointe du G5 Sahel", *Ultima Ratio*, 16 January 2018. Retrieved on April 2018, 25 from <http://ultimaratio-blog.org/archives/8650>.



By:
Joel Hayward, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC



The Islamic Tradition of Diplomacy

Throughout the last fourteen hundred years Islamic empires, states and nations have based their understanding of international relations, war, peace, statecraft and diplomacy on the key

sources of all Islamic authority: the Qur'an and the traditions (Sunan) relating to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. These traditions were recorded in two main bodies of early documents: the



ahadith, or recorded sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad, and the Sirah, the early biographical studies of his life. They are detailed and cover all aspects of his life, including his military leadership and diplomacy.

Given the Islamic belief that Prophet Muhammad ﷺ is the exemplary human, whose decisions and actions were guided, shaped and supported by divine intervention and inspiration, they are considered to be qualitatively superior to those of other humans. In every sphere of private, public and political activity, therefore, scholars, jurists and leaders throughout the long haul of Islamic history have looked back to the lifetime of the Prophet in order to establish how things should be done.

After 622 CE, the Prophet ﷺ found himself the leader, lawgiver, military commander and primary diplomat of a nascent religious community of believers and its treaty allies in the

Arabian city of Yathrib (soon renamed Medina). The wording of the pact that he entered into with the non-Muslim tribes of Medina, which some scholars call the Constitution of Medina, was included in the first major biography, the *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh* of Ibn Ishaq (died c. 770). That pact has served as a model for diplomatic accords involving Muslims ever since.

Likewise, in 628 CE Muhammad signed the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah, a pivotal armistice between his Medina-centered ummah and the Quraysh tribe of Mecca. It effectively ended the state of war between the two cities, affirmed a 10-year peace, and allowed Muhammad's followers to enter Mecca the following year in a peaceful pilgrimage. Although we no longer have the exact wording of this treaty it became a model of Islamic diplomacy.

The Prophet fought several major battles between the hijra of 622 CE



and the liberation of Mecca in 630. Hadiths and early biographies, plus of course numerous Qur'anic verses, provide narrative and explanation. From these hadiths, biographies and verses, scholars and jurists have developed the Islamic concepts of war, peace and diplomacy. The key concepts include the need to put security between states ahead of any religious differences, the belief that the peoples of all countries and communities should be treated with dignity, respect and tolerance, and a strong commitment never to break or dishonor the terms of a treaty or contract.

After the Holy Prophet's death in 632 CE, the Islamic polity expanded quickly outside of Arabia and within a century had reached Spain in the West and the borders of India in the East. Explaining this expansion, scholars and jurists in the ninth century CE — almost two hundred years after the Prophet — created an analytical framework to describe what we nowadays call International Relations. Rather simplistically, they divided the known world in a binary fashion into communities that were either Islamic or non-Islamic and created a set of principles for how they should interact. Put simply, they said that the major divisions are Dar al-Islam (lit. abode of Islam), denoting regions where Islamic law prevails, and Dar al-Harb (abode of war), denoting adjoining non-Islamic lands whose rulers were seen as potentially threatening and were therefore called upon to accept Islam. A third community was the Dar al-Sulh (abode of treaty), denoting a non-Islamic land which had, through warfare or diplomacy, concluded a treaty with an Islamic government.

It is worth noting that neither these terms nor concepts were ever used in the Qur'an or by the Holy Prophet. □ Their first use was in Iraq by the scholar Abu Hanifa (died 772) and his students Abu Yusuf and Al-Shaybani. They also came to feature prominently in the teachings of Al-Shafi'i (820). In their minds, the Islamic polity, by

which time had assumed the title of Caliphate, was homogeneous and included all the world's Muslims. In reality, this was never really true. Muslim communities always existed beyond the boundaries of the Caliphate, and often without any shared borders or direct engagement (much less subordination). At times several competing Islamic caliphates existed.

Nonetheless, the concepts of competing and rival religiously defined power blocs featured prominently in Islam jurisprudence and tended to relegate diplomacy mainly to the negotiation of treaties relating to war (rather than trade), non-aggression and border-stability pacts (rather than alliances), and the legal and tax status of non-Muslims and short-term commercial visitors in Islamic territories.

Forcing Islamic International Relations and diplomacy into an out-of-date and unhelpful binary position ("us" and "them"), the concepts and phrases decreased in usage after the Mongols reportedly brought the Islamic Golden Age to an end in 1258. Since the West's ascendancy from the sixteenth century onward, which corresponded with the declining strength of the Islamic polity, this binary division now really exists in our increasingly globalized world as a historical idea with very limited contemporary applicability.

Modern Sunni scholars have stressed the inapplicability of these terms, arguing that the Muslim population is now scattered all over the world, and with large minority communities within most non-Islamic states. Their fate is linked to that of the societies in which they live, and it is unthinkable to draw a line of demarcation between them and the "non-Muslims" based on medieval ideas of civilizational separateness.

Most contemporary Sunni theorists advocate a return to the more tolerant, inclusive and neighborly models of statecraft articulated by Qur'an and Sunnah, with the overriding



thought being God's revelation in Qur'an (Surah Al-Hujurat 49.13): "O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another."

With this in mind, the old binary geographical representation, with two rival worlds existing in relative balance and the constant threat of conflict, has given way to a far more tolerant, optimistic and potentially fruitful hope for positive engagement. Most Sunni scholars argue that diplomacy should



no longer focus on the differences between communities, but on the commonalities, with religious dissimilarities no longer a defining feature. Now unshackled from the medieval concept of civilizational divisions, Islamic conceptual thinking on international relations, war, peace, statecraft and diplomacy has once again returned to a study of the Holy Prophet's own lifetime and his tolerance and respect and his desire for dialogue and engagement. At the heart of contemporary Islamic discourse


on diplomacy we find the final verse of Surah al Kafirun (109.6) revealed to the Prophet in Mecca shortly before the Hijra: "To you your way of life, to me my way of life". This has opened up diplomacy well beyond the need to include religion as a matter of potential conflict. As one scholar recently wrote, typifying this view, "Muslims should not allow a politicized ideology to set our principles of diplomacy. Our main goal must be to promote Islamic values through our sincere struggle, sound judgment and good

conduct (uswah hasanah)." Diplomacy is about the establishment of "harmonious relations with other nations and communities according to the totality of the qur'anic spirit."



By:

Samuel R. Greene, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC




“Easy to Win?”

Strategic Implications of a U.S.-China Trade War for GCC States

Many commentators have suggested that the Trump Administration had adopted a largely mainstream economic policy in its first year. In February 2018, Jeremy Peters argued in the New York Times that Republicans saw significant continuity with the George W. Bush Administration: “Government spending and the debt are soaring, provoking grumbings about fiscal reck-

lessness. Taxes were slashed at the expense of balanced budgets...And with the exception of some highly specific tariffs, international trade remains free and unfettered” (Peters 2018). By April 2018, this viewpoint is less common. In March 2018, President Trump maintained that “...trade wars are good, and easy to win.” He repeatedly denounced Chinese trade policies, ac-



cusing China of cheating, particularly via selling subsidized products for a loss (dumping), in announcing tariffs on steel and aluminum (Deaux et al 2018). In April 2018, Trump threatened to impose an additional \$150 million of tariffs on Chinese goods. China responded by releasing plans to impose at least \$ 50 million of retaliatory tariffs, targeted at industries

broadly distributed throughout the United States. This led a Brookings Institution report to conclude that “the Chinese tariff lists seem designed to ensure that both parties—and virtually all parts of the country—are maximally disturbed by the ongoing saber-rattling” (Muro, Whiton, and Maxim 2018) . While a recent conciliatory speech by China’s President Xi

Jinping may suggest a possible resolution, an intensified trade competition with global implications is certainly far more likely than in February 2018. Accordingly, this paper considers the challenges and opportunities such a scenario would provide for states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Challenges

The potential global implications of a US-China trade war include disruption to the global supply chain, global contagion leading to an economic downturn with international implications, and a possible move away from the post-Cold War order that has prioritized open economies across the globe. Such a worst-case scenario that includes all of these elements is not inevitable, but clearly possible, should a trade war escalate. GCC economies are more vulnerable now than during the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis because of



the lengthy duration of low oil prices from 2014 to the present, increased alternatives to Gulf oil from fracking, and greater competitiveness of renewables. Many states in the Gulf have spent reserves and taken on debt to meet spending commitments (Greene and Raets 2015; IMF 2017). Furthermore, a trade war could further reduce demand for oil by driving down the Chinese growth that has led China to be a key consumer of oil. While all GCC states are attempting to diversify, particularly from increasing revenues via taxes and fees and diversification via developing new economic sectors (IMF 2016), this will be a challenging task in the short term.

GCC countries with robust sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are also at risk from a global downturn that could reduce investment value. In the 2008 crisis, a Wharton School of Business report (2009) suggested that SWFs

in the Middle East lost an estimated 30% of their value. In the near term, this would put further pressure on countries that are relying on investments to provide a cushion from decreased oil revenue. GCC countries also benefit from open economies and a rules-based approach to international trade and finance. From both exporting oil and petrochemical products as well as serving as transport hubs, much of the economic structure of GCC countries works best with open markets. Thus a trade war could put considerable pressure on many states in the region.

Opportunities

However, a contest between the US and China also presents GCC states with opportunities. As states in the Gulf invest in knowledge economies as an important component of their economic diversification strategy, policies that reduce the desirability of the US market could provide an opening

for GCC states to attract global talent—particularly in the context of anti-immigrant sentiment across much of the West. For states like the UAE that are also targeting foreign direct investment (FDI), this could also make the UAE an increasingly attractive destination due to its stability.

Further, if states with deep pockets can weather the short-term challenges, a downturn could provide opportunities to acquire valuable assets at discounted prices, as occurred in 2009. Indeed, investments by SWFs ultimately helped restore stability to global markets, because despite the funds' losses, their extensive reserves meant that they were still well placed to invest when other actors were unable or unwilling (Mooney 2016).

Recommendations

A trade war between the US and China has the potential to cause considerable disruption to the global economy. As such a trade war is certainly



not in the interests of GCC states, they should seek to halt it if possible. Given that states in the GCC have good relations with both parties, it is possible that GCC members could play a constructive role in resolving the economic dispute between the two great powers.

However, GCC member states should also prepare to mitigate the challenges and stand ready to take advantage of opportunities, should a trade war occur. The other states in the GCC would do well to follow the UAE's lead in economic diversification and developing sources of revenue from fees and taxes, which increases flexibility. GCC states should also continue building on investment in the knowledge economy and developing an attractive and stable market. The UAE, as a GCC leader in both areas, could be in the best possible position to benefit should a trade war occur.

Works Cited

Deaux, Joe, Andrew Mayeda, Toluse Olorunnipa, and Jeff Black. 2018. "Trump Says Trade Wars Are 'Good, and Easy to Win'" Bloomberg, March 1. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-01/trump-is-said-to-delay-decision-on-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs>

Greene, Samuel and Kiani Raets. 2015. "Responding to the 'New Normal': Gulf Economic Strategies in an era of Low-Cost Oil" Gulf State Analytics (November): 3-6.

IMF. 2017. "The Economic Outlook and Policy Challenges in the GCC Countries." <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2017/12/14/pp121417gcc-economic-outlook-and-policy-challenges>

IMF. 2016. "Economic Diversification in Oil-Exporting Arab Countries." <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/042916.pdf>

Mooney, Attacta. 2016. Sovereign wealth funds stop coming to the rescue. Financial Times, July 31. <https://www.ft.com/content/dd99a128-5590-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60>

Muro, Mark, Jacob Whiton, and Robert Maxim. 2018. "How China's proposed tariffs could affect U.S. workers and industries" Brookings Institution. April 9 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/04/09/how-chinas-tariffs-could-affect-u-s-workers-and-industries/>

Wharton School of Business. 2009. "Kings of Cash: The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Sovereign Wealth Funds" knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/kings-of-cash-the-impact-of-the-global-financial-crisis-on-sovereign-wealth-funds/



By:

Nikolas Gardner, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC

Technology and the Nature of War in the Twenty-First Century


Violent conflict has always been a feature of human relations. Throughout history, tribes, states, and other entities have employed force in pursuit of a broad range of objectives including territory, wealth, prestige, and political legitimacy. While the motives and methods of belligerent parties have evolved over time, armed conflict has always been a struggle between human beings, influenced by emotion as well as miscalculation. Recently, however, some scholars and military professionals have argued that war is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Technologies such as satellites and autonomous weapons enable states to employ instruments of power with unprecedented precision and, in the case of military instruments, lethality. The internet has enabled states and non-state actors alike to strike adversaries using non-kinetic means with minimal economic or human costs.

But how much has really changed? Many writers argue that despite technological advances, war has an essential nature that remains unalterable. In order to make sense of this debate it is important to distinguish between war, a state of armed conflict between two or more belligerents, and warfare, the way in which wars are conducted. New

technology, such as motor vehicles or aircraft, has had a dramatic impact on warfare, without forcing us to redefine the term war itself. It is also important to distinguish between the character and the nature of war. The character of a particular war is determined by who is fighting and for what purpose. This will differ in each conflict. The nature of war, on the other hand, refers to its constituent elements, the properties that differentiate war from other human activities. These elements include the purposeful use of force to achieve an objective, the pervasiveness of chance and uncertainty, and the influence of human emotions such as hostility and hatred.

Perhaps the clearest explanation of the nature of war was provided by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Writing in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s, Clausewitz developed a model he called the “paradoxical trinity”, which outlined the basic attributes of any war. According to Clausewitz:

“As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free



to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” (Clausewitz, 89)

Clausewitz associated these tendencies with different parts of a society involved in a conflict. He attributed “violence, hatred, and enmity”, to the general population, which could be moved by emotion to act against the enemy. He viewed “the play of chance and probability” as the realm of the armed forces, which faced the challenge of coping with uncertainty during active operations. The task of determining the political objective for which violence was to be employed was the role of the government.

Clausewitz did not intend to reduce the Trinity simply to these three actors: people, armed forces, and government. He recognized that emotion could influence the decisions of government leaders and the behavior of soldiers on the battlefield. He also un-

derstood that chance and uncertainty could affect the decisions of senior leaders and popular opinion. The real value of the Trinity lies in its identification of the tendencies that make up the nature of war, and its explanation of how they interact. Clausewitz



likened the course of any conflict to an object suspended between three magnets. As the conflict progresses, the three elements of the Trinity - the forces of emotion, chance, and reason – will affect its course, pulling it in different and unpredictable directions.

Given the pace of technological change over the past two centuries, and particularly in the last three decades, it is legitimate to ask whether the tendencies Clausewitz described still have the same influence as they did in his lifetime. Today the critical infrastructure of most states, as well as the international financial system, is reliant on the internet. This allows states and other actors to target their adversaries with precise and potentially debilitating cyberattacks, which can achieve similar effects to a military strike without actual bloodshed or even a declaration of war. The increasing reliance on social media as a



mine the cohesion of entire societies at relatively low cost. Should physical force become necessary, some analysts have argued that the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of modern armed forces, combined with the precision of their weapons systems, allow them to identify and target adversaries with unprecedented accuracy. (Owens and Offley) Altogether, these technologies enable a degree of precision that promises to reduce dramatically the impact of chance and uncertainty in war. Technology may also reduce the impact of emotion. In theory, states equipped with unmanned or autonomous weapons can target enemy combatants without inflicting collateral damage on innocent civilians, while minimizing losses to their own armed forces. They can therefore prosecute wars without incurring the wrath of the civilian population that surrounds enemy combatants. They can also sustain prolonged wars without significant popular support at home. (Chamayou)

These developments have certainly changed the conduct of warfare, and the character of specific conflicts. But will they eliminate the tendency of uncertainty and emotion to pull conflicts off the rational paths devised by policymakers? At present, there is little evidence to suggest that this will be the case. While modern surveillance technologies enable states to identify adversaries with unprecedented accuracy, even the best equipped armed forces still face difficulties identifying and targeting their enemies. The unfortunate but continued occurrence of civilian casualties as a result of air strikes aimed at combatants is evidence that armed forces have yet to eliminate chance and uncertainty from war. Even non-violent measures, such as cyberattacks and targeted sanctions aimed at an adversary's economic assets, can also cause collateral damage. In April 2018, for example, US sanctions aimed at specific individuals in Russia

news source also enables the use of sophisticated information campaigns, which can influence specific segments of public opinion and under-



undermined investor confidence in the Russian economy more broadly, weakening the country's currency and hurting ordinary Russians in the process. Even if they are unintended, such consequences generate an emotional response, encouraging affected civilians to rally in support of their leaders. They may also weaken popular support for the attacker if it is perceived to be inflicting unnecessary suffering on innocent people. Truly autonomous weapons, independently capable of identifying enemy combatants and neutralizing them without harming bystanders, hold the promise of removing human emotion from the conduct of war. But the de-

cision to use lethal force in ambiguous circumstances requires expertise and often an element of intuition—qualities possessed only by humans at present. While computers may be able to perform relatively routine tasks, such as aerial navigation, decisions regarding the use of lethal force will remain a human responsibility for the foreseeable future. (Hoffman, 22)

Rather than the limitations of existing technologies, it is the continued centrality of humans that ensures that uncertainty and emotion will continue to pervade conflict. While their cognitive skills remain superior to machines for complex decisions in ambiguous circumstances, human beings are

prone to errors stemming from fatigue as well as emotion. For political leaders and military commanders, these factors compound the difficulty of predicting the intentions and responses of human opponents, themselves prone to the same limitations. While modern technology may increase the information available to leaders and enhance the precision with which they can employ instruments of power, as long as conflicts consist primarily of contests between determined human adversaries, chance, uncertainty and emotion will continue to shape their course and outcomes. Thus, Clausewitz's image of an object between three magnets remains an appropriate and sobering analogy for leaders contemplating the use of force.

References:

- Chamayou, Gregoire. *A Theory of the Drone*, trans. Janet Lloyd. New York: The New Press, 2015.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Hoffman, Frank. "Will War's Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?" *Parameters* 47(4) Winter 2017-18.
- Owens, Bill and Ed Offley. *Lifting the Fog of War*. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2000.



By:

Patrick M. Bell, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC



Analyzing the Impact of Asymmetric Information Operations from a Neo-Clausewitzian Standpoint





The activity of social media suffuses today's social and political movements. While this can have both positive and negative effects, there is growing concern over the use of social media as an instrument in hybrid warfare. As recent headlines can attest, the use of social media in hybrid warfare is not limited to traditional conceptions of information space. Facebook, YouTube, and other popular social media platforms are only the latest example of the expansion of hybrid warfare. In the past eighteen months there has been increasing attention paid to a practice, denoted 'trolling', in the 2016 US presidential election by Russian operatives with names including Fancy Bear and Guccifier 2.0.

Despite all the recent expansion in social media, this is not a new battlefield. Alternative facts, disinformation, and propaganda (i.e. "active measures") have their roots in both military and diplomatic strategy going back centuries to Clausewitz

and even Sun Tzu whose work infamously stated, "All warfare is based on deception". What is new is the speed with which the battle is being waged and the immediacy of the results. The ubiquitous presence of information communication technology (ICT) and widespread use of social media have facilitated this trend. Moreover, social media now allows misinformation and disinformation to be spread at a speed heretofore not possible. With relatively little investment, Russian trolls disseminate both misinformation and disinformation to hundreds of thousands of users which is then viewed millions of times.

With all the furor surrounding the influence of Russian trolls on the 2016 US presidential election, it is important to keep things in perspective. What happened in the 2016 US presidential election is not some new type of warfare. Russian-sponsored influence campaigns or Asymmetric Information Operations (AIOs) as



they are known in military parlance, are nothing new. In the last decade alone, Russian AIOs can be specifically traced to at least half a dozen countries before November 2016. These include, but are not limited to, Brexit also in 2016, a continuing AIO in Ukraine since 2013, and attacks on the Republics of Georgia in 2008 and Estonia in 2007.

The prevalent use of social media has important implications for national security as this new medium has become the latest battleground in what is often referred to as an information war. The impact of this information war on national security is continuing to evolve but has at least four aspects. This can be described using the acronym LAMB:

1. Language
2. Audience
3. Medium
4. Beliefs

The first aspect deals with the language being used in the information war. This includes not just the words but also symbols. Symbols are often rooted in issues related to cultural, ideological, and even social identity. For example, in the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, there are three languages being used; Ukrainian, Russian, and English. In each of these languages a specific narrative is being formulated and implemented. Despite discussing the same events, there is contention over not just the meaning, but even over the facts themselves.

Disagreement over these events


is emblematic of a larger trend, not just in political discourse, but in social discourse as well — discourse in which the very nature of what constitutes a fact is up for debate. This discourse also points to a more ominous trend — a trend in which facts are not just debatable, but their very existence is questioned. It is as if “Nothing is true and everything is possible” to quote Peter Pommerantsev.

(Public Affairs.2015)
In this information war the most important weapon is that of controlling the narrative and through it perception — perception about not just what the narrative is but what ‘alternative facts’ are used. It is as if perception is more important than reality — not just on social media but in society itself. In this war, information, not just tanks and missiles, are the weapons and public perception is the battlefield.

Symbolic of this trend was the ‘Euromaidan’ protests that took place between November 2013 and February 2014 in Ukraine. However, what happened in Ukraine was not confined to Kyiv between the months of November 2013 and February 2014. Moreover, the use of social media was not just restricted to the Maidan as events over the last

four years have demonstrated.


The information war and by extension asymmetric information operations, are about far more than language. It is also about the audience to which these narratives are directed and the mediums used to communicate with those audience-



es. With the advent of social media, there is an ability to design narratives that are at once pervasive and persuasive on a scale not seen before. When combined with a detailed knowledge of the behavior of their targets, these nar-

natives can influence the beliefs of those targeted. As the controversy over the access of data from 50 million Facebook users by Cambridge Analytica shows, audiences can be targeted in a highly specific manner — even down to the individual level.

This ability to influ-



HOW TO ENGAGE MORE PEOPLE TO SHARE YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT



erations and strategy. Most of all, they must be able to communicate in multiple mediums, be they social media or more traditional media such as print, radio or television.

The effectiveness of these techniques is a topic of significant concern for governments worldwide as the impact of Russian operations in the US and European elections makes clear. Moreover, the use of asymmetric information operations is increasing and has direct implications for national security as they have the potential to destabilize not only military but also civilian institutions responsible for maintaining the legitimacy of the state. It is therefore important to analyze the role of asymmetric information operations techniques such as alternative narratives, disinformation and propaganda (i.e. “active measures”) used in hybrid warfare.

Given the impact of these asymmetric operations, not just in Ukraine but in the United States and Europe, it is also crucial to identify ways to measure their impact on the information space. This would entail a research agenda that includes investment into academic areas including social network analysis, nat-

ural language processing and machine learning to name only a few. Proffering a solution to this question is beyond the scope of this article, but we desperately need new research to begin to understand the mechanisms by which these asymmetric information operations work in practice.


What we do know is that the purpose of AIOs is to exploit and expand underlying divisions in the target state, so you do not have to engage in kinetic action. When combined with kinetic action, AIOs are a powerful tool which can impact far beyond the traditional battlefield. Thus, states have the option of using both kinetic and so called non-kinetic options in achieving their objectives. Moreover, what the operations in Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States reveal is that the nature of AIOs is more psychological than physical. In military terms, this means that your objective is to affect the psychology of your enemy — to disturb their psychological Center of Gravity (COG) to use Clausewitzian terminology.

Given the increasing use of asymmetric information operations, national security decision makers must not only invest in research but also understand that these operations will be a continuing and perhaps growing part of any state or non-state actor's arsenal.

ence beliefs has profound consequences for national security. To successfully counter the impact of these operations, today's information warriors must be skilled in several areas including neurolinguistics, psychological op-



By:
Yacouba Gnegne, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC



Climate Change and the UAE's Strategic Interests



Climate change stands out as one of the most robust, albeit often silent, predictors of the future of the world. The transformations occurring against this backdrop also have implications for countries' geopolitical outcomes, as increasingly evidenced by regional security developments which have been triggered, among other factors, by the consequences of climate change. This serves as a reminder that climate is a shaper of geography, which subsumes geopolitics.

Climate change "refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity." The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underscores that it has become unequivocal that the current climate system is changing. This is demonstrated by rising temperatures, warming oceans, shrinking ice sheets, retreating glaciers, decreasing snow cover, rising sea level, declining Arctic sea ice, expanding deserts, growing extreme events, and increasing ocean acidification. For instance, climate change puts pressure on water resources, and water scarcity


causes population exodus from rural zones to urban centers. Water shortage is also a source of public discontent, which can give rise to street protests, or spark insurgency. In many countries, the direct and indirect strategic consequences of climate change are already a matter of national security. As the New York Times (18 January 2018) wrote, in different manners, warming and water shortages can catalyze conflicts and render survival difficult in major cities of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. For the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country that is blessed to be able to grow one of the most prosperous societies out of the desert, the geopolitical externalities of climate change need to be monitored carefully, for a number of reasons.

First, all the regional countries relevant to the UAE in terms of foreign security are currently experiencing the security challenge posed by climate change. In this regard, it is a national security matter to closely monitor climate-related changes (desertification, dried grassland, water scarcity) occurring in these countries, in relation with their socio-economic effects such as extreme water stress, food insecurity, unemployment, population exodus, health risk...). The UAE itself, along with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, is

susceptible to drought, extreme water stress, storm severity and rising sea levels. The Environment Agency of Abu Dhabi (EAD) notes that the country is already suffering the effects of extreme climatic conditions that are expected to further increase because of the climate change phenomenon. EAD further argues that even minor changes in the long-term pattern of temperature and precipitation may translate into negative effects on the domestic economy due to the country's extremely high levels of vulnerability regarding the UAE's natural resources and its reliance on the global economy. The UAE has approximately 1,300 kilometers of coastline, with about eighty five percent of the population and more than ninety percent of the infrastructure located in low-lying coastal areas.

Second, the rapid depletion of the world's natural resources necessary to support food production is compounded by climate change, making it is likely that the UAE will encounter growing challenges in food importation. This may quickly translate into higher consumer prices for foodstuffs. According to the United Nations, food security is the condition in which all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Food availability, access, utilization, and stability are increasingly challenged by climate change. Forty percent of the world's landmass is already arid, and more will be turned into desert because of rising temperatures and water scarcity. Current food production and demand trends suggest that the world will have sufficient food for only half of its nine billion people by 2050. The 2007/2008 world food price crisis and the Arab Spring have already proven how vulnerable countries are when they rely on food imports. In order to mitigate





the risk of food security, countries can strategically engage in international food supply chains.

Third, not only international climate policy decisions but also market dynamics need to be closely monitored by the UAE given the high carbon dependence of its economy. Indeed, climate-related risks are likely to have deep repercussions on current economic models and the financial system, in the form of both physical damage and transition costs, including through generating stranded assets (non-viable assets) in energy-dependent industries. Domestic policymakers, in particular monetary authorities, should take into account climate change related issues as part of their mandate of enabling economic growth, ensuring monetary and financial stability, as have the Central Banks in some advanced countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This requires evaluating the exposure of the domestic economy to risks arising from climate change (physical risks, such as natural hazards; transition risks, for instance, climate policy risks and liability risks). As regards physical risks and the potential losses caused by natural events, the obvious first hit is the insurance sector, with effects potentially leading to contagion to the rest of the financial sector. Climate policy might generate a situation where carbon intensive companies see their assets quickly lose value, or the technology they rely on becomes obsolete.

Finally, the UAE is likely be confronted with more demographic pressure from ever-rising international flows of migrants, and demand for more humanitarian aid abroad. In 2017, about 258 million people were living outside their country of birth, 106 million of them originated from Asia, with India the largest source-country of international migrants (17 million). The inward migration to the UAE was 8,095,126 in

2015. Climate change will likely push more people to immigrate. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, slow-onset climate change impacts could force more than 143 million people (around 2.8 percent of the total population of these regions) to immigrate within their own countries by 2050. Another estimate suggests that 200 million people will be climate immigrants, within or outside their country by 2050. Conflicts and socio-economic crises triggered by climate change will add to these figures in these regions and elsewhere in the world.

Overall, climate change is adding complexity to the domestic and international security environment. This raises the prospect that UAE military forces might be confronted with complex situations requiring their intervention. The fact that most of the potential geopolitical effects of climate change are occurring silently should not make us lose our sense of urgency. National security strategists ought to rely on integrated tools to support their analyses. In order to integrate a multiplicity of climate change considerations into their decision-making process, they need to take account of data on temperature, precipitations, water scarcity and water stress, grassland, agriculture, climate migrants, as well as physical and transition risks.



By:
Sterling Jensen, Ph.D.
Faculty, UAE NDC



Strategic Insights from Studying Thucydides and Machiavelli in the UAE

For centuries students of international relations, strategic studies and statecraft have studied the writings of the Greek military historian Thucydides and Italian writer Niccolò Machiavelli. Today it is common to hear leading geo-political analysts and academics refer to concepts such as the “Thucydides Trap” when forecasting US-China relations or describing regional leaders making the headlines as being “Machiavellian.” (Allison, 2017) In 2018 a new elective on Thucydides and Machiavelli was introduced at the National Defense College (NDC) to discuss how history might help interpret the geo-political forces at play in the Middle East. This is the first course of its nature in the Arab world being taught in Arabic. There are many books written and courses taught in the English language about Thucydides and Machiavelli, but there is no current analysis of consequence in Arabic or originating from the Middle East. Yet lessons from a study of Thucydides and Machiavelli are just as relevant today to interpret the geo-politics of the region as they were when they were written about their respective regions.

Why study Thucydides?

In 2014 the influential US newspaper The Washington Post published an article that popularized a new nickname for the UAE as “Little Sparta.” (Chandrasekaram, 2014) This nickname originates from US Secretary of Defense James Mattis and other top US generals referring to the UAE as a “Little Sparta,” not just due to the UAE’s relatively small size, but due to its military capabilities, professionalism and outsized role in coalition operations. Sparta was an ancient Greek city-state that centralized its efforts and resources to produce the most capable and professional military in the Greek world. History knows Sparta as defeating Athens in the great Greek civil war, the Second Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE). The best known history of the Peloponnesian War was written by Athenian general Thucydides, who was a veteran of that war. Thucydides describes in great detail the war’s geo-political dynamics and analyzes the decisions made by the strategic leaders conducting the war. In the end, Sparta and its allies beat the alliance led by Athens, the Greek city state known for its exceeding wealth,

democracy and civilization. Studying Thucydides has provided NDC participants a historic case study to better assess and analyze the current state of Middle Eastern affairs, its alliance structures and profiles of leadership. NDC participants gained insights into strategic considerations for leaders during times of peace, crisis and war. In fact, studying Thucydides is so relevant to policy makers nowadays that one observer noted how the Trump administration’s national security team is obsessed with using insights derived from the Peloponnesian War to shape how the US might manage its future relations with China. (Drezner, 2017)

Why study Machiavelli?

Since the time of Niccolò Machiavelli, during the Italian Renaissance over 500 years ago, the term “Machiavellian” has been used to describe a leader who believes the “ends justify the means;” meaning it is acceptable, and perhaps at times advisable, to lie, cheat, steal, kill and adopt other unethical acts and means as long as the leader is in pursuit of a noble objective or cause. Italian authoritarian Benito Mussolini, who aligned with



tators it rather provides valuable strategic insight to leaders of resource-rich, small city-states immersed in an environment of competing city-states, regional power rivalries, foreign power occupation and rising religious sectarianism. While it is debatable whether Niccolò Machiavelli was himself “Machiavellian”—as the term is understood today—the fact remains that his writings in political science and statecraft are still must reads in the top strategic studies and international relations programs in the world.

Machiavelli lived during a time of both great turmoil and change, but also a time of promise; Italy was divided into different city-states with varying degrees of power and resources, but Italians were the top innovators of their day. There is consensus among scholars that Machiavelli’s writings were driven by a desire to help the rulers of Florence deftly exploit the opportunities of his time to unite Italian cities, expel foreign influence and resurrect Italy to its past glory under the Roman Republics. Studying Machiavelli offers students insights into how small city states and fractured nations can develop the critical and strategic thinking skills required to unite a nation, efficiently mobilize its forces and gain respect and influence in an environment of great power politics.

How is a study of Thucydides and Machiavelli relevant to the UAE today?

Similar to the times of Thucydides and Machiavelli, the UAE lives in an environment of turmoil, riven by great and regional power rivalries, and rapid social and technological change. The UAE has also developed a vision of its destiny—to be a harbor of safety in a sea of uncertainty and destruction and to be a uniter, innovator and an influence and voice for moderation, tolerance and civility. States such as the UAE seeking to realize their destiny can learn from the lessons of history so they do not repeat

Adolf Hitler in World War II and who popularized, influenced and helped spread fascist (radical authoritarian nationalism) ideology in Italy and Europe after World War I, was an open admirer of Machiavelli’s writings and

tried to mimic many of the traits and tactics mentioned in his famous book “The Prince.” However, an objective study of Machiavelli is much more than an instruction manual for dictators; it is rather valuable strategic dic-



past mistakes and can capitalize on the experiences, insights and efforts of those who have gone before.

At the end of the course on Thucydides and Machiavelli, NDC participants visited the newly opened and critically acclaimed Louvre Abu Dhabi museum. Not only were they able to discuss the lessons of history while looking at artifacts of those times, they were able to apply Machiavelli's advice to value history for its lessons in governance and strategy, and not merely for the aesthetic value and prestige of possessing an ancient,

yet expensive artifact. While Machiavelli believed there are some things we cannot change about destiny, such as natural disasters or death, he taught us that it is unwise to believe we cannot influence our destiny through preparation and strategic thinking. A study of Thucydides and Machiavelli illustrates that history repeats itself and that those who study history correctly and seek to learn from it can gain valuable insights into how to navigate a nation to achieve its inspired destiny during times of uncertainty and challenge.

References:

- Allison, Graham "The Thucydides Trap," Foreign Policy, June 9, 2017
 Chandrasekaram, Rajiv "In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potentially nicknamed 'Little Sparta,'" The Washington Post, November 9, 2014
 Drezner, Daniel W. "The good, the bad and the ugly aspects of Thucydides in the Trump administration," The Washington Post, June 22, 2017



By:

**Staff. Col. Humaid
Mohamed Alremeithi
Participant, UAE NDC**



Qualifying Leaders for Stronger Instruments of State Power



The four instruments of state power: Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy are the means that a state uses mainly for its foreign policy. Those instruments are not necessarily intended for domestic use within the state itself, as if such an event occurs, this means that the state is going through internal challenges and has to compromise on its international role. The four instruments of national power represent the strength of the state. This is why states have put a lot of efforts into developing and enhancing their capabilities so as to be have stronger instruments of national power, thereby crafting effective foreign policies that would lead to playing more influential roles in the international arena.

Instruments of power capabilities do not depend on the resources of the state alone but, on the professional individuals

who, because of the knowledge and education gained, have maximized the state's effectiveness. Having strong instruments of power does not lead to stronger effect, because it is very important that those instruments are then synchronized and orchestrated to achieve the strategic goals. Any failure to have strong synchronized instruments of national power would lead to inefficient foreign policy; i.e if a country goes to war having strong diplomacy, military, and economy but a weak information instrument, that would lead to weaker narrative and media campaigns which could antagonize the domestic and international community, thus losing the advantage of the strength on those instruments. At the same time, strength in some instruments will compensate for weaknesses in others only if being used effectively.


For preparing official representatives, states have to look at each instrument domain and identify each government institution that helps achieve that instrument's objectives. Then you would have to look at each of those institu-

tion and assess how it serves the instrument. After identifying each institution's role, the government should direct it towards preparing its potential strategic leaders to have the ability to serve the instrument in the best way to achieve a certain level of education, knowledge and expertise as to be able to participate effectively in advancing the instrument internationally, not just domestically.

The above figure is an exemplary illustration of the qualification path of the potential strategic leaders of different government entities against the instrument that it help achieving. The qualification path (Yellow background) represents the domain across which those entities are best to follow in order to prepare their strategic leaders. The Diplomacy instrument of power is run mainly by one entity — the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MOFA-IC), which makes preparation of its staff much easier. Diplomatic Academy, are where MOFAIC personnel are being prepared for their positions in representing the country abroad. MOFAIC avail of

Instrument	Tools	Ways
Diplomacy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Foreign offices in capital cities 2. Diplomatic official envoys 3. International law 4. International organizations 5. UN Security Council Resolution 6. Alliances 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Persuasion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Diplomacy • Talks / coordination with states, IGOs & NGOs • Intimidation • Coercion / consensus building 2. Co-optation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiation / Compromise • Engagement 3. Coercion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat of force • Moral Ambassador • Break Diplomatic relations
Information	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Media (Print, Electronic, Film) 2. Press releases 3. Intelligence (Agencies, Centers, assets) 4. Information Operations (Psychological Ops / Deception) 5. Cyber 6. Research centers / Knowledge 7. Education 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Persuasion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic Narrative • Public Diplomacy • Alliance building • Identity formation / Norm diffusion • Exchange of information 2. Coercion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber attacks
Military	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Army 2. Navy 3. Airforce 4. Presidential Guard 5. Other military units 6. Reserve 7. Alliances & Defense agreements 8. Dozes 9. Marshal Law 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-optation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military cooperation / Engagement • Peace keeping operations • Humanitarian Assistance 2. Coercion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intimidance / show of force • Peace enforcement/ building / making • Threat of force • Blockade • Arms Control 3. Use of force <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compulsion / Acquisition of resources
Economy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Trade 2. Investment 3. Financial Sanctions / Embargoes 4. Cyber 5. Foreign Aid 6. Financial & monetary policy 7. Federation of chambers of commerce 8. Energy & commodities policies 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Co-optation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic incentives • Debt forgiveness • Positive economic sanctions • Economic Development 2. Coercion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negative economic sanctions • Freeze & Sinks monetary assets

Note: Innovation and exploration of new tool and ways are necessary for the aim of achieving the political objective in the best efficient method



it effective and supportive to other instruments of state power.

The Information instrument is effected through a number of entities that complicate the qualification of their strategic leaders to become professional in the statecraft of the information instrument to achieve political objectives. Therefore it is vital to have an information media statecraft institute that is able to provide professional education for those individuals who could be part of the strategic decision making process.

The Military instrument is similar to diplomacy as it is run by a specific entity — the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the process in qualifying its leaders and the level of education they receive at different stages is almost a universal pattern. The path starts from Joint Command

EDA must also include qualifying its potential strategic leaders in state crafting the instrument of diplomacy in such a way to render



and Staff College which prepares officers to be professional in the tactical and operational level while understanding the international context. When the officer reaches the level where he/she participates in strategic decision making he/she is then chosen to go either to the War or Defense College. The War College prepares officers at military strategic level, while understanding other instruments of national power. The highest level of all is the National Defense College which helps potential strategic leaders understand the strategic context and statecraft of the national strategy. The Economy instrument is quite unique because it is the backbone

of both the domestic and international capability of the state. Some might argue that the economy is concerned with the prosperity within the state only. That is correct when we talk of the economy in isolation, not as an instrument of national power. Therefore it is very important to have the capabilities to mobilize economic strength into an instrument that is effective internationally. The diversity of the entities that serves this instrument complicate the qualification process, but should not be an obstacle towards pursuing a unique model to gather all those potential leaders into a joint environment where their skills are honed to collectively statecraft an effective economy instrument that achieves national objectives.

After qualifying leaders to be professional in their designated instrument, then another level is to be considered which a number of states have recognized through the establishment of a National


Defense College (or similar institute) in which potential participants are carefully selected as strategic thinkers to blend each instrument of state power into a synchronized action that protects and promote national interests. This leadership grooming process will render the state more efficient and effective, in terms of resources, time and space and will be able achieve its objectives through different, innovative collaborative approaches.



By:
Stephen James Quick
Academic Staff, UAE NDC

Arabian Peninsula History

The Dhofar War in Oman, 1965-1975: A Historical Perspective



SAS CAT in action (Daily Mail).

In 1975, a coalition headed by the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) finally defeated the decade-long insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province in a Counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign described as "...model in every way" (Beckett, 2001:230). Importantly, under the Sultan, both 'state-building' and military tools were utilized to bring about the eventual victory in what was one of the region's most strategically significant confrontations of the 1960s and 1970s where "...its outcome had significant implications for the Arabian Gulf's subsequent history" (Hughes, 2015:424). The SAF's eventual victory prevented the collapse of Oman to a Marxist insurgency and buffered the spread of Communist great power proxy influence in the Arabian Gulf during the height of the Cold War, and safeguarded the crucial flow of Gulf oil for the world economy.

Background

Up to the mid- 20th Century Oman was an isolated county, both geographically and politically with Britain being the country's primary strategic partner. Formal treaty relations had been in place between Britain and the ruling Sultan since 1798 (Hawley, 1995: 59-60) and the incumbent ruler (Sultan Said bin Taimur) had delegated conduct of Oman's foreign affairs to Britain since 1932 when he assumed power. With towering mountain/jebel ranges, an unusual monsoon season (Khareef) and an ethnically distinct population, Dhofar was unique in the Arabian peninsula. Alongside the extremely conservative and frugal regime of the Sultan these were significant factors in the development and longevity of the insurgency that followed. Omanis were denied the trappings of modern life e.g. radios or eye glasses and even when oil revenue came on stream in 1967, only very limit-

ed funds were directed to development in infrastructure, health and education (being worst in Dhofar, with but a single primary school, no medical facilities at all and no electricity or running water in 1965 (White, 2008:3). What started as a small-scale nationalist rebellion in 1965 via the Dhofar Liberation front (DLF) was not successfully contained. Fanned by sometimes repressive SAF practices such as crop burning/well-capping and the UK's withdrawal from Aden in 1967 (and resultant communist bloc-sponsored People's Democratic Republic of Yemen-PDRY), allowing establishment of a rebel 'safe haven' across the border; the now Marxist-dominated insurgency spread rapidly. With popular support from the Dhofari population (either genuine support or through widespread indoctrination and/or intimidation by the fanatical Marxist insurgents), by 1970 the war was in danger of being lost.

State-building COIN Perspective

With insurgent activity alarmingly also being discovered in northern Oman, the country's survival was in real danger and the son of Sultan Said, Crown Prince Qaboos took power in 1970, exiling his father. In less than two years, the tide of war was turning to the government side, with social and economic development being prioritized, as well as large uplift in military spending. Also, through Britain's intensive lobbying (plus assistance via the USA and Saudi Arabia) Oman was accepted as a member of both the Arab League and United Nations in 1971; a crucial step to bolstering Oman's image/perception as an independent country fighting a legitimate conflict within its borders. Along with the establishment of the first ever Embassies in Muscat, this provided a powerful regional and in-

ternational voice for Oman in dealing with the insurgency and diplomatically isolating the key backer of the rebels; the PDRY (including 'outmaneuvering' protests about Omani retaliatory airstrikes in PDRY territory). These state-building efforts all helped lay the foundation for later military victory.

Military COIN Solution

Delivery of vital helicopters and artillery were prioritized and SAF was tripled in size from only 3000 to over 10,000 men in just 2 years by 1972 (Ladwig, 2008: 72). In addition, alongside Royal Engineer, Royal Air Force units and specialist military training teams, Britain covertly seconded up to c.250 of its elite Special Air Service (SAS) regiment to Dhofar to train/lead local tribesmen/Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) as Firqat militia units to undertake combat missions. The SAS also implemented a classic 'hearts and minds' COIN strategy, providing a range of services from intelligence gathering to medical/veterinary care and assisting with civil aid programmes, plus dissemination of 'white propaganda' on behalf of the Sultanate authorities (to counter false propaganda broadcast from communist-controlled Radio Aden). This counter-narrative strategy included broadcasts/leaflet drops which reinforced the peaceful message of Islam which was diametrically opposite to the violently-imposed atheist views of the Marxist insurgents.

Though improving, the military situation remained a virtual stalemate, and with Britain's domestic economic issues, (resulting in the UK military withdrawal east of Suez in 1971), the Sultanate authorities were forced to look elsewhere for help. Alongside practical support from countries such as the UAE/Saudi Arabia, large-scale effective assistance came initially from Jor-



dan, which sent combat engineers and Special Forces, but also in the unlikely guise of a pre-revolutionary Iran which provided troops (c.5000 by 1975, Valeri, 2017:59) and vital extra helicopter lift capability from 1973. In addition, an aggressive new strategy implemented by the seconded British Commander Sultan's Armed Forces (CSAF) divided up the jebel via reinforced barriers to physically split the insurgent forces and 'choke' their supply routes. No fewer than four huge wire, mine and sentry-fortified 'lines' were constructed from 1971 to 1974 (e.g. Hornbeam Line, 1972) which cordoned the insurgents into ever smaller zones to be 'mopped up'

by SAF and Firqat units. Alongside such policies, and after the remarkable defeat of a massed insurgent attack on the small SAS and Askar/SAF garrison in the town of Mirbat in July 1972, the SAF were finally in the ascendancy. This culminated in December 1975 with SAF/allied units attacking the main insurgent supply base at the Shirshitti caves in western Dhofar. The surviving insurgent (and supporting PDRY regular army) combatants were forced across the PDRY border, ceasing to be a significant threat which allowed Sultan Qaboos to declare victory after ten long and costly years of war.

By 1970 the war was nearly lost to the insurgent forces. Post-1970

with new leadership and the will to engage diplomatically, increase expenditure and aggressively prosecute the COIN campaign crucially by both 'state-building' and (not just) military means, it was only a matter of time before victory was achieved. As Maj-Gen Ken Perkins (CSAF, 1975-77) stated: "...A counter-revolutionary war cannot be won by military means only. The military create conditions in which political forces can operate, while politics, often involving international opinion, produce(s) a favourable environment for military success" (Perkins, 1979: 45). Despite not being a complete tactical success/'model' campaign (SAF and allies suffered hundreds



of casualties, thousands of Dhofari civilians were killed and the war absorbed up to 50% of Oman's annual GDP (Ladwig, 2008: 72), from a wider strategic perspective, the Dhofar COIN campaign can, however, be considered an overriding success for Oman, the UK (and other military allies) as well as for 'the West' in the context of the Cold War. Importantly, victory was also a vital stabilizing factor within the Middle East at a critical period in the region's history. Despite its shortcomings, the Dhofar war's eventual prosecution has, however, been described as "...probably the best conducted counterinsurgency campaign ever fought" (Ladwig, 2008: 63), and a

key example of how to facilitate an ally's victory via a process of 'COIN by consultancy'.

Bibliography

1. Becket, Ian, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies – Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1756*, (London: Routledge, 2001)
2. Hawley, Donald, *Oman & Its Renaissance* (London: Stacey International, 1995)
3. Hughes, Geraint 'Demythologising Dhofar: British Policy, Military Strategy and Counterinsurgency in Oman, 1963-1975' *Journal of Military History* (2015)
4. Perkins, Ken 'Oman 1975: The Year of Decision', *The RUSI Journal*, 124:1 (1979)
5. Ladwig, Walter 'Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion' *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 19, No.1 (2008)
6. Marc Valeri, *Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2017)
7. Jim White, *Oman 1965-1976: From Certain Defeat to Decisive Victory*, *Small Wars Journal*, (2008)



By:
Staff. Col. Rashid Alkaabi
Participant, UAE NDC

Qatar

in Economic Crisis

Executive Summary

The situation regarding the crisis with Qatar is at a decisive turn nowadays. The crisis is a direct result of Qatar leaning heavily towards Iran and supporting terrorism across the region. With the UAE and its allies strategic political objective to unite the GCC under one front to tackle security issues most importantly terrorism and proxy wars, cutting political ties and exercising economic contrarians on Qatar so that the prolonged isolation would extract enough economic pain that would force Qatari leaders to offer concessions and return to the rightful course. Nevertheless, Qatar, being the largest world exporter of natural gas, can easily cope with the forced boycott due to considerable accumulated wealth notwithstanding the economic pressure made currently. With the current economic statecrafts approaches, we cannot afford the boycott to continue for years as the outcome is not nearly as much as we had both hoped for and expected. Therefore, the situation requires using new economic techniques: imposing technical barriers

through the Suez Canal on LNG exports of Qatar and short-term extension of the economic boycott to include all Qatari companies.

Background

A swift economic techniques are required in order to prevent Qatar from drifting further into Iran's sphere of influence and changing the balance of power in the region and also to fulfill demands with regard to fighting terrorism and its financing. Consequently, the UAE and its allies, severed diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar and placed the country under a boycott hoping that Qatar will return to the lawful course and stop its support to terrorism and fanatical Islamist groups and cut its ties with Iran. Nevertheless, the position of Qatar remains the same; moreover, the state announced that the economy will be strengthened with a number of precautionary and pre-emptive measures with no concession. Other strong players trigger Qatar's position including Iran and Turkey.

The economy of Qatar is strongly impacted with the economic constraints



imposed. According to economic reports, Qatar was forced to withdraw a part of overseas investments in the amount of 20 billion USD in the ownership of the sovereign wealth fund to bring them to the onshore economy.

The estimations of the Moody rating agency, there was an injection of \$38.5 billion into the economy of Qatar since the eruption of the crisis. Furthermore, the banking system liquidity in Qatar has been ensured with a number of precautionary and pre-emptive measures; besides, the deposits of Qatar Investment Authority created a buffer and contributed to providing the banking system liquidity as well after the capital outflows which exceeded \$30 billion. The stock exchange of Qatar also suffered considerable damage being equal to 4.2 percent (July 2017) after 11.3 percent (June 2017), in particular in the private sector and aviation industry.

Analysis

A long-term policy of boycotting Qatar cannot be afforded for long term. Although, the impact of the boycott on the economy of Qatar was significant, it was not consistent with the expectations. As a result, boycott will not be devastating for Qatar resilient economy.

Notwithstanding the fact that the boycott made Qatar look for less cost-efficient trade routes for importing equipment, building materials, and food, it still can make use of the huge reserves

and cope with the crisis with the help of the additional resources in the following years even under the conditions of the 40 percent drop of imports as compared with the estimations made in 2016, in the same month. The damage to the economy of Qatar done by the boycott was not extensive because oil and gas exports, which accounts for about 60 per cent of Doha's revenues, continue to flow freely.

In the same context, if the crisis goes on for years, the boycott will hurt other across the Gulf, most importantly, the UAE. For example, Jebel Ali, the busiest port in the region handles more than a third of cargoes in the Gulf and, before the boycott, 85% of shipborne cargo for Qatar. Moreover, all companies in Qatar have local partners, doing business in the UAE; consequently, the loss of contracts impacted them negatively. Since Qatar deals with the boycott and economic pressure from the UAE and its allies flexibly and effectively, it implies the need for them to revisit the current economic statecraft techniques.

Recommendations (act)

It is expected that the demands will not be fulfilled if there are no further economic constraints imposed on Qatar. With serious cost implications involved, it is clear that favorable decisions are likely to be made. Serious cost implications on Qatar can be achieved by the following:-

1- Imposing technical barriers on Qatar LNG exports via the Suez Canal.

This means that if Qatar's LNG exports to Europe must be transported via the Horn of Africa, prices are expected to rise perhaps as much as by half a dollar per mmbtu. Moreover, the economic attractiveness of corresponding US exports to Europe will increase. There might be also a partial advantage for Russian pipeline gas and certain strengthening of the bargaining position of the largest customers of Qatar, Japan, allowing it to better dictate the terms of their long-term contracts.

2- Extending economic Sanctions (for a short term) to include all Qatari companies not only Qatar Airways. It is expected that those companies will sell their assets and close operations; which also can mean that Qatar will have to withdraw money from its overseas investments and sovereign wealth fund and bring them onshore to rescue its private sector economy. Besides, the corporations in Qatar will either withdraw the operations or downsize.

Conclusion

A close examination to the current economic constraints imposed by the UAE and its allies reveals that Qatar will continue drifting further in Iran sphere of influence and support terrorism across the region. Failing to adopt the above recommendations means that crisis will continue and it will hurt other across the Gulf, most importantly, the UAE and the real risk is that the GCC will cease to exist will be high.





By:

**Staff Lieutenant Colonel
Yousef Juma Al Haddad
Editor In Chief of Nation Shield**



The Implications of the New U.S. Strategy The Decline of Iranian Influence in the Region





Iran, which dreamed a few years ago of forming a vast empire in the Middle East, and exploited its nuclear deal with the group (5 + 1) in July 2015 to achieve this dream or project focused on expansion in the countries of the region, is facing an unprecedented crisis, whose main theme is the decline of its influence in the region. This follows the new American strategy announced a few days ago, adopting a comprehensive perspective in dealing with this Iranian project and its underlying dangers and threats to regional and international security and peace.

The Nuclear Agreement and Iran's Expansionist Project

"Iran has become an empire as it once was, with its capital, Baghdad, the center of our civilization, our culture and our identity today as it has

historically been. The geography of Iran and Iraq is indivisible, and our culture cannot be fragmented; therefore, we have to fight together or unite," said Ali Yunisi, the Adviser of the Iranian President, Hassan Rowhani, in March 2015, in his address before 'the Iranian Identity Forum' in Tehran, pointing out that "Iran intends to establish a federal alliance in the region, extending to the Mediterranean and Bab al-Mandeb in Yemen, to form a Shiite crescent, which is the basis of the Iranian empire." At that time, he did not imagine that the day would come when these "dreams" would collapse. Iran today, or rather its expansionist project, is in the decline, if not on its way to collapse.

Iran envisioned that the nuclear deal with the P5 + 1 group was a green light for the implementation of this imperial project. Instead of using the billions of dollars it received after the nuclear deal to bring about real development that would reflect positively on the Iranian people, Iran used them to finance and arm terrorist groups and militias serving its expansionist project in the region. At a time when the countries of the region were waiting for Iran to change its hostile behavior and stop its interferences that upset security and stability, and to start a new chapter of good-neighborly relations that take into consideration the interests of the peoples of the region in terms of security and stability, it began instead to maneuver, equivocate, demonstrate its power, and even launch explicit threats against the countries of the region, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Bahrain. It tried to disrupt their security and stability by means of its terrorist and espionage cells, all with the aim of implementing its expansionist project in the region.

Exposure of Iran's Expansionist Project and its Strategic Stalemate

With Iran's persistence in these interventionist policies and hostile practices

against the neighboring countries and other countries of the region at large, the reality of its expansionist project has begun to unfold day after day. It is the main factor behind the region's crises and conflicts in more than one country, including Yemen, Syria and Iraq. It is making many attempts to fuel sectarian discourse in the region. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have certainly played a prominent role in uncovering the reality of this Iranian project and its tools, such as terrorist and espionage cells, and armed militias, to cause chaos and destruction in the region, so the world has become in the past few months alert to the danger of this project. The major powers have no more concealed their worry about this issue. The US President, Donald Trump, who has adopted a firm stance against Iran since he took power, finally announced on May 8, 2018, his withdrawal from Iran Nuclear Deal and the re-imposition of economic sanctions at the highest level against Iran and those who support it. "Iran's promises to halt uranium enrichment were false," he said. Despite their support for the continuation of this agreement, the major powers (France, Britain and Germany), the European parties to the nuclear deal, expressed their alarm at Iran's hostile practices, which stand behind the instability in the region. They demanded, in a statement issued at the end of last April, to expand the scope of the agreement to include issues such as Iranian ballistic missiles and Iran's destabilizing activities in the region, and to address the range of challenges posed by Iran in the region.

The New U.S. Strategy and the Future of the Iranian Project in the Region

The exposure of the expansionist Iranian project and the increasing demands to address this project have undoubtedly brought a strong shock to Tehran and put it in a historic im-



passee. It is facing a serious challenge, not only about how to defend this project, but more importantly how to maintain its influence in the region in which it invested billions of dollars. The new US strategy announced by the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, on the twenty-first of May 2018, is the most decisive and comprehensive in dealing with the various aspects of the Iranian threat, whether with regard to its nuclear and missile programs, to its relation with the terrorist organizations and militias in the Middle East, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi Militia in Yemen, the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, or to the presence of its militias in Syria. The United States has called on Iran to stop its support for these militias and terrorist groups and its activities that undermine the security and stability of its neighbors, and the Middle East region in general.

Indicators of the Decline of the Iranian Influence in the Region

It is clear that the new US strategy towards Iran is aimed at several main

objectives, namely:

First: to contain its danger in the region.

Second: to limit its influence by controlling its terrorist militias in the region.

Third: to create a broad international coalition against Iran.

These goals now seem more imminent than ever before, not only because Iran's ability to challenge the United States is eroding day after day, but also because it can no longer maintain its main areas of influence in the region. Recent developments in the region indicate that Tehran's influence has declined considerably.

The Most Prominent Indicators of the Decline of Iranian Influence:

1. The collapse of the Houthi terrorist organization in Yemen, which is one of the most important arms and tools of Iran for the implementation of its expansionist project in the region. The recent victories achieved by the legitimate forces, with the support of the Arab coalition countries in

the West Coast, and the imminent liberation of the port of Hodeidah, would no doubt tighten the screws on these terrorist militias and portend their imminent collapse in the coming days. This means the defeat of the Iranian-Houthi project, which was aimed at turning Yemen into a region of Iranian influence, through which it would exert pressure on the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.

2. The growing dilemma of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran's main ally in the region, and the tool on which the IRGC relies for its interventions in the countries of the region. Hezbollah has been subjected to unprecedented criticism. The sanctions imposed by the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council in May 2018 on the party leaders, including Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and members of the Shura Council of the party, have deepened the impasse.

These sanctions were imposed because of the party's close association with the Revolutionary Guard and its role in prolonging the suffering in Syria, aggravating violence in Iraq and Yemen, exposing Lebanon and its people to danger, and Jeopardizing security and stability in the region. These sanctions will place more pressure on the Lebanese Hezbollah and restrict its movements in the coming period. This is in itself a great loss for Iran, which views the party as the ideal model for the work of the ideological militias associated with it.

3. The Iranian presence in Syria was subjected to strong Israeli strikes, without any effective response from Tehran, except for hollow threats of retaliation without being translated into action on the ground. Russia has recently called on Iran to withdraw from southern Syria, asserting that the only forces entitled to stay there are the Syrian army. This means that the Iranian presence in Syria is now at stake, especially after the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government has explicitly stated that it will not allow any Iranian presence in Syria to threaten its security. At the same time, the withdrawal of Iran from Syria is one of the main demands of the New US strategy.
4. The defeat of the Iran-affiliated Shiite parties and forces in the Iraqi legislative elections held in May 2018, which resulted in Muqtada al-Sadr and Haidar Abadi taking the lead in these elections. No doubt, these results are a severe blow to Iran and its influence in Iraq, considering that Muqtada al-Sadr is one of the strongest opponents of the Iranian presence in Iraq during the past two years. He was one of the most important supporters of Haidar al-Abadi's rapprochement



with the Gulf states. Last Tuesday (May 29, 2018), he re-asserted this in his statements in which he explicitly said that "Iran is a neighboring country which is afraid for its interests; we hope it will not interfere in the interior affairs of Iraq." In addition, the past period has witnessed explicit calls by many countries of the world for the need to dissolve the Iran-affiliated militias of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), as they constitute an obstacle to the efforts of the Iraqi government to establish security and stability. All this reflects the impasse facing

Iran in Iraq.

The decline of Iran's influence in this way in the countries that constituted its "supposed empire" confirms that its expansionist project is about to collapse in the near future, not only because it is a project that contradicts the realities of geography and history, but also because there is an Arab, regional and international will that rejects it and seeks to face it decisively.