



National Defense

Strategic Annual Journal – Issued by National Defense College – Issue 02 – June 2015

Current Transformations and their Implications on the National Security Strategy



**The increasing regional and
international role of the UAE**

**Under Khalifa's leadership, UAE is a model of
cultural tolerance and peaceful coexistence**



Editorial

In its second year, the NDC releases this second issue of NDC Journal after the first issue had gained the overall satisfaction of the readers with its plethora of articles and the diversified topics addressed that really reflected the depth of the writers' thought who diligently worked on them. That first issue has marked the foundation of NDC. These topics have included various insights that would support researchers in important national strategic issues. Here comes the second issue which follows the same approach in pursuit of establishing an academic and research standard that places the National Defense College in the top ranking national institutions hosting and supporting thought. Therefore, the college leadership would highly appreciate all editorial efforts that have been made to let this issue see light with its distinguished authors and diversified subjects. It is my pleasure to thank the people involved in writing articles, studies and research, and the Editorial Board.

The idea of developing a Journal came in conformity with the college mission of creating a research tool that could contribute to the achievement of the vision of the college and the study of national, regional and international contexts. During the past year, the region had experienced drastic changes and fluctuations in various aspects of politics, security, economy and others. The sequential incidents and transformations that smote the region have brought threats and challenges that are new to the whole world. Of these challenges, are the negotiations done by superpowers on issues such as Ukraine, Syria, Korea, Yemen and parts of Africa, energy issues and its complications. This issue has made it so difficult to predict the future and had brought the sublime of uncertainty about the continuity of alliances and balance of powers. Today, breaking the balance of powers is one of the features that imposed on countries the logic behind reconsidering their international relations and the motives for pursuing the strategic interests.

Despite the complexity of this phase with its drastic changes, it evidently reflected the sagacity and wisdom of our sage leadership. The continuity of development in an auspicious pace represented our leadership's keenness on international security and peace. It has also shown how much the UAE leadership and people cherish stability, justice, peace, development and prosperity. It has also shown the strong ties of our cohesive society in which people deeply believe that the UAE geography and history represent one consolidated entity not to mention that it came to reflect noble UAE values. These events came to stress that it is imperative for the GCC nations to support and stand firmly by their leaderships and share the same visions and goals to tackle various challenges.

I would like to commend the roles played by our armed forces that highlighted the importance of military might that became one of the instruments of national power. This clearly reflects the deep strategic thought of our wise leadership that has always sought to provide all means possible to ensure the security and safety of nationals and residents alike, thereby building the ideal environment for achieving development and prosperity and ensuring the integration of the nation into an international community that seeks to achieve security and progress. To this end, the National Defense College seeks to support student participants, faculty, and directing staff by providing them with all necessary resources and information so that they can understand the strategic environment and its variables as well as national resources and gains. By doing so, they can clearly explore ways to enhance, preserve and further develop national achievements. As such, the curriculum of the NDC study program was designed to meet the future leaders' needs in identifying the requirements and implications of strategy and the skills necessary to cope with the changing strategic environment and how to handle it.

I would like to conclude by stressing the fact that the NDC will continue its efforts to achieve its mission and objectives as a higher military institute that is specialized in specific field of knowledge and studies. We ask God Almighty to help us do the best for our beloved country under our wise leadership.



**Maj. Gen. Pilot
Rashad Mohammed
Salem Al-Saadi
Commander of the
National Defense
College (NDC)**

Cover Issue




18

In recent years, the UAE's foreign policy has become dynamic and effective on the regional and international arenas. The United Arab Emirates has become a prominent member in the regional equation, and an axis of the global move towards a number of issues, especially the Iranian nuclear file and the fight against international terrorism. Under the leadership of His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, has become wide open to the outside world, the most important indicators being its expansion of diplomatic relations to include 190 countries, and more than 52 international organizations in the six continents.

Developing Strategic Leaders for a Complex & Uncertain World



8



14

Iran & GCC-Egyptian Relations

The US & Gulf Security



22



National Defense

A Specialized Yearly Journal
on Strategic Affairs
Issued by UAE National Defense College
Second Issue June 2015

General supervisor

Maj. Gen. Pilot /
Rashad Mohamed Salem Al Saadi

Editor in chief

Staff Colonel / Abdulla Al Zaabi

Editorial Manager

Staff Lt. Colonel / Yousef Al Hadad

Editorial Board

Colonel Dr. / Al Bader Al Shatri
Dr. Saleh Al Maita
Awanee Al Khateeb
Sami Al Mahirat
Mahmoud Al Twaissi

Sub-Editors

Sameera Naser Basaloom
Salwa Mohamed Al Marzooqi
Mona Khalfan AL Abdulsalam

Technical Supervisor

Major / Jamil Khamis Al Saadi

Layout & Design

Ali Salem Al Shehhi
Khalil Esmaeel Al Hosani
Ahmed Mahmoud Ahmed

Photos Archive

Amna Mubarak Al Zaabi
Ahmad Abdulla Al Blooshi
Mohamed Ramadan Al Blooshi
Sakha Pramod



26

Peninsula Shield

National Service: New Opportunities for Public Health in UAE



36



44

Thirsty Mountains

Who Is Teaching Our Children Civics: Revisiting Demography/Identity Dilemma In The UAE



60

◆ The views expressed in National Defense Journal are not necessarily shared by, nor should they be taken as the views of National Defense Journal.



Editor in Chief:

The primary goal of the National Defense College (NDC) Journal is to be a platform for in-depth research and studies that serve the objectives of NDC and achieve its goal through the preparation of qualified cadres that possess the cognitive dimension, intellectual vision and the capacity for strategic planning in order to be able to perform their tasks that serve the national goals and interests of the United Arab Emirates. The release of the second issue of the Journal coincides with the graduation of the second batch of the National Defence Course students. This issue contains a number of strategic articles and analyses written by the course students and members of the steering body, as well as different studies and research by strategic thinkers, researchers and intellectuals in the field of strategic leadership, challenge assessment and crisis management. This issue is a valuable addition which helps to reinforce what we started in the first issue of the Journal, based on our commitment to achieve the mission and objectives of the college.

Thanks to God's help and to the permanent and continuous sponsorship of our supreme leadership, NDC was able – three years after the decision of its establishment - to win the appreciation and attention of national institutions and research centers. This is due to its ability to keep pace with the latest academic curricula of world-class colleges through attracting some of the best researchers and lecturers. It has also provided state-of-the-art technical tools of education that helps its graduates to possess the highest degree of efficiency, so as to be ready to assume their duties and jobs in various sectors and national institutions and agencies in both public and private sectors.

We have made sure that the contents of this issue should be an intellectual incubator and academic authority for think-tanks and those interested to be acquainted with the variables of local, regional and international environment. This is evident in light of the developments of Operation Al-Hazem Storm, which highlighted the importance of the strategic axis of gravity of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which enjoy the potential, prospects, and important geopolitical location that impacts on the balance of power and interests. Moreover, this Journal will also be one of the sources of thought and strategic planning for decision makers and policy makers of national strategy, because of the scientific methodology that have been adopted in the selection of articles, studies and research that are suitable for publication.

In conclusion, we extend our compliments to the Leader of the nation and to all institutions of the country on the occasion of graduation of the Second Batch of the National Defense Course graduates – with their achievement, excellence and creativity - to return to their national institutions armed with knowledge, experience and strategic thinking that have become one of the most important elements of the country's national power.



Editor in Chief:
Abdulla Al Zaabi
Staff Colonel



By:
John R. Ballard, Ph.D.
Dean of the National
Defense College



Developing Strategic Leaders for a Complex & Uncertain World

Strategic leadership implies broad scale and scope and issues of great import, requiring vision, possibly extending over many years and orchestration under complex and changing circumstances. Today's strategic national leaders must not only help set a country's direction for the future, but to be truly effective they must also gain and maintain the support of key constituencies necessary for resourcing effort over the long term. Our leaders are also responsible for the directing activities within environments that are increasingly global and unwaveringly complex; they must then manage strategy execution under difficult and often uncertain

conditions. These potent challenges will demand the best from our future leaders, so strategic leader development remains a core mission for the National Defense College. Our national leaders have shown remarkable skill in the past, which is an important reason for the notable development of the UAE over the past 43 years, but future leaders will face even greater challenges than existed in the past, most significantly due to the rapidity of change in the modern world. Change is not only occurring domestically, regionally and internationally but also in the technical and natural environments. As the local, domestic and international environments evolve,



due to new technology, innovative ideas, emerging transnational threats and other destabilizing factors, so will the methods (or ways) governments use to achieve their interests, (or ends) have to change. Some of this change is predominantly human-induced (globalization), while other types of change happen with minimal human control (natural disasters). There is change within states and between states; some changes are transactional, while others are transitional or even transformational. There is a growing literature of change management that is used in business, but those ideas have yet to be fully appreciated by leaders in government, many of whom must adapt to significant changes in today's highly charged domestic, regional and international environments. Since change will be increasingly multi-faceted, multi-layered and multi-relational, future government leaders will need to know how to navigate such complex challenges strategically.

Managing change effectively benefits from creative analysis as well as strategic leadership – both of which rely on a firm understanding of strategy. Strategy is the art and science of using means through ways to achieve ends. In international relations, the core national interests

pursued by governments inform decision-making and become the national strategic objectives, or ends. Core national interests can be ideological, economic or security-based. They are not always static and are certainly not immune to changing technologies. For example, new political movements often arise during times of scientific and technological advancement.

The rise of communism followed the enormous impact of the Industrial Revolution on common workers, and as a result, the Soviet Union under Stalin pursued a strategy of centralized labor and resource based-industrialization to strengthen and expand communist values and interests. The result was a long Cold War. The Cold War was largely an ideological war and leaders in the U.S. and the Soviet Union spent a large amount of resources (means) to defend their respective ideological interests. Early Soviet advances in their space program in addition to their acquisition and development of nuclear power after World War II pushed U.S. leaders to pursue strategies (ways) of containment, then deterrence then finally détente to stop the threat and spread of communism. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and global leaders placed more

priority on achieving economic interests and less on defending ideological values (ends). National strategies (ways) began changing based on new priorities, a new international environment and an emerging new international system. After 9/11, the U.S. renewed and prioritized a policy of democracy promotion (engagement) in order to complement its war on terror for which it had developed a strategy of acting against threats before they emerged. Some senior U.S. strategists at the time assessed that supporting repressive regimes at the expense of the rights of their citizens would have significant and negative effects on long-term U.S. national interests. However, when governments begin to push values as part of their national strategy, they frequently fail to correctly assess the unintended consequences of their actions. For example, attempts to support democracy in the Middle East during the information revolution have arguably brought more turmoil than stability to the region. This one example shows how strategic leadership during changing times can be enormously difficult.

Luckily, there are well understood fundamentals for effective leadership. For example, strategic leaders must understand how to



NEW DEVELOPMENTS ANNOUNCED in 2014

THE BUTTERFLY
DUBIOTECH HEADQUARTER BUILDING
PUBLISHING PAVILION
MAKATEB
VILLA LANTANA



manage change. This nation has witnessed phenomenal change over its 43 years; few could have imagined today's UAE in 1971, but thanks to God, one true strategic leader did. Such dynamic change will likely continue over the next 43 years; modern world events are highly volatile, increasingly uncertain (even with so much information), more and more complex due to globalization and new technologies, and highly ambiguous, often creating situations with few precedents for decision-makers. Because world affairs are so complex and ill-defined, strategic leaders must be creative problem-solvers who are innovative yet levelheaded, in order to effectuate inevitable change.

Strategic leaders must effectively communicate a vision. In today's dynamic environment senior officials must be able to understand and evaluate the opinions of others and be able to communicate options coherently and passionately. They are often called upon to work closely with industrialists, scientists, educators, representatives of other government departments, and

leaders from other nations and international groups. They must bring to this decision making pool not only clarity of thought and mastery of problem solving, but also a comprehensive knowledge of the national, regional and international affairs influencing national security, and they must be able to inspire action by communicating their ideas effectively to everyone concerned, thus creating a common vision for the future.

Strategic leaders also must act; they need both organizational ability and decision-making skills to align people and organizations and translate strategy into action. For any strategy to succeed, the leader must be able to adjust it as conditions require. The best strategic leaders prepare for the future and consider both long-term goals as well the culture and context of the organization while remaining adaptable, so the nation can flex as required to navigate the global arena effectively.

Strategic leaders who can not only provide vision, but can also manage change and deal with ambiguity to

act so as to accomplish national goals under increasingly complex circumstances can meet every test. But leaders cannot do everything themselves. To carry out the range of responses typical today, national leaders must rely on others to understand their strategic intent and support their strategies by adapting as required in their areas of responsibility. So the challenge of strategic leadership is not only producing an optimum strategy and a clear vision but also creating a strategic team and developing the people required to adapt in execution as conditions require.

As the international and domestic environment changes (especially as global communities are more interconnected through non-state means and ways) senior government officials are in ever more need of strategic thinking skills to navigate these times of uncertainty in their pursuit of solutions to state problems. Leaders must not only understand the elements of effective strategy, but must also understand their limits. As wisdom reveals, a government's strategy is only




ambitions, ends and means often fail to be connected due to weak leadership in many states. In addition, as increasing public demands pressure governments to expand their activities in size and scope, state institutions must also expand to meet those requirements; national leaders will then be challenged by the enormity of the task of incorporating such adapting institutions effectively while simultaneously maintaining functioning governance and pursuing effective national strategies. For government leaders to execute complex modern strategies (ways) effectively they have to ensure adequate harmony and interconnectedness across government institutions; implementing effective strategy then requires a keen understanding of the capabilities and limitations of governmental institutions and of people, as well as strategy.

These are only a few of the reasons why education has become a crucial pathway for producing senior officials with the skills needed to

as good as its leaders' ability to resource and execute that strategy. Some government leaders struggle to resource their government's strategies with physical and human

capital. Other governments have the needed resources, or means, to achieve their ends, but still do not find the right ways to accomplish their goals. Finally, despite lofty





effectively lead in the 21st century. These changing international and domestic conditions give evidence that nations need future leaders who have the strategic thinking skills to understand their environment and derive solutions, plus the necessary ability to generate the connective tissue across government to galvanize the effort required to succeed. Both are crucial to ensure national prosperity and both can be best enabled through high quality national security education.

The security of a modern state depends mainly on how effectively it can harness its resources for the task. All departments of the administrative machinery have to be geared and directed to one goal - the advancement of national interests (ends). Senior civilian officials must not only understand economics and diplomacy, they must also know the capabilities of defense and the workings of the armed forces. Likewise, senior military officers must understand the viewpoints of civil officials, and know the limitations and strengths of the entities within which they function. Both have to be aware of the problems of security in its larger perspectives, the challenges and limitations of geography, international politics, and also the interplay of economics and defense.

Advanced national security education helps very senior-level personnel deal with the uncertainty of modern challenges and to hone the decision-making abilities required to lead nations effectively during peace, crisis and conflict. An added benefit of such education is the relationships developed among senior officials who learn to trust each other and work effectively side-by-side in government and in multinational coalitions due to the insights shared during high quality education programs. Along with the United States, Great Britain, China and the UAE, a handful of nations have had the foresight to create and conduct National Defense College programs to educate the whole of their governments - involving officials from the military as well as a variety of other government agencies - concerning international challenges and strategies for enhancing national prosperity, to better prepare for the challenges of the future.

Professionals in all government organizations need an understanding of the national and international security environments to do their jobs well. All of them can benefit from a modern system of national security education. National security education programs can also add much to the knowledge base of

the nation with many states having some form of compulsory national service. Such programs could also serve as a model for a variety of other professional education and training regimens in the knowledge-based societies of the future. Regardless, national security education will always remain a crucial strategic enabler for the nation. The important challenge is developing the right kind of program that meets the current needs of security professional around the world in both military and civil positions of influence.

States that prioritize and modernize their national security education programs will enable a body of senior officers with the critical and creative thinking skills needed to effectively confront a more complex and integrated international system. Current and future transnational threats and destabilizing factors, whether political, economic or environmental will challenge the way governments currently operate, but well educated senior leaders will be better prepared to navigate those troubled waters. History shows that most governments move more slowly than innovation and change demand. In the past, governments may have had more time to address threats to their national security because their threats largely originated from state sponsored



actors and it was easier to manage working with states than non-state actors; even so many governments failed to meet the challenges they faced.

States have historically sought new competitive advantages and technologies to enhance their instruments of state power. In the past changing national technologies, economics and military capabilities were understood within a framework of international relations largely defined by the interaction between states. Now new, powerful non-state actors, a variety of transnational threats, and other emerging destabilizing factors warrant new thinking and new approaches to international relations and national security. If states are not able to adapt their policies to a more interconnected and rapidly changing, asymmetric international environment, they may unexpectedly lose control of their sovereignty and then lose any ability to prevent even more destabilization within the international system. This is a serious risk.

As the international environment changes, based on new technology and emerging threats, so will the strategies adapt that governments use to achieve their interests. What will not change however is the importance of strategic thinking in

the achievement of government interests. Effective strategy matches a state's interests with its ways and means for achieving those ends. Strategic thinking skills are fundamental to the orchestration of that ends, ways and means process. Strategic thinking skills guided the successes and failures of Spartan and Athenian leaders during the Peloponnesian Wars, as Thucydides revealed 2500 years ago. Strategic thinking guided Islamic warriors such as Khalid Ibn Waleed and Saladin in the defeat of the superior Byzantine forces in Syria and the Fatimids and the Crusader States 1500 years ago. Strategic thinking enabled Winston Churchill to lead his war-weary nation and significantly rally the Allies to victory against Nazi Germany, and strategic thinking helped Mao Zedong to achieve communist objectives when he lacked the military equipment and economic resources to beat a superior army and establish a revolutionary government in China. Strategic thinking helped Lee Kuan Yew turn Singapore, then a small Southeast Asian island without significant natural resources at the crossroads of competing regional powers, into a successful hub for global commerce and financial services, and strategic thinking enabled Steve Jobs to take Apple

Inc. from the brink of bankruptcy in 1996 to one of the most successful companies in history. Strategic thinking is certainly what guided Sheikh Zayed to turn a barren desert on the Arabian Gulf into a thriving country and leading globalized economy.

For centuries strategic leaders have shaped history. Their strategic thinking skills did not necessarily always benefit from formal education, though many of them were extraordinarily well versed in the history and culture of their lands. But, today, national security education offers states a format for institutionalizing the critical thinking skills needed to think strategically about national security. When national security education is wedded to the principles of strategic thinking, and states institutionalize this approach within the skill set of their senior leadership, they will produce future leaders possessing critical thinking skills that will not become outdated. They will acquire proven habits of mind that have been used throughout history by naturally gifted leaders and will be able to apply those skills to modern problems.

Though the security environment will inevitably change, effective ways to think creatively and critically about security will remain invaluable. UAE Vision 2021 calls for the nation to "harness the full potential of its national human capital by maximizing the participation of Emiratis and nurturing home-grown public and private sector leaders." With a new National Innovation Strategy and a proud history of strategic visionary leaders, this nation can be confident in the future, but our strategic leaders will still need all of our support as they manage the complex world of tomorrow. The skills gained through high quality national security education will help ensure their success and the prosperity of the entire nation.




By:
Staff Brigadier:
Abdulla Al Hmoudi



Iran & GCC-Egyptian Relations

The nature of the Egyptian-Iranian relation has always had immediate and direct implications for GCC member states, due to inherent security and geopolitical dimensions. The long period extending from early 1900s to the present has seen fluctuating relationship as a result of political shifts and changes in the mindset of foreign policy makers in each country. As the so-called

the «Arab Spring» brought a new ideological- driven leadership in Egypt, Tehran seized the opportunity to rebuild ties with the prominent Middle Eastern powerhouse that is Egypt, hoping that the religiously oriented leadership would be susceptible to closer links with the relatively likeminded clerical regime in Iran.





Iranian perception of Egypt

Tehran's appreciation of Egypt's regional and international status may be based on the following views. First and foremost, Egypt is viewed as the leading power among Arab countries and due to its status as such, Iran has always been keen to forge strong ties with Cairo whenever opportunity presents itself¹. Secondly, Egypt is situated at the heart of the Arab world controlling one of the most vital waterways- the Suez Canal -that connects the East with the West and through which thousands of merchant and cargo ships sail.. Thus, Iran recognizes Egypt as a potential gateway to the West through the Mediterranean Sea as well as its strategic importance. Shortly after the fall of the Mubarak regime, and for the first time since the 1979 revolution, two Iranian military ships crossed Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal². What adds to

Egypt's importance is the fact that Cairo houses the most prominent Sunni institution of Al-Azhar. With its historical link to the creation of Shi'ism, the Islamic world recognizes Al Azhar as the highest religious institution representing moderate Islam. Unlike other Sunni institutions, in 1959 the Imam of Al-Azhar Sheikh Mahmud Shaltout recognized the Ja'fari school of Islamic thought, on which the clerical regime in Iran belongs to, as a legitimate school within Islam³. During the visit of the Iranian president Ahmadinejad to Egypt in May 2013, he visited the Al-Azhar Institution as recognition of its importance, which was founded by the Shi'i Fatimid dynasty.

In the Iranian ideology, the spread of Shi'ism is a fundamental goal along with exporting the Iranian revolution. Egypt has always been a target as one of the earliest venues for Shiite ascendance to power at the hands of Fatimid Caliphate that spanned a

large area of North Africa, from the Red Sea in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west. Armed with this historical lineage, Tehran has always been keen to draw Egypt into the Iranian sphere of influence⁴.


Iran believes that any rapprochement with Egypt will affect the Egyptian relations with the United States and reduce the American influence over Egyptian politics, especially after the success of the January uprising that caused the demise of the despised Hosni Mubarak regime, which was perceived as submissively controlled by the United States⁵. Ahmadinejad was keen to comment on this matter before a visiting Egyptian delegation in 2011 when he expressed his country's readiness to provide aid and advisory assistance to Egypt comparable in value and significance to US aid. The former Iranian President continued saying that the alliance with Iran could end Egypt's need to rely on US support.

Egyptian perception of Iran

Stability and security of Iran and GCC countries are of great importance to the Egyptian economy, as the Arabian Gulf region is the principal source of income derived from the continued shipping traffic transporting oil and other various goods through the Suez Canal. Statistics shows that in 2011 total revenue from the Suez Canal was registered as approximately \$5.2 billion, bringing much-needed funds to the stagnant economy. Furthermore, stability in the Arabian Gulf region means a steady flow of remittances from the growing Egyptian expatriate communities in the Gulf States, with numbers estimated at approximately 1.63 million people in 2010. Egyptian expats transferred a total \$6.9 billion in 2011, comprising 2.9 % of the Egyptian GDP in the same year, exceeding revenue derived from the Suez Canal by \$1.7 billion over the same period⁶. By implication, stability and security of the Arabian Gulf region has a direct impact on



Egyptians in GCC Countries (2010)



the Egyptian economy. The following graphic shows the distribution of the Egyptian expats in the GCC countries⁷.

Despite several initiatives put forth by former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who commented on the status of Egypt and Iran as the two wings of the Islamic Nation, the former Egyptian regime set several pre-conditions for improving Egyptian-Iranian relationship based on security concerns. A better relationship with Tehran would allow the Egyptians to vary their international alliances, build new political ties and free the new government from the conditions set by the previous regime to improve bilateral relations. Despite the Iranian initiatives in the era of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to build stronger ties with Egypt, all these attempts were hindered by security concerns⁸. A better relationship would also open new markets, especially in Central Asian countries, thereby promoting and increasing the volume of trade exchange between the two countries, and increasing Iranian investments in Egypt from the 2010 value of \$331 million.

The GCC and Egypt

Egypt has political military and cultural weight in the Arab world, and it is considered to be the guarantor

of regional security and stability and particularly that of Arabian Gulf countries. GCC states had a large stake in developments and events affecting the Egyptian political scene in the years after the popular uprising that ultimately ended the long era of Hosni Mubarak era in 2011. The sudden power vacuum was immediately exploited by the only structured political organization at the time, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) with long history marked with turbulence at times and closeness at other times with successive Egyptian governments. As a well-established political party with expansive membership, MB utilized its well-enshrined institutions to achieve long-awaited victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections that followed.

Riding the wave of the ill-advised «Arab Spring» and leveraging perceived achievements in several countries including Egypt, the International Muslim Brotherhood leadership had decided that there was ample opportunity for expansion for similar uprisings in GCC countries. Encouraged by moral and financial support from the MB, MB «sleeper» branches and other affiliated groups in the GCC took it upon themselves to exploit what was unwisely considered a sweeping movement capable of changing reality in the broader Middle

East in general, and the Arabian Gulf region in particular. Failed protest attempts in the region took various forms ranging from heightened rhetoric and somewhat violent protests in Kuwait by likeminded activists in Saudi Arabia demanding reforms to demonstrations in the streets of several Omani cities. These subversive efforts failed to understand the nature of these tribally based societies supported by globally accepted popular political systems. The trial of the secret MB affiliated organization accused, among other charges, of plotting to overthrow the government in UAE came as the clearest indication of MB conspiracy to destabilize the region.

Despite the highly celebrated semblance of unity among GCC states, different states took varying positions on the developments in Egypt and ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. While Qatar decided to support MB, other GCC states designated the group as a terrorist organization and ultimately provided full support to the military establishment that eventually toppled the short-lived Morsi presidency.

During the Revolution and the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iran took full advantage of the opportunity presented by the likeminded and ideologically- driven regime to interfere in the Egyptian affairs culturally and economically to the point where several Iranian officials and other prominent religious and political figures described the Egyptian revolution as an extension of the Iranian revolution⁹.

GCC states have shown their support and commitment to Egypt mainly in the form of financial aid measured by direct relief assistance and multitudes of development



projects including those recently announced during the Future of Egypt conference in Sharm al-Sheikh. Financial support came in line with steadfast political support to Al-Sisi government that came after full political recognition of the new regime in Cairo.

GCC states and Iran

Throughout the past few decades, relations between Iran and the GCC both as an organization and individual states have been marked with suspicion and caution on the GCC side, while Tehran's interaction with GCC states was characterized by discontent and disrespect as evidenced by various instances of interference in the internal affairs of several GCC states.

No serious attempts were undertaken by Tehran to build trust with GCC states. From the perspective of the majority of GCC states, Iran has always been a source of instability and threat to their national security as evidenced by interference in the internal affairs of countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. There have been many examples of overt Iranian actions, political and otherwise, against the national interests, stability and security of GCC states. In Bahrain, Iran has overtly and covertly supported the Bahraini Shi'a in their persistent confrontation with the government since the onset of riots in 2011. In Kuwait, an Iranian sleeper cell, plotting to carry out attacks, was discovered and arrested. In Saudi Arabia, Iranian agents and

proxies have actively instigated riots and disturbances in the Eastern Region of Saudi Arabia as well as in Medina, where Shi'a communities are exploited to serve the interests and objectives of the clerical regime. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates has exhausted all diplomatic efforts which were, unfortunately, with no avail to resolve the long-standing dispute with the Islamic Republic over Iranian occupation of the three UAE Islands. Due to their excellent relations with Tehran, Qatar and Oman have yet to see their share of Iranian interference.

Iran accuses GCC member states of threatening its stability by hosting foreign military bases that pose a threat to the Islamic Republic. On its part, most of GCC states, by implication, are persistently supporting international efforts to disrupt Iranian endeavors to acquire nuclear weapons, in line with G51+ negotiations with Iran to tone down its ambiguous nuclear program. On its part, Iran has maintained that the nuclear program is peaceful with no weaponization, thus claiming that GCC concerns are unfounded. Overall, the tense relations between GCC member states and Iran has been driven and caused by suspicions, uncertainty and lack of trust about Iran's motivations.

Conclusion

Fears and concerns over Iranian intentions has translated into strong support to the incumbent regime in Cairo to guarantee stability and counterbalance any potential

chaos that may arise as a result of political turmoil and tensions that may be exploited by some states or non-states actors to destabilize the region. By helping Egypt, the GCC states have preserved a strong ally by their side against Iran's regional ambitions and aspirations.

References

- 1.Brara'a, Abadhir. «العناصر المؤثرة في العلاقات المصرية الإيرانية.» International Center for Peace Studies, October 6, 2011.
2. Sherwood, Harriet. «Iranian Warships Cross Suez Canal.» The Guardian, February 22, 2011
3. Bahgat, Gawdat. «Egypt and Iran: The 30-year Estrangement.» Middle East Policy, 48.
4. Srouf, Dr. Jamal Al-Din Muhammad. 1995. «Political and Religious Movements in the Fatimid Era.» In In History of the Fatimid State.
- 5.Makram, Rania. 2011. «How Tehran Think?. Iran's Vision of Relations with Egypt .» International Politics Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
- 6.Ajaji, Fadi Bin Abdullah. 2013. «Kingdom of the Main Custodian of the Egyptian Expatriate Labor and Remittances Top.» Al-Riyadh Newspaper.
- 7.«Remittances of Egyptians in Saudi Arabia.» Al-Qabas Newspaper, July 28, 2012.
- 8.Howeidi, Fahmi. 2011. «خطبة مصرية في إيران.» November 23. Accessed January 2, 2015
- 9 .Mohseni, Dr. Payam. «The Islamic Awakening: Iran's Grand Narrative of the Arab Uprisings.» Middle East Briefs, April, 2013.



The Growing Regional and International Role of the UAE



By:
Staff Lieutenant-Colonel /
Yusef Juma Al-Haddad
Editor-in-Chief
Nation Shield
Journal

In recent years, the UAE's foreign policy has become dynamic and effective on the regional and international arenas. The United Arab Emirates has become a prominent member in the regional equation, and an axis of the global move towards a number of issues, especially the Iranian nuclear file and the fight against international terrorism. Under the leadership of His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, UAE has become

wide open to the outside world, the most important indicators being its expansion of diplomatic relations to include 190 countries, and more than 52 international organizations in the six continents.

This open policy has helped to strengthen the international standing of the UAE. This is reflected in selecting it to host major international events, such as the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX), Dubai Airshow, Expo 2020, and also to host international organizations (International Renewable Energy





Agency / Irena), as a first-time precedent for a southern country. In the same context, the UAE passport has become one of the strongest passports in the world, for now its citizens can travel to 72 countries without a visa. In an unprecedented move in the Arab world, the European Union has agreed to exempt the United Arab Emirates from entering the countries of «Schengen» area, where citizens will be able to travel to 34 European countries, and to enjoy the freedom of travel and movement in the EU

countries.

It is noted that the openness that characterizes the foreign policy of the UAE is determined and accompanied by a balanced foreign behavior toward international actors and issues. This balance feature is behind the success of the UAE foreign policy, and is one of the most important elements of its strength. On the Arab level, in view of its attractive federal model, its role in the Gulf Cooperation Council or through the regional bloc it is leading together with Egypt and

Saudi Arabia, the UAE is relied on for boosting the ability of Arab countries to contain the current challenges and threats, preserve their national and regional integration, adhere to the Arab identity, and prevent the division and disintegration of the Arab system.

In 2011, the UAE participated in the «Peninsula Shield» forces to help Bahrain, upon its request, in securing strategic facilities and facing the violent internal unrest raised by some foreign-backed opposition forces. Emirati soldiers





are still serving there. The GCC military intervention in Bahrain has proved its effectiveness, and was in line with the Charter of the United Nations, in implementation of the joint defense agreement between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (December 2000), and a translation of the basic reason for the establishment of «Peninsula Shield».

In the same year, the UAE joined the international intervention force in Libya led by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to counter Muammar Gaddafi's regime and impose the no-fly zone over Libya, which was established by Security Council resolution No. 1973. The UAE's support of the decision and its participation in the air campaign against Gaddafi forces were an important factor in alleviating any regional doubt about a new western intervention in the Arab world, and securing support for this action. Since then, Libya has represented an important focus of the active regional role of the UAE. Related to this is the active and firm role pursued by the UAE towards the Syrian crisis. On the one hand, the UAE condemns the violence committed by Bashar al-Assad's regime against its people. On the other hand, it supports the moderate Syrian opposition in order to contribute to finding an alternative to the regime.

The UAE was one of the first countries to join, in September

2014, the international coalition led by the United States to face the expansion of ISIS «Daesh» terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria, through the provision of logistical support and involvement in the air campaign against the strongholds of the terrorist organization there. The role played by the UAE's fighters to target ISIS sites has been widely appreciated by the countries participating in the international coalition, as well as by military and strategic experts.

In fact, the UAE is an active member of the international coalition to fight terrorism and extremism in the world, through its membership of the Global Forum on Terrorism Fighting (GCTF) and its positive participation in many relevant international events, notably the Security Council Summit of the United Nations, chaired by the US President, Barack Obama (September 24, 2014), and the regional meeting in Jeddah on September 11, 2014. In keeping with this dynamic and preventive policy towards international terrorism, The Cabinet issued, in November 2014, a list of terrorist groups and organizations around the world. In his speech to the 69th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, His Highness Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, Minister of Foreign Affairs, called on the international community to cooperate in countering all terrorist groups, and to take comprehensive measures to combat them wherever

they are. He also asserted once again the commitment of the United Arab Emirates to positive participation at all levels in combating terrorism and extremism in the world.

The UAE also participated in the GCC diplomatic effort to resolve the Yemeni crisis, which resulted in the GCC initiative in April 2011. It announced its refusal to political and constitutional coup carried out by the Houthis in Yemen in September 2014, and its standing by the constitutional legitimacy represented by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his government. It also called for a firm and immediate stance that rejects the change of reality through violence and force. In this sense, the United Arab Emirates participated in Operation «Al-Hazem Storm» (March 26-April 21, 2015), as part of a Gulf-Arabic coalition which includes the GCC countries,





Sudan, Jordan and Morocco, in answer to President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi's request for legal support in Yemen to prevent Houthis' control the whole country after their progress toward the south, and brake Iranian expansion in the Arab world. The UAE-Saudi-Egyptian axis was behind the mobilization of support by Arab countries participating in the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit for Operation Al-Hazem Storm. The UAE is the second country in this process in terms of the power of participation and political and military influence. This participation continued at the same rate after the launch of Operation «Restore Hope», and moved on to a new phase by employing «special» ground troops, limited in number, to support the forces that are loyal to President Hadi in the defense of Aden, and create a new reality on the ground that is useful to the Arab coalition countries in the negotiations of political settlement for the Yemeni crisis.

The UAE also provided «unlimited» support for approval of the Egyptian idea for the formation of a joint Arab military force, the joining of which is optional, in order «to meet challenges and maintain Arab national security.» The position of the UAE and other GCC countries might be behind the approval of the formation of this force in Sharm el-Sheikh Summit (March 28 - 29, 2015).

Moreover, the UAE took a firm position in support of the Revolution of June 2013 in Egypt against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE has provided, and continues to provide, Egypt with a tremendous political support (exchange of visits at the highest level between the political leaderships of the two countries) and a generous economic support (its value amounted to about \$ 18 billion), which protected the Egyptian economy from collapse. Related to this is the leading role played by the United Arab Emirates, at the national and regional levels, in countering the groups of political Islam in the region, and standing in the face of the politicization of religion, or using it as a means of political action.

At the international level, the UAE aims, under Khalifa's leadership, to occupy the position of the Global Hub, which connects between the different countries, cultures and institutions in various parts of the world. Indeed, the UAE turned into a key link connecting the region with the world, as well as providing a model for the interaction of cultures, peaceful coexistence, and human tolerance. The UAE has also worked to build bridges to Europe through the appointment of an ambassador to the European Union, and the opening the first headquarters of Arab mission in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

headquarters(NATO). The wise leadership went on to deepen its major strategic partnership with the United States, extending it to economic, political and defense fields, which makes the UAE an «ally» of Washington outside NATO, almost like Washington's relations with Japan or South Korea, which is a great credit to the UAE.

The participation of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in the Camp David talks in the current month, between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States, is evidence of the growing international recognition of the importance of the UAE's role in the development of collective solutions to regional problems. It also testifies to the American recognition of the end of its unilateral policies in the region and of the establishment of a genuine regional partnership with the GCC countries. The Camp David Summit has come in the light of a critical juncture being witnessed by the Middle East, with the growing power of ISIS organization», the continuation of Operation «Restore Hope», the armed conflict in Yemen, and the presence of a tangible Iranian role in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, which threatens the Arab national security in general, and the Gulf security in particular.



The US & Gulf Security



By:
Dr. AlBadr AlShateri

The world powers and Iran have recently hammered out a framework to resolve the nuclear standoff they have beavered away at for quite some time. The deal has its detractors, and no doubt supporters, in the US, and in the world. The US president, Barrack Obama, was quick to

point out that “[m]any key details will be finalized over the next three months, and nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed.” But others described it as “seismic as the Camp David accords signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979. The Iran nuclear agreement is a strategic one and finally turns the





page on Iran's struggle with the West».

The new development augments the suspicion of the current administration's commitments to the Gulf region. That the US commitment to the region has flagged was confirmed by Barack Obama's National Security Adviser, Susan Rice, who averred that Washington will not be "consumed 24/7 by one region, as important as it is". "There's a whole world out there," Rice added. "And we've got interests and opportunities in that whole world."

The political vocabulary has seen

a somersault in Washington: The supercilious language of war on terrorism, pre-emptive war, and regime change of yore, have given way to rarefied neologisms of reconciliation, leading from behind, and strategic patience. Certainly, one could point to a wider context of these changes, namely, the US relative decline and retrenchment, and the so-called pivot to the East. The first is highly exaggerated: the sources of US power are still strong. The US spends about 40 percent of all military expenditure in the world, and the size of its economy represents about a quarter of

global GDP, and the US is still one of the countries holding the highest number of patents. To be sure, the US is in relative decline because of the rise of other powers— not so much its own absolute decline. Walt argued that "The twilight of the American Era arrived sooner than it should have because U.S. leaders made a number of costly mistakes." But then, Walt concedes that "the United States is not finished as a major power. Nor is it destined to become just one of several equals in a future multipolar world. To the contrary, the US still has the world's strongest military, and the





US economy remains diverse and technologically advanced. As far as retrenchment is concerned, the US probably will be more selective in its intervention and would concentrate on issues of great strategic interest. The Arabian Gulf is such an area for palpable reasons that I shall nonetheless discuss shortly.

On the second concern regarding the pivot to the east, I think, there is a lot of misconception. The pivot will not, and cannot, be at the expense of the US commitments to the Arabian Gulf states and the wider MENA region. First, the growing interest in the Pacific or the rebalancing in Asia would make the US more, not less, interested in the Gulf as a source of energy for Asian powers, to wit, India and China. This fact alone

would push the US to strengthen its presence in the region rather than the other way around. The Gulf becomes a strategic pressure point to the US near rivals.

Second, the US interest in the Gulf would continue even as it becomes self-sufficient in energy. US world leadership depends on stabilizing energy markets. The free flow of oil and commerce in the Strait of Hormuz is pivotal to US world leadership, or so Washington perceives itself (as the indispensable country). Moreover, because the energy market is so well integrated, a rise in oil prices because of a crisis in the Gulf will reverberate throughout the world, including the US domestic market. Furthermore, the US is not only concerned with the free

flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf, but also has tremendous "interest in preventing any potentially hostile state from gaining control over the region and its resources and using such control to amass vast power or blackmail the world." These are obvious reasons to all observers, but need emphasis all the same. "Far too much of the world's energy wealth—and power derived from it—are married to the most acute security problems on the globe".

The pivot to Asia counter-intuitively would make the US dig its heels even more in the region. Jon Alterman argued that the shift to Asia would mean more, not less, US involvement in the Middle East to safeguard «the sea lanes that go from the Middle East past the Indian





is, it is pulled back to the region. Washington had to get involved with friends and foes to defeat ISIL and ratchet up its support for moderate Syrian opposition, coordinate with allies on Yemen, and engage Iran on the nuclear negotiation, and Obama called for a summit with the GCC leaders at Camp David, to boot. All in all, the Carter Doctrine still holds: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the... Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Endnotes

Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon at the Rose Garden.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201502/04/statement-president-framework-prevent-iran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon>. Accessed on April 9, 2015.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, «Iran, the Beast Unchained?» Asharq Al Awsat April 5, 2015. <http://www.aawsat.net/201504/article55342785/opinion-iran-the-beast-unchained>. Accessed April 12, 2015.

Taimur Khan, "US determined 'not to be consumed by one region,'" The National. October 28, 2013. <http://www.thenational.ae/world/americas/us-determined-not-to-be-consumed-by>

one-region. Accessed on April 9, 2015.

Stephen M. Walt, "The End of the American Era," The National Interest, (November/December 2011), p. 12.

Ibid, p. 15.

Kenneth M. Pollack, "Securing the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58993/kenneth-m-pollack/securing-the-gulf> accessed April 12, 2015

Richard L. Russell, "Rumors of Central Command's Decline are Wishful Thinking," Small Wars Journal, (March 29, 2013) <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rumors-of-central-command%E299%80%82s-decline-are-wishful-thinking> accessed April 12, 2015.

Jon B. Alterman, « The Asia Pivot,» January 2013, Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://csis.org/files/publication/0113_MENC.pdf. Accessed April 12, 2015.

Robert A. Sharp, «Middle East Implications of American Pivoting or Re-Balancing into the Asia-Pacific,» National Defense, (June 2014), p. 79.

On reassuring GCC states see Bilal Y. SaabBarry Pavel, "Reassuring America's Gulf Arab Partners," The National Interest (March 24, 2015). <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/reassuring-americas-gulf-arab-allies-12468>. Accessed April 13, 2015.

Cited in Russell, "Rumors of Central Command's Decline are Wishful Thinking," emphasis added.

subcontinent and into East Asia.» Viewed from this perspective, the Middle East gains more significance as a source of energy and a market for Asia, and the US is more likely to coordinate its Middle Eastern policies with Asian allies as the latter increase their economic engagement with the region. Likewise, Robert Sharp makes a similar point: the Middle East stands to benefit from the new strategy. The discussion above does not gainsay the changes the US and the Middle East are undergoing. Few would miss US's reticence, even wary, of plunging into the region—as the cases of Syria and ISIL amply demonstrate. But the Middle East is seductive even when it is abrasive, and no matter how cautious the US





Peninsula Shield



By:
Staff Col.
Nasser Al Otaibi

In 1982, the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain – initiated the creation of the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF). The newly created military unit was a response to the Iran-Iraq War posing threat to the territorial integrity of Kuwait. The PSF took part in the liberation of Kuwait during the First Gulf War (Shaheen, 2011). Its troops also participated in restoring civil order during the Bahrain Uprising starting in 2011 (Lessware, 2011). In both cases, the effectiveness of the PSF and the need for its use raised a number of questions among national and foreign experts. Some of these concerns were voiced by Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Sultan bin Abdul Aziz during the 2005 meeting in Abu-Dhabi. The leader noted that the unit would cease to exist as the world knows it today, while its operation would need further revision (Legrenzi, 2006).

While approaching the history of PSF, it can be concluded that Abdul Aziz's statement has a grain of truth. For nearly three decades of its existence, the PSF did not have a unified doctrine (Global Security Council, 2014) which made it an unpredictable force inside the GCC, rather than outside of it. Trying to protect themselves from the political and economic turmoil,

the GCC member countries did not seek to invest a maximum of resources and efforts in creating a unified military alliance. As a result throughout its existence, the PSF faced many challenges, including lack of interoperability, poor training of military staff, and almost total dependence on economic and technological support of foreign partners.

To become the symbol of the military power in the region, the PSF command is to consider a series of important changes. Firstly, it is important to approach interoperability. "The ability of different military organizations to conduct joint operations" (NATO, 2006, p. 1) is more than interoperability of weapons across regions. It also involves strategic, operational, and tactical interoperability (Saidy, 2014), which is only possible when there is a unified strategic vision. Secondly, the longevity of the PSF depends on training of its staff. Nowadays, the PSF command is faced with poorly trained personnel, some of which use thumbprints to sign for their pay (Kuffel, 2000). The efficiency of training also depends on its regularity, clear objectives and criteria, and cooperation with foreign partners. Lastly, the GCC member countries are to consider the development of their own military industry, rather than relying on business partners. This will not only cut down expenses, but also



retain political independence of the region. The mentioned problems have been brewing in the region for more than three decades. Now, the GCC has only two possible options. One of them is to finally approach the problem issues. The other is to cease the existence of the PSF, thus putting in jeopardy political and economic development of the region.

The present Capstone Project aims to assess military effectiveness of the PSF, and provides strategies to improving it. The importance of the research can be hardly underestimated, as the PSF was historically created as the guarantor of political and economic security in the region. The project relies on qualitative research to approach the obstacles hindering the performance of the PSF, and draft strategies to its improvement. The qualitative data are expected to provide a more comprehensive picture of the problem when compared to quantitative (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), and are collected through literature review, interviews with experts, and case studies.

Research question

The present Capstone Project seeks to answer the research questions: 1. What obstacles prevented the

PSF from fulfilling its historical mission that is ensuring security in the region? 2. What changes are to take place for the PSF to accomplish its historical mission?

The Peninsula Shield Force

The prerequisites for the cooperation between Arab Gulf states can be traced to the 1976 (Ramazani, 1998; Guzansky, 2014). However, on 25 May 1981, it acquired a new shade, with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain signing the agreement to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The assumption underlying the creation of the Council was that the mentioned countries have "similar political systems based on Islamic beliefs, joint destiny and common objectives" (Global Security, 2014). In 1982, Kuwait, a GCC member country, was faced with the threat posed by the Iran-Iraq War. The response to this threat was the creation of the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), a military unit aimed to provide security in the region. At the beginning of its development, the unit comprised 5,000 men; but by the year 1984, the number of the unit increased to 10,000 people (Khomeini & Peterson, 1988), the majority of whom resided in King

Khalid Military City at Hafar al Batin, Saudi Arabia (Global Security, 2014). For three decades of its existence, the unit has been the subject of heated debate among experts. On the one hand, it was not clear if the hastily formed alliance would survive for some time. On the other hand, member countries realized that delaying the creation of the alliance would put at risk the safety of the region, and jeopardize political, economic, and cultural independence of the GCC (Koch, 2010).

Other issues arouse immediately after the PSF took part in the liberation of Kuwait. The first, and evidently the most important military operation, turned a complete failure for the PSF. The unit showed a low level of readiness that was exacerbated by the lack of interoperability at regional level (Kuffel, 2000).

The year 2005 was a turning point for the PSF. During a meeting in Abu-Dabi, Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Sultan bin Abdul Aziz noted it was time to reconsider the mission of the PSF, while focusing on it performing exclusively symbolic role (Legrenzi, 2006).

Abdul Aziz's proposal was not followed by any specific action; and in 2011, the PSF stepped into

a new stage of its development, while entering Bahrain. The PSF's intervention in the context of Bahrain Uprising gave a new reason for concern among domestic and foreign experts. Colombo (2012), for instance, notes that, the cause of survival and regional stability was taken a step further in the case of Bahrain. On 14 March 2011, soldiers from Saudi Arabia and police forces from the UAE entered the country to forces from the Gulf Cooperation Council have arrived in Bahrain to maintain order and security and to protect strategic facilities. The move became as an act to defend a GCC member against "external threats", meaning Iran and to maintain security and stability. This was the first GCC deployment in relation to an internal threat (Colombo.S. 2012 p. 116).

Like decades ago, the role of the PSF is not clear for experts, and is a cause for concern both at home and abroad. To restore peace and maintain security in the region, the GCC members need to carefully approach the historic mission of the unit, and what hinders its accomplishment. More insights are proposed in the present Capstone Project suggesting that, the PSF has not been able to accomplish its historical mission and ensure security in the region due to political, economic, and cultural obstacles that the unit encountered on its way. A closer look at these obstacles make the focus of this project, that relies on the data collected to draft strategies to increase the effectiveness of the PSF.

Phase 1: 1982 - 1986

The development of the PSF cannot be considered in isolation from the development of the GCC. The history of the GCC can be traced back to 1979, when the Islamic revolution in Iran made the Gulf conservative Arab states take measures to safeguard their regimes and safety in the region (Pasha, 2012). With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War,



the GCC member countries realized the need to strengthen their military cooperation, and established the PSF (from interview with Mr. P.).

The creation of the PSF was a hotly debated issue among experts. The newly formed unit did not have a unified doctrine, which made it an unpredictable force for the GCC members, rather than other countries. The main uncertainty was that it was not clear whether the PSF had the authority to intervene in domestic emergency (Global Security, 2014).

The uncertain status, however, did not prevent the PSF from the rapid build-up of force. In the first years of its operation, the PSF was a two-brigade unit comprising 10,000 men. It was based near King Khalid Military City at Hafar al Batin under the command of a Saudi officer (Global Security, 2014).

Phase 2: 1986 - 1990

In subsequent years, the PSF was focused on increasing the number of its staff and the formation of a control system. Both issues, though, still cause questions.

While examining the number of the


PSF military staff, it is important to note its approximateness. Kuffel (2000) admits that, "Two separate force structures exist in the PSF; one exists on paper and is used by the PSF Headquarters for planning, the other is a small standing force at Hafr-al-Batin" (p. 5). The number of forces used for planning differs from year to year, and depends on political and military events, taking part in the region. This idea is best illustrated by the table presented below.

The organizing principle of the PSF control system was adopted from American Army (Kuffel, 2010). The head of the unit is the Commanding General who is elected for a 4-year term. The Commanding General is assisted by Deputy Commanding Generals. They are assigned from each of the GCC country, and are selected for a 2-year period (Kuffel, 2000). Although the hierarchy of the system is simple and efficient, it is worth noting that the Commanding General often comes from Saudi Arabia, as the country tends to make the biggest contribution to the unit. This not only violates the principle of equality between partners, but also

Table 1: Peninsula Shield Force Structure

Country	1986	1999
Saudi Arabia	1 Brigade	2 Brigades
Kuwait	1 Battalion	2 Battalion
Qatar	1 Company	1 Battalion
UAE	1 Battalion	1 Brigade
Bahrain	1 Company	1 Battalion
Oman	1 Company	1 Battalion

(Kuffel, 2000, p. 6)



Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a common responsibility, even it might has some criticism of some by saying that it was using a military force to protect the Royal regime in Bahrain but in the other hand that operation maintain the stability and security and protect the vital facilities of Bahrain. (Cunningham, 2012).

makes the PSF resistant to change.

Phase 3: 1991 - 2000

The liberation of Kuwait was among the most significant military operations in which the PSF was implemented. It took place after the massive air campaign, 2428-February 1991 (Morse, 1991). At a specified time, U.S. troops and the Coalition approached Kuwait International Airport; but the Iraqi troops were not going to retreat, and the situation led to fierce battle over the airport and many casualties (Morse, 1991). The battle revealed the military failure of the PSF preconditioned by internal and external factors.

To liberate Kuwait, the PSF did not have sufficient military capabilities, and sought help from the USA, UK, and other countries. Moreover, the GCC's contribution to the 600,000 army participating in the military operation was fairly modest. Metz (1993) writes about 20,000 Saudi troops, 7,000 Kuwaiti troops, and 3,000 personnel from the GCC's member countries taking part in the Operation Desert Storm.

In addition to the lack of the military personnel, the PSF also demonstrated the lack of the military equipment. The Iran-Iraq War made the GCC member countries reconsider their military capability, which had both advantages and limitations. After the war, the GCC member countries increased their military spending, which made Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar the world leaders in terms of the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on defense (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999).

Phase 4: 2000 - 2010

The fourth phase in the development of the PSF started from the GCC member countries signing Joint Defense Agreement in 2000, evidently the "most significant achievement in the field of military cooperation" (Saidy, 2014, p. 20), the necessity of which has been brewing since 1981. The GCC Joint Defense Agreement has changed the face of the PSF in several important ways. Evidently, the most significant achievement is that the GCC member countries shifted their focus from remaining dependent on the foreign partners to increasing military capability by their own efforts (Saidy, 2014), which resulted in a large-scale purchase of military equipment. The GCC also shifted its focus from western to eastern partners. The changes are for instance evident in the contract signed between Qatar and Turkey. Under the terms of the contact, the former spent USD25 million for the purchase of 10 Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) produced by the latter (Turkish Studies, 2014).

Although being positive in their nature, the changes did not affect a very important issue that is the ambiguous strategic status of the PSF. The Bahrain Uprising has become the subject of scrutiny, and is reflected in many articles, including that of Cunningham (2012). The expert suggests that the use of the PSF to stop violation in Manama was proactively successful operation. While sending their forces to Bahrain, GCC member countries actually supported their own security and stability and it shows that The security and stability of the

Phase 5: 2011 - 2015

During the 34th Summit held in Kuwait City on December 1011-2013, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreed on establishing a unified military command for its member states. This decision is a clear indicator on the commitment to establish a reliable joint defense force that is capable of providing a collective security in the region. The functions of this unified command include the provision of strategic and operational command for all GCC missions.

Assessing the Operation of PSF

To examine the research thesis, this section approaches the performance of PSF using the benchmarks named in literature review. It aims to identify strengths and limitations of PSF capability-based planning in order to formulate steps to be taken by the unit to accomplish its historical mission.

Interoperability

The importance of interoperability, "the ability of a system to work with or use the parts or equipment of another system" (Merriam-Webster, 2015), has been realized by individual countries, but more importantly, by alliances. In 2006, NATO released its Interoperability for Joint Operations, emphasizing the significance of this element for capability-based planning. In this context, the lack of interoperability within PSF is puzzling experts, and they note that it can be seen at strategic, operational, tactical, and technological levels (Saidy, 2014). The main problem at strategic level for the PSF is that it does not have an

accurate doctrine (Global Security, 2014). The ambiguity of PSF doctrine can be seen, for instance, in the fact that GCC Charter does not specify whether the joint force has the right to intervene in a domestic emergency (Global Security, 2014). At the tactical and operational levels, the lack of interoperability stems from insufficient training of personnel who are not used to taking independent and efficient decisions. Although the unit adopts hierarchical system, which can also be noted in capability planning of Canada or New Zealand, its application to training military personnel is inefficient given that the levels are not related to each other. From a technological perspective, there is the lack of platform and weapon systems interoperability at regional level. Cordesman (2010) attributes this to the fact that each GCC member pursues "its own path in creating military forces, often emphasizing the purchase of modern major weapons systems that were perceived to provide prestige and glitter factor in terms of regional status" (p. 9). While comparing between the experience of NATO and PSF, it can be suggested the latter should consider establishing a balance between integrity and flexibility that is provided to member countries

Planning of Resources

Recently, GCC member countries have focused on planning their resources, and invested much in armament, especially in intelligence systems. However, despite considerable investment, the performance of the unit is fairly modest, which can be attributed to two factors identified in Jane's Defense Weekly, and published in years 2012 and 2014. Firstly, local population sabotages the intelligence system's attempts to counter terrorism; and this factor has not been addressed yet. Secondly, PSF needs to procure advanced sensors and communications, as well as surveillance and resonance

assets (Saidy, 2014, p. 38). While approaching these challenges, it can be concluded that they stem from the lack of efficient communication between the parties involved, and the necessity of which is recognized in defense systems of NATO, Australia, Canada, and other countries. The efficiency of the intelligence systems adopted in other GCC member countries is still on the agenda.

Dealing with the mentioned challenges involves maintaining cooperation between GCC member countries and foreign partners, which is an ambiguous question. On the one hand, such cooperation may trigger positive changes in the operation of PSF. On the other hand, it increases the presence of foreign military in the region, and jeopardizes its political and economic stability.

Training

Training of personnel is viewed as the core element in most effective capability-based planning frameworks. Efficient training increases the value of money, which is emphasized in Canadian defense system (Sloan, 2006). In the context of this assertion, training at PSF can be assessed as inefficient.

The collective training of the PSF can be considered from multiple perspectives. One of them is from the hierarchy of training, an approach described by Al-Shahrani and Kuffel (2000). The experts identify three levels of training - unit level training, religious instruction, and annual training exercises. The main problem with this training, as indicated by experts, is that a limited number of personnel participate in exercises (Kuffel, 2000). For example, annual training exercises are designed for the brigades located at Hafr-al-Batin, and GCC member countries seldom send their forces to the training (Kuffel, 2000). The other problem is that the three levels of training are not interconnected.

While approaching the Peninsula Shield Force Training, Kuffel (2000)

highlights two other problems that require attention. The expert notes that in the unit there is no casualty reporting system meaning that a commander is to rely on the subordinates' verbal reports, and they rarely have the courage to tell the real numbers. The other problem identified by Kuffel (2000) is that the gunnery exercises are conducted only once a year, and are usually biased.

Although they are facing with many problems, the Peninsula Shield Force is resistant to change. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that the Peninsula Shield Force Training seldom finds its coverage in press. While responding to the interview questions, Mr. L., a military expert from Kuwait, notes that only positive reviews are available to the public. The publication is very selective, and this adversely affects the performance of the Peninsula Shield Force, as there is an impression that the unit functions perfectly, and there is no room for improvement. The real picture of training can be found in the foreign press, and it is always very different from that presented by GCC military correspondents.

It is fair to note that joint trainings of the Peninsula Shield Force with foreign military units are not without problems. Language barrier makes, evidently, the greatest problem when it comes to communication with foreign partners (Kuffel, 2000). Saidy (2014) suggests the barrier becomes especially evident when "there is an unexpected requirement for a doctrine or a piece of equipment" (p. 24). Today, the PSF is faced with a challenge of showing its true prestige (as cited in Al-Awsat, 2011); and to accomplish this goal, the unit is to address the persistent problems. The concluding part of the present Capstone Project provides recommendations to promoting military capability of the PSF. The PSF command began a rapid development process for training through the recruitment of educated



personnel and involving most of the PSF officers in courses and joint exercises in various countries of the world and using of well experienced trainers as well as purchasing the latest weapons and equipment, which led to rapid development in the training of all personnel of the Peninsula Shield.

Conclusion

The Peninsula Shield Force was created more than thirty years ago, a time that is sufficient to have a high-performance military alliance. Although the unit took part in the liberation of Kuwait and other military operations, the experience it has accumulated makes it a formidable military force, rather than the guardian of order in the region. The Bahrain Uprising and the use of PSF to restore civil order in the country not only prove this assertion, but also illustrate the need for the unit to revise its performance. The present capstone suggests that the improvement of the Peninsula Shield Force performance should start with the comparison between capability-based planning in PSF with capability-based planning in other countries and alliances, and assessment of PSF performance using interoperability, planning of resources, and training as benchmarks.

The application of these indicators allows drawing two important conclusions. Firstly, PSF has not

been able to accomplish its historical mission that is, maintaining safety and order in the region. Secondly, the unit should revise its capability-based planning to become an efficient military force. The present capstone ends with recommendations to achieve this aim. It is suggested that military efficiency of PSF should rely on accurate military doctrine, transparency of command and operation, regular training of personnel, and openness to cooperation with countries that have a long history of warfare.

Recommendations

The present section focuses on dealing with the persistent problems faced by the PSF.

- Present a clear military doctrine. The lack of a clear military doctrine makes the PSF a truly formidable force for the GCC, rather than other countries. The composition of a clear military doctrine can be triggered by the cooperation with countries and alliances that have extensive experience in the conduct of hostilities.
- Make the operation of the PSF transparent. Currently, there is a clear relationship between the lack of transparency in all walks of the PSF and its low efficiency; while reporting only positive results, the PSF command leaves no room for improvement.
- Focus on training of personnel. The PSF needs training that

incorporates several perspectives. The first perspective is the training of ratings. The illiteracy of soldiers not only diminishes their ability to independent decision making, but also makes them completely inefficient when it comes to the maintenance of high-tech equipment. The poor training of the military command adversely affects the accuracy and efficiency of the military planning. To address the problem issues, the PSF is to focus on cooperation with foreign partners having better technological equipment and a long history of warfare.

- Focus on promoting national defense industry. The investment in home defense system not only improves military capability of the Peninsula Shield Force, but also reduces the dependence of the GCC on foreign partners. While presenting this recommendation, the present Capstone Project considers the long-term prospects of such an option
- Consider interoperability of weapons and platforms at regional levels. Given the foreign assistance, this recommendation is more realistic than rebuilding of the national defense system. The interoperability can be accomplished in many ways, the most likely of which are roundtables with U.S. and other foreign partners.

Perceptions of Time and the Art of Strategy



By:
Daniel Baltrusaitis,
Ph.D.

Time is an enduring and critical dimension of military and national strategy. Military strategy, according to Napoleon, is the art of making use of time and space. Current western military doctrine is infused with this Napoleonic conception of time. Space can be given to save time to mobilize or maneuver forces; conversely, rapid operations can preserve critical terrain. Unfortunately the conflicts of the late 20th and early 21st century have emphasized the converse of this concept. No longer, for many adversaries is quick victory plausible. Instead they actually use time as a dimension to stretch out a conflict to lower the political will of the stronger adversary. Quick battles and trading time for space has been replaced with refused battles and survival rather than victory. Time has become the weapon of the weak against the strong, and perhaps a weapon of the East vs. the West, as illustrated in the Barro quote at the end of this article. This difference in the role of time in strategy causes problems for the strategist; how do I counter an enemy whose goal is not to win, but rather to extend the duration of a conflict? Even more importantly, does the cultural interpretation of time and tempo undermine my strategy and coalition? This paper explores the time dimension of strategy and argues that there is a predisposition in current

western military thinking to equate speed with decisiveness that undermines counterinsurgency effectiveness as evidenced in Iraq and Afghanistan and has important implications for future military operations.



**Time: As We Know It?**

The western view of time reflects Napoleon's appeal that time is a tangible quantity that can be lost. The field of anthropology, however, provides insights into differing interpretations of time that starkly contrast with this western conception. Edward Hall, in his significant study of time, *The Dance of Life*, outlines two major time orientations, monochronic and polychronic. These two conceptions of time are logically and empirically distinct. According to Hall, industrialized cultures exhibit a monochronic, or linear, time orientation. Monochronic time, or M-time, is a linear interpretation of time, a sequential march of days and years, where schedules dominate, and separate items are accomplished one at a time. It is characterized by punctuality, rules, conformity and speed. M-time is thought of as a tangible quantity; "time can be saved, spent, wasted, lost, killed, and running out." Monochronic orientations are driven by tasks, schedules, and procedures that may eventually take a life of their own. Schedules can and frequently do cut things short just when they are

beginning to go well. Important meetings are cut short due to prior commitments. In the military domain, planning orders are issued based on the "battle-rhythm," even if incomplete. M-time scheduling becomes a classification system that orders life. What gets scheduled constitutes a system for setting priorities for both people and functions. Important things are scheduled first and allotted more time. Unimportant items drop off the schedule. Agendas are mapped into the future, since time marches into the future. It must be noted that the advances in western industrialization could not be accomplished without the schedules and compartmentalization inherent in monochronic time.

Polychronic time orientation, or P-time, on the other hand, is the time orientation seen in the tribal or agricultural societies like the UAE.

**«Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the later than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never.»
–Napoleon**





Polychronic time is multi-track and circular; it allows many things to happen simultaneously, with no particular end in sight. P-time culture values relationships and ritual over schedules and task completion. They value human contact, patience, and honesty above speed. P-time stresses involvement of people and completion of transactions rather than strict adherence to preset schedules. Polychronic time is open-ended: completing the task or communication is more important than adhering to a schedule. For polychronic cultures, schedules are simply unimportant. People are the currency of life and therefore, if spending time with people, time is rarely "wasted." Being on time is not important, schedules are always in flux, and important plans may be changed right up to the last minute of execution. P-time is typified by spur of the moment decisions based upon intuition, creativity, and less on adherence to rigid rules and schedules. These cultural differences in time orientation give insight into decision-making processes. M-time cultures schedule and compartmentalize tasks; this makes it possible to concentrate on one thing at a time, but also reduces context. Scheduling

limits one horizon of possible events within a given period and what is scheduled constitutes a system for setting priorities. M-time people, by means of compartmentalization, are less likely to see their activities in the context of the whole. Polychronic cultures, on the other hand, need less contextual information because they do not compartmentalize tasks and see a project as a whole. Polychronic people tend to be more group-oriented in keeping with their high context orientation. They cultivate trust-based personal relationships with partners, vendors and customers that facilitate market shifts and decision opportunities. P-time people juggle many tasks simultaneously, rather than prioritizing some but neglecting others. Figure 1 summarizes the attributes and implications of different time orientations. For both cultural time orientations, time is woven into the fabric of existence and neither is aware of the degree that it determines and coordinates interactions with others. Time is arbitrary and imposed but because it is so thoroughly integrated into culture, it is treated as the only natural way of organizing life. However, these subconscious orientations are likely to cause

conflict and misinterpretation if not understood. The cultural view of time in relation to history is illustrative. Monochronic emphasis on the future, versus the polychronic emphasis on the past, can cause significant conflict in the strategic environment. Issues are seen as less urgent when there is an emphasis on the past versus the future. When time is seen as unlimited and expandable, the sense of urgency will be diminished.

Time as an Element of Strategy

Research on organizations and bureaucracies suggests that monochronic time cultures strongly and positively value speed over other factors in business relationships. James Gleick, in *Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything*, posits that fastness and the value of acceleration has acquired an independent quality that trumps all others. Exponential growth is causing an accelerated rate of change making the pure quest for speed a positive goal. According to Gleick, "the modern economy lives and dies by precision in time's measurement and efficiency in its employment." Increasing wealth and increasing education brings a sense of tension about time. We believe we possess too little of it. Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft, argues that to compete in the 21st century one must think about velocity; to compete one must operate at the speed of thought. Such space-time

Figure 1. Time Orientations and Strategic Interactions

	Polychronic	Monochronic
Attributes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Process can end without a clear winner - Issues addressed in parallel - Quality of time more important than accomplishments - Time is circular, to be experienced - Agendas mapped to history 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Process can result in measurable zero-sum progress - Complete one issue at a time - Agenda mapped to the future - Issues addressed sequentially
Implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporal acceleration and time-dominance approaches appear aggressive - Frustration occurs when historical issues not adequately addressed - Diverging views of progress and unclear paths to conflict resolution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Misunderstand or ignore adversary's intentions - Frustration when schedules not met - Optimizes time dimension - Issue resolution defines conflict resolution
	Source: Cunningham and Tomes, "Space-Time Orientations and Contemporary Political-Military Thought"	



considerations significantly influence global diplomatic and military thought and doctrine.

This emphasis on speed has infiltrated the operations of most militaries. The thinking that speed is decisive in warfare is embedded in most western doctrine, and is well founded as long as all parties to a conflict understand the same linear conception of time. Unfortunately, this conception of speed versus the enemy ignores the role of strategy and cultural conceptions of time. Mao Tse Tung, in his powerful work *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War*, outlined the problems and strategy for the Communist challenge to the Kuomintang government in the Chinese civil war. The communist party was facing a large and powerful Kuomintang military with a small and weak Red Army. According to Mao, it followed from this strategic situation that it was impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly; in other words, the war would have to be protracted and may even be lost if it was mishandled. Mao successfully waged a war of time to wear down the much superior forces of the government.

This pattern was again used against the French and eventually the Americans in Vietnam. Truong Chinh, second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote in his book *Primer for Revolt*:

«The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and the enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics ... and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become

***“In Afghanistan,
Americans have
all the wrist
watches but
Afghans have all
the time.”
– Lt. Gen. David
Barno***

weak and will meet defeat instead of victory.»

This focus on asymmetric time horizons, not only reflects the difference in military capabilities, but also reflects the difference in time comprehension between regular military forces and a counterinsurgent. Being in a weak position, and also because insurgencies tend to start in remote agricultural areas, insurgent strategies show all the characteristics of a P-time orientation. Time is on the side of the insurgent because they are forced to be patient rather than risk annihilation. Militaries, on the other hand, show an M-time orientation. Conventional doctrine calls for a quick and violent engagement with the enemy. Progress must be shown that the insurgents are being reduced. Using an industrial mindset, however military objectives include industrial metrics such as insurgents killed and villages pacified. Although the current U.S. doctrine Field Manual 324-, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, recognizes this time element, military strategists and intellectuals have not universally accepted that military forces are organized, trained or properly equipped for protracted warfare.

Summary

Tom Hughes highlighted the dangers of the military “Cult of the Quick” in a noteworthy article in the Winter 2001 *Aerospace Power Journal*. He highlights the propensity for current military thinking to equate speed with decisiveness. Airmen especially

fall into this club due to the inherent speed and range of airpower. He warns the strategist that a simple view of the inherent goodness of speed makes strategy vulnerable to adversaries who place different values and different measures on time. Among the outcomes is a tendency to project Western space-time orientation on others, a failure to assess others’ perceptions of strategy and doctrine, and the inability to realize that adversaries are using Western space-time orientation against us. However, Hughes falls short of showing how to escape from the phenomenon of speed, or cult of the quick. Surely, many militaries will be faced with strategic choices that will require quick “knock-down-the-door” action; however, in most cases what will be needed is not a quick reactionary approach but a rather cautious strategy.

Since there is a natural impulse for military strategy to emphasize speediness, policy makers must be aware of these factors when determining strategy. Rapid offensive action must not become only an article of faith. Policy makers must determine if the desired strategy is executable given the existing conditions. It is essential for security advisors to remember and incorporate all the dimensions of strategy when pressed for options against a potential adversary.

U.S. combat operations in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq highlight the fact that temporal dislocation is a “two-way” street. Spatial-temporal anguish is amplified when space-time orientations are incompatible. M-time societies are likely to resolve temporal angst by further accelerating attempts to gain control. Against an adversary such as Al-Qaeda or Daesh this orientation may be counterproductive. Time is not as important to these extremist organizations as is the idea of their mission. Any effective strategy will require a long-time horizon to address the key elements of extremist support.



By:
Dr. Omniyat Mohamed
Al Hajeri



National Service:

New Opportunities for Public Health in UAE

In March 2014, a law introducing mandatory military service for all Emiratis between the ages 18 and 30, setting up a new National defense and reserve force, was endorsed by The President His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Emirati men who have finished secondary school would have to serve nine months, while those who did not would serve two years. The service is optional for

women, who if they chose to enter, may be trained for nine months, regardless of their education, according to the law. More than 9,000 citizens, comprising the first batch of Emirati recruits, started the National Service induction training on August 31, 2014. Since then two cohorts have completed their three months of basic military training and started the rest of the training program. According to Major General Shaikh Ahmad Bin Tahnoun Al Nahyan,



chairman of the National and Reserve Service Authority "This day will go down in the annals of history as it's the first time that mandatory military service has been introduced in the UAE,"; "The service includes a wide range of significant training courses aimed at helping these young recruits develop their creative skills and capabilities to take part in meaningful and effective community engagements," (GulfNews.Com 2014) . The draft strategy states that three batches of about 5,000 to 7,000 conscripts will be enrolled every year to build the National Reserve Forces.

Looking at the morbidity and mortality profile of UAE and particularly Abu Dhabi, it has always been strongly alarming that the Emirate has high rates of chronic diseases related to lifestyle such as obesity, diabetes, hypertension and cardiovascular

diseases. Cardiovascular diseases accounted for 36.7% of all death cases in 2013 according to HAAD statistics report (HAAD Statistics 2013). Almost one in three UAE residents under 18 smoke according to Ministry of Health (MOH). (Cleland 2013) Without robust interventions and effective measures, these rates are set to increase further as the young population ages. In addition to the high prevalence of cardiovascular disease and its risk factors, road traffic accidents is the first killer in the National Service recruits age group. We also should not turn a blind eye to sexually transmitted diseases which are also on the rise including gonorrhea and hepatitis B.

Intervening positively in the young conscripts life style and health related behaviors can have significant public health implications later in

adulthood. With the National Service conscripts, we are almost catching all the target age group of young males between 18 and 30 years of age from all the different Emirates. Achieving positive outcomes in improving their life style and health habits can change the future of a full generation in our country. It is also important for the defense forces to improve physical fitness of their National Service recruits. Physical fitness contributes significantly to the effectiveness and general health of individuals of the Defense Forces. Personnel who are unfit reduce operational effectiveness, put themselves and their colleagues at greater risk of injury and detract from the overall performance and public image of the Defense Forces. This paper will examine the opportunities and challenges The National Military Service provides to improve the health of the public in the UAE and will discuss what is needed to achieve the desired outcomes including short-term improvements in knowledge, attitude and behaviors translating to long term reduction in morbidity, mortality and costs of health care.

Review of the literature on Public health interventions in the Mandatory Military Service sitting internationally:

All countries that have mandatory military service are providing medical care for all of their conscripts.



They also provide the necessary vaccinations appropriate to the age and the areas of deployment, but the other preventative services and programs are less popular. Smoking cessation programs, physical fitness and healthy eating with or without specific weight loss programs are available in many countries that have national military service including but not limited to USA, Switzerland, Finland, Singapore and South Korea. Some of the armed forces also provide psychological support services mainly after returning from missions that involve combat and casualties, but not pre enrollment screening for depression and suicidal ideation. Suicidal ideation was as high as 15.5 % in school children aged between 13 and 15 years old in UAE in 2010 and 12.6% who actually attempted suicide one or more times during the past 12 months according to the published results of the WHO Global School-based student health survey. (WHO 2010)

A review of the literature shows that the straight forward interventions in the US, in which the military recruits were tested for cardiovascular risk factors and proved an initial pattern of blood glucose, lipids and smoking habits are found to be very similar to the age-matched group in the US population. These indicators have improved significantly after 9 weeks of the Basic Combat Training program. (Stefan M. Pasiakos. 2012) In Finland an intervention targeted selection, placement, and attractiveness of healthy foods

in conscript's home cafeterias confirmed that it is important to be realistic on the expected results of isolated non intensive and non comprehensive interventions. This intervention did not increase their fruits and vegetables consumption in a sustainable or meaningful way. (Clarissa ML Bingham 2012). In the military setting, healthier food choices can be promoted by intervening on the main food environments by improving the supply of healthy foods. However, impacting on conscripts' individual selection of fruit and vegetable consumption is more challenging. In some countries like Ireland, the conscripts are encouraged to have healthy life style choices and in addition to educational sessions on healthy nutrition and the avoidance of Drug abuse , Alcohol and smoking; the policies strictly prohibits drugs and smoking in most areas apart from single occupancy barracks. (Irish Defense forces Information Handbook 2011)

Smoking cessation programs and policies received an extensive interest in the Defense forces of many countries, not only because of the detrimental health effects of smoking and second hand smoke, but also due to the effect of the physical unfitness of the smokers on the rest of the conscripts or troops endangering their safety and impairing their performance.

Different countries varied on the strictness of their anti-tobacco policies and interventions. Singapore and Ireland are on the

strict side where smoking in uniform is prohibited and also banned in almost all places within the military campus apart from single occupancy barracks. While other countries have more relaxed attitude towards smoking in the armed forces in general including most of the GCC and Middle East countries, but they still prohibit all types of tobacco consumption during the Mandatory military service.

Among other preventative health interventions, the Swedish Armed Forces also have a very useful hearing conservation program (HCP), which is of the utmost importance to prevent auditory complications during military service. The HCP of the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) includes sound level measurements, noise control, safety instructions and education for all officers and soldiers, the use of hearing protection devices (HPD) and repeated audiometric testing. The compliance with an HCP is dependent on knowledge and attitude among the conscripts. All conscripts are educated in the risks and consequences of Noise Induced Hearing Loss, levels of noise exposure from weapons and vehicles, and how to protect themselves in accordance with the Safety Regulations. The soldiers used earmuffs, helmets with earmuffs, or a combination of earplugs and earmuffs. The earmuffs used were equipped with electronic level-dependent function to allow speech communication (Per Muhr 2011).

Additional research showed a



very impressive Defense Medical Surveillance System which is available in the US Army, with very interesting public health prospective and applications including morbidity profiling, risk assessment and emerging threats mapping which is used to influence health care policies in the military sitting (Rubertone and Brundage 2002). This system and the data it generates can help interested public health professionals design targeted health interventions to improve the health status of the armed forces population (Hartman 2002).

In some countries like Finland very creative interventions for improving physical activity among conscripts were used for instance, the «Gamified physical activation» that was proposed in 2013, but publication of the results is still pending. This intervention involved a gamified platform, which combines several modules: 1) a virtual coach, i.e. avatar for each participant, 2) a game based on participation of peer groups, and achievements supported by rewards from increased physical activity or reduced sedentary behavior 3) possibility for social networking between peers 4) input on physical activity recordings and feedback, 5) communal youth services for supporting coping and an active lifestyle (e.g. through exercise and social counseling), 6) exercise instructions and personal objectives for long-term fitness improvement based on baseline measurements and activity recordings, 7) tailored information

content related to health and wellbeing based on a participant's readiness for changing his exercise behavior. It also includes instructions to physical activity, aerobic and muscle exercise programs targeting fitness improvement and weight management. Throughout the program, long-term fitness estimations are provided to the participants. The given health information is evidence-based and the intervention lasts for 6-months (Riikka Ahola 2013).

Finally; it is important to mention the impressive Defense Medical Surveillance System which is available in the US Army, with very interesting public health prospective and applications including morbidity profiling, risk assessment and emerging threats mapping which is used to influence health care policies in the military sitting (Rubertone and Brundage 2002). This system and the data it generates can help interested public health professionals design targeted health interventions to improve the health status of the armed forces population (Hartman 2002).

Overview of preventative health services and public health initiatives in UAE National Service:

To date, there is no published data on this topic as the National Service only commenced in 2014 and only two cohorts have completed their first 3 months of on campus mandatory training and are still receiving the two additional parts of the training program scheduled. A full

medical check-up is performed for all recruits; "We do the investigation in three military medical centers, Abu Dhabi, al-Ain and Sharjah. We also have agreements with other health care providers in order to help us perform these investigations. We do these investigations in the beginning before recruitment, and these should be reviewed every three years unless something has changed in the candidates' health" commented Brigadier General Matar Saeed Al Nuaimi the Director of the Medical Services in the UAE Armed Forces.

The Medical examination for the National Services recruits in UAE is divided into two parts. "The first part includes the following laboratory and radiological investigations is done for all recruits (Blood group (blood type) including Rh factor, Complete Blood Count, Blood Urea Nitrogen, Creatinine, uric acid, Fasting blood sugar - additional tests such 2 hrs Post Prandial Glucose, Glucose Tolerance Test, (HbA1C)- will be done if indicated, Liver function test, Drug screen and alcohol, HIV, Hepatitis C (Anti-HCV) and Hepatitis B (HBsAg), Sickle cell and hemoglobin electrophoresis if positive results or Hb below normal range, Biochemistry including lipids, proteins and nucleic acids, Serology including plasma serum and antibodies, Optometry / color blindness or color deficiency exam, ECG, Urinalysis, Chest X-Ray, Pregnancy test for married female, Vital signs include Heart Rate (Pulse), blood pressure, height, weight and body mass index" according to Dr Ahmed Farhood the Head of the Medical committee responsible for the Health of the National Service recruits.

The first part of the examination also includes a base line Audiogram and further testing as indicated as well as the appropriate confirmatory testing if indicated. The Second Part of the examination includes psychiatric and clinical examination and examination of all systems to



rule out abnormalities such as:

- 1) Asthma or any respiratory disorder.
- 2) Orthopedic problems (Disabilities and congenital malformations) .
- 3) Flatfoot, pes planus or any Foot and knee deformities .
- 4) Back problems, any scoliosis or kyphosis .
- 5) Severe eczema or psoriasis .

The psychiatric evaluation is based on a questionnaire questioning the recruits regarding previous history of psychiatric illness, drug or stimulants use, alcohol use, sniffing glue or similar substances, it also checks for family history of psychiatric illness and if the recruit has served any periods in Jail. After the medical examination, the medical fitness grades are determined for recruits according to military medical fitness standards.

Overview of the Public Health programs available to the National Service Recruits in UAE:

Given the fact that the National Service just started less than a year ago, the public health interventions available to the recruits are quite limited. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Dr Mouza Hassan Al Shehhi, the head of health and sport medicine wing in the National Service, “around 25% of the young recruits that came to us were obese, in response to this we came up with a proposal to incorporate some essential preventative services as a routine for all the National Service recruits not only to achieve fitness but also the required Military Readiness. Those services included Dietary assessment and guidance to

maintain a healthy weight, targeted exercise programs, proper physical and post injury rehabilitation services, and healthy food options. In addition to general health education, “We are testing the proposal currently in our medical clinic in one of the training camps allocated for the training of the National Service recruits”.

This initiative has four proposed stages including the initial assessment and classification stage (blood tests , physical examination, fitness evaluation), results will be communicated with the recruit in stage two, stage three will focus on allocating each category to the appropriate weight reduction and physical fitness improvement programs. Multiple educational lectures and workshops are scheduled for the National Service recruits.

The physical fitness test is going to be repeated every three weeks and the recruit will be given a (fitness passport) that will register all his test results culminating in the final pass. Stage four will include building a local data base for the medical and fitness information of the National Service recruits.

Overview of the Public Health programs available targeting the general adult population in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi:

There are several well established public health programs that are implemented in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, those programs will be briefly described below,

Weqaya program: a public health program that targets early detection and prevention of cardiovascular disease risk factors in Emarati adults

above the age of 18 years. It is a population based program where at the first round of screening (2008-2010) covered more than 175,000 UAE nationals above the age of 18 years old in Abu Dhabi that brought to the spot light very alarming figures: 67% are obese or overweight 55% have central obesity 44% have evidence of either pre-diabetes or diabetes 44% have high lipid levels 23% have high blood pressure 24% of males self-report smoking. In many cases, people are unaware they have risk factors for cardiovascular disease such as diabetes, high blood pressure and high cholesterol. Early Detection of these risk factors can prevent heart attacks and strokes. Weqaya testing include checking for:

Random glucose & HbA1C, Cholesterol: Total Cholesterol; Blood cholesterol level; cholesterol in HDL, Kidney function (creatinine, eGFR), Vitamin D3. Additionally, a detailed self-administered questionnaire and physical examination to record blood pressure, height , weight, Hip circumference and Abdominal circumflex is given. Results are communicated to subjects within five days and according to their risk profile they get stratified to low, medium and high risk groups. The groups are scheduled to meet their physicians for follow up within two weeks, two months or in three years if no new signs or symptoms are reported respectively. Health care providers are obliged to report the screening results through the HAAD electronic claims system and are subject to routine audits



for compliance with HAAD Weqaya Standard. (Health Authority Abu Dhabi Weqaya Screening Standard 2012).

The program is supported by electronic infrastructure that allows participants to access their Personal Data, have Interactive recommendations based on risk level, appointment booking option, links and recommendations for non-health sector interventions and general information on healthy living for Weqaya and general public. The Weqaya program also contain a smoking control element. This is augmented by a yearly anti tobacco public health campaign called Abu Dhabi says no to tobacco, which includes smoking cessations counseling services. The Eat Right and Get Active program is a Weqaya related program, it focuses on the importance of Healthy nutrition and physical activity as important health behaviors. In some hospitals, restaurants and coffee shops The Weqaya Logo is currently used to label healthy meals with less than 750 Calories. No more than 30% of the calories from fat, no Trans fatty acids, less than 3 gram refined sugars per 100 gram of the food, less than one gram salt per 100 gram of the food, fruits or vegetables other than potatoes should weigh more than 100 grams of the meal in addition Weqaya logo cannot be added to dishes that are deep fried (HAAD, HAAD Standards for Labelling Food with Weqaya Logo 2012).

Weqaya in the work place: Evidence from around the world shows the beneficial effects of workplace

health promotion programs for both the organization and its employees. Healthy and productive workers contribute to successful business outcomes which lead to a healthy economy and ultimately to sustainable development of countries & nations. In the Army setting, this is even more important as a physically unfit or an unhealthy recruit can negatively influence the safety and effectiveness of his fellow soldiers. In a recent study across the UAE (Edelman 2011) UAE Health Barometer, 79% of participants said they would have more trust for a company that was effectively engaging in health promotion. Workplace health promotion also provides the opportunity for Employers including the Armed forces to enhance their community image. In addition, work place wellness initiatives reduce actual health care costs, improve productivity and reduce absenteeism.

Other relevant health promotion programs in Abu Dhabi include "Protect your health with vaccination" program which includes adult vaccines in addition to the usual childhood vaccination program. (Health Authority Abu Dhabi Standard for Childhood and Young Adult Immunization 2013) Also the Mental health program which is a relatively new program. A lot of time and effort has been invested in integrating early screening and detection of mental issues like depression and anxiety. They are incorporated in the primary health care sitting with a mental health educational campaign planned for the near future educating

the public on the early signs of depression, stress, and anxiety and also highlighting the basic coping strategies.

HAAD is also planning educational public campaigns to face the taboo of sexually transmitted diseases like HIV, Hepatitis B C and others. Another program that will add value is the safety in the heat program that will help the young conscripts to train and work effectively in the hot and sunny climate without any significant health issues. There is also a proposed Dental Hygiene awareness initiative, where HAAD will expand its current Abu Dhabi Smile Dental care program for children to include adult population.

Recommendations:

The current pre enrollment testing of all National Service recruits and the pilot intervention for weight management, healthy diet and improved exercise capacity implemented in some clinics in the National Service camps; is a great start. However; we definitely need more. Recommendation that can help achieve better health outcomes; include :

- Further research is required:

This should include taking a sample (large enough to provide statistical significance) from the current batch of the National Service conscripts and apply the weqaya screening questionnaire and blood tests and look into their results and the prevalence of the cardiovascular risk factors in this sample.

We should also consider a short questionnaire assessing what method do the young conscripts believe are going to be the most effective method in health education and what in their opinion is really needed to change their risk behaviors and replace them by healthier behaviors?

It will also be interesting to compare the male mandatory service population and the female volunteers from the same age group.

- Implementation of an integrated and comprehensive public health



initiative:

Complete Cooperation between the Ministry of Health and Health Authorities of all Emirates starting with the health authority of Abu Dhabi and the Military medical services responsible for the National Service conscripts health issues. The current Public Health programs available in Abu Dhabi like Weqaya program, Weqaya in the work place, Eat Right and Get Active program, Abu Dhabi Smile, protect your health with vaccination, Abu Dhabi Says No to Tobacco, Pre marital screening and Abu Dhabi Mental Health program can be integrated and modified to give the best possible preventative care to the National Service conscripts.

This can be accomplished by a combination of entry medical examination, dental screening and psychological assessment. Also blood tests including all the Weqaya panel tests, infectious disease tests, Thalassemia and sickle cell screening added to the routine blood tests that the armed forces requires upon entry.

In addition to regular health education sessions in the training schedule of the conscripts, a pilot implementation is recommended in the training camps in Abu Dhabi using the HAAD accredited health education material, health educators from HAAD or alternatively use

HAAD experts to train a selected group of military health professionals to deliver the educational messages to the target group (train the trainers approach). Age appropriate vaccination updates should also be given at this stage. The educational program should cover aspects of healthy eating, physical activity, smoking cessation, dental hygiene, drug abuse awareness, sexually transmitted diseases avoidance, inherited diseases, stress management and recognition of early signs of depression and anxiety. The education should be phased over the mandatory training time for the National Service conscripts and educational material should be distributed. Weqaya food standard should be applied to the food available to the conscripts. We should also offer one on one clinical sessions for smoking cessation. It will also be a very useful opportunity to educate the group in regards of their road safety (speeding, text while driving and not wearing their seat belts).

According to behavioral change experts a habit that is adopted for more than 4 to 12 weeks is likely to transform into a long term adopted behavior. Hence, if the conscripts are compliant with the healthy life style modifications for the period when they are on campus, they are likely to continue the adopted

healthy behaviors. An anonymous hot line for questions can be of a great value, especially to answer question that the young conscripts may find embarrassing or sensitive. An electronic data base should be established and linked to the current data bases available in HAAD. It can also be linked to the conscripts electronic medical record if it is already used in the military medical services. Even after the conscripts return to their normal life; periodic refresher courses will be needed and periodic reminder messages will be useful. (SMS, email etc). Multiple social media platforms should be considered where conscripts can log in and share their experiences, challenges, success stories, ask questions and be role models for the subsequent cohorts and the general public.

For the female conscripts we should also use the opportunity to update their HPV vaccination and reduce their risk for cervical cancer. Also we can educate them on planning for healthy marriage with premarital screening and healthy pregnancy. Once the pilot project implementation and outcome results come back, they should be further analyzed and used in the implementation of the country wide initiative with the benefits of avoiding previously faced challenges.

- The integrated comprehensive program should have built-in tools to evaluate the program. This should include implementation key performance indicators and milestones in addition to short term, mid-term and long-term outcome determinants).

- A medical surveillance system including morbidity profiling, risk assessment and emerging threats mapping similar to the US Army Medical Surveillance System can be used in assessing the outcomes of the proposed interventions, redesign them to improve, and guide future policy.

- A study of the cost effectiveness and the Economic impact of the



initiative should also be performed during the pilot phase. This can be benchmarked to the actual cost of health care prevention for this age group from previous years prior to National Service. In addition to the budget allocated from the Military Health Services; payment system should be negotiated with the insurance companies operating in UAE.

Conclusion:

UAE National Military Service already has some good preventative health interventions but it is important to be realistic in the expected results of isolated non intensive interventions. There are many promising public health programs that are currently available in UAE. The fragmentation is making those programs less effective. The integrated approach to all the health risks that the young conscripts joining the National Service face; can be a golden opportunity to change their life style to a healthier one for the rest of their lives. This will significantly impact the Public Health profile of the community in the UAE in a positive way. The long term effects of an integrated program targeting our National Service recruits will have a rebel effect in the community in the short term and long term, it will spell over to their families , friends and children to help achieve a healthier UAE in the Future. We should also look into age appropriate and attractive educational and physical activity encouraging methods; like interactive gaming, educational apps, four dimensions cinemas and other edutainment instruments.. The challenges that chronic diseases impose on the population of UAE are not trivial and they call for creative and innovative interventions that can make a real difference in reducing the related risk factors and improve the general health of the community.

Bibliography

Clarissa ML Bingham, Marjaana Lahti-Koski, Pauli Puukka, Marja Kinnunen, Piia Jallinoja and Pilvikki Absetz. Effects



of a healthy food supply intervention in a military setting: positive changes in cereal, fat and sugar containing foods. 2012.

Cleland, Emily. «Alarming smoking statistics emerge on UAE youths.» The National May (2013).

Edelman. Edelman UAE Health Barometer Report 2011. 2011.

GulfNews.Com. First National Service Recruits in UAE start training. August 31, 2014. <http://m.gulfnews.com/news/uae/first-national-service-recruits-in-uae-start-training-1.1378649> (accessed December 23, 2014).

HAAD. «Health Authority Abu Dhabi Standard for Childhood and Young Adult Immunization.» HAAD. 2013. <https://haad.ae/HAAD/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=clq6hgdwLQ03%D&tabid=820> (accessed Dec 22, 2014).

HAAD. «Health Authority Abu Dhabi Weqaya Screening Stabdard.» July 2012. <http://www.haad.ae/HAAD/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=sj-gl8-Blv43%D&> (accessed December 22, 2014).

HAAD. «HAAD Standards for Labelling Food with Weqaya Logo.» 2012. <http://www.haad.ae/HAAD/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VyqVlFF-KLY%3d&tabid=819> (accessed Jan 7, 2015).

HAAD. «HAAD Statistics 2013.» November 27, 2014. http://www.haad.ae/HAAD/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=LrAOka_Zx3Q%3d&tabid=349 (accessed

December 23, 2014).

Hartman, Richard Thomas. Military Deployment Health Surveillance and its Application to United States Special Operations Forces: A Policy Analysis. ProQuest Information and Learning, 2002. HumanResources. Defense Forces Information Handbook. 2011.

Per Muhr, Ulf Rosenhall. The influence of military service on auditory health and the efficacy of a hearing conservation program. 2011.

Riikka Ahola, Riitta Pyky, Timo Jämsä, Matti Mäntysaari, Heli Koskimäki, Tiina M Ikäheimo, Maija-Leena Huotari, Juha Rönning, Hannu I Heikkinen and Raija Korpelainen. Gamified physical activation of young men – a Multidisciplinary Population-Based Randomized Controlled Trial (MOPO study). 2013.

Rubertone, Mark V, and John F Brundage. The defense medical surveillance system and the department of defense Serum Repository. 2002.

Stefan M. Pasiakos., J. Philip Karl., Laura J. Lutz, Nancy E. Murphy, Lee M. Margolis, Jennifer C.Rood, Sonya J. Cable, Kelly W. Williams, Andrew J. Young, James P. McClung. «Cardiometabolic Risk in US Army Recruits and the Effects of Basic Combat Training.» PLOS One 7, no. 2 (2012): 17-.

WHO. «Global School-Based Student Health Survey.» 2010.

Thirsty Mountains



By:
Staff Col. Abdulla Al
Mehairbi



A **fgghanistan** has attracted all international powers to play the game of war in which the chess pieces are the Afghans and the game rules are interest, ideology, and corruption. Nevertheless, the mountains still thirst for blood.

As the game between the United States and terrorists reaches its final minutes, the next players are already warming up and in preparation phase, waiting for the

whistle to blow and announce the end of the game. The new players are driven by ideology, and fueled by extremism to fill spectators' interests. The main rule of the game is that the blood spill must only be Afghan's.

The Hazaras will represent Iran in the next game played in Afghanistan. This team has been trained to represent Iran's interest and ideology during the war as well as its politics. Besides, using soft



power strategy for a long period of time, Iran has successfully gathered a very loyal team through the Imam Khomeini Foundation efforts. The focus of this foundation is to spread the Iranian and the Imam's ideology among the Shia community in Afghanistan using all types of media such as TV and radio, and education in Qom for the Hazara, in particular. Also, to keep lines of communication open and support the Taliban activity to counter the



American existence in Afghanistan. This is to ensure a security power vacuum which will be created after the pullout of the international forces from Afghanistan. The Iranian's interest in the area will not stop in Afghanistan territory only as the long term strategic goal is actually Pakistan. Therefore, the Iranian approach will be through fighting terrorism, gathering Shia support, and financial funding. This can be through supporting Kabul government regardless of their ethnicity or even ideology as long as they accept the support of the Shia community. This is because Iran will not rush the process in order to get to the required end.

However, the Iran's relations with the Taliban were close to war, until the Taliban government was thrown out by American forces. After that, Iran started to build up a relationship with the Taliban by supporting them to ensure an Iranian diplomatic role in any deal. At the same time, the Iranians were against any deal by the Afghan government and the United States for having a military bases in Afghanistan.

Looking at Iran's act in Afghanistan, it does not require any professional analyst to envision the Iranian interest is to create a loyal community to support Iran's will. However, Iran



can create destabilization where it can operate and serve its interest in the region. By this, Iran will be able to get into Afghanistan and try to control the country by any means as they were previously prepared to do. The international community as well as Afghanistan's neighbors are already exhausted and fed up from the intervention in Afghanistan. For that, they would not mind the involvement or occupation of Afghanistan by Iran. This will

create a crack in the Afghan social community where the Shia, loyal to Iran, is on one side and the Sunni, represented by the Pashtun and Taliban, on the other. Both sides will be lead by extremists and driven by their ideology where there is no room for civilized behavior such as negotiation, and election. Creation of hatred among society is the head of the spear where interests are concerned. The Iranians will start to provide

limited support to the other terrorist organizations, with all types of weapons and train them on how to use them. In addition, Iran may support assassinating all promising leaders, keeping the corrupt and loyal ones to Iran. Both Afghan sides will suffer greatly from bombing in the market place where innocent people will be victims. However, the Iranian media will highlight the incidents by stating that those bombings are carried out by Sunnis. This is to fuel





the hatred among the society and to attract extremists from both sides. This stage will take about eight to ten years from the time of American withdrawal from Afghanistan, as they have previously learned the lesson from Iraq and Yemen. During this period, Iran will start to cooperate with Pakistan to counter terrorism and extremism through the Hazaras. It is that moment when Iran get the trust of Pakistan when dealing with Afghanistan conflict without India's

involvement. Accordingly, Iran will be in control of Kabul. The next stage would be Pakistan, where Iran has already started to create a kind of Shia lobby, and engaging with the government through more trade and cooperation in countering the Baluchi movements. Through this, Iran will be able to have more political power in the Pakistani system through both the Shia lobby and money flow. In conclusion, Afghanistan will have

a vacuum of security and become a fertile mountain land of extremism with powerful neighbors, whose actual intentions are their own interests. The field will be opened for international involvement in supporting one of those teams to create some kind of power balance that will lead the Afghan society to a dark future. The mountain of Afghanistan will be wet for years to come and the blood will run for decades.



Economic Statecraft & Sovereign Wealth Funds



By:
Sultan Al Mahmood


The GCC countries including the UAE have gone through and are going through many challenges in recent times. These challenges are in some way new in nature regionally but their effects are global and do not recognize any border. We have seen the rise of terrorism and extremists' groups challenge and threaten regional stability, civil war in Syria, instability in Iraq, the decline of oil prices, the War against the Houthi's in Yemen, and most recently the agreement between Iran and the West over the nuclear program. These issues have and will continue to create economic challenges for the GCC countries including the UAE. Our economies will continue to be confronted by the surrounding problems that seem to have no immediate solution. The prospects of growth continue to face a wave of unfortunate events that force us to relook

and reconstruct our conventional economic methods. Innovation comes on top of the strategic agenda in order to help look at new ways of doing things in order to think outside the box. Although certain past strategies helped us

The Gulf Economies' Emerging Pa

The GCC's connections with the BRIC and "Next 11" countries are investment flows. The blue lines represent total bilateral trade b nations. By comparison, in 2010, trade with the U.S., Europe, and \$122.2 billion, and \$115.5 billion, respectively. The GCC's trade w outperformed trade with the United States.

2010 BILATERAL TRADE
in US\$ billions







make wise decisions that offer support for future anticipated difficulties. The farsightedness of our leadership will continue to surprise those who are looking at us from the outside. The recognition that our main natural resource that has helped make us significant to the rest of the world will one day diminish is in itself a statement only a wise leader can foresee and make. This brings me to the decision of the creation of sovereign wealth funds in the GCC including the UAE. I don't believe that those observing from the outside considered that SWF's can one day be used as part of a country's economic statecraft. The role

Partnerships


illustrated through trade and investment between the GCC and these countries. Japan was US\$72.5 billion, with China and India has already





of SWF's will become important in determining the outcome of the economic stability in the region.

Today it is important to understand the role of the sovereign wealth funds (SWF) in the UAE and the GCC. I believe that SWF's are a tool of economic statecraft that UAE and the GCC are utilizing as an instrument of power and influence to achieve a objective which fulfills the national interest of economic prosperity. These economies are largely dependent on oil production and export to the rest of the world. The majority of the revenue that GCC countries generate is income from oil exports to the rest of the world, and with large revenues these countries choose to direct a big part of the revenue to SWF as their economies are not that large and economic diversification has still not reached the required desired level. It is also important to acknowledge that SWF in the GCC are all owned and run by the government like the majority SWF around the world. It is also worth mentioning that SWF in the Gulf account for 34% (\$1.9 trillion) of the total assets under management by global SWF that in turn own \$5.4



trillion worth of assets. In the UAE the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) which is part of the top two SWF's in the world was estimated to hold assets worth \$627 billion in 2013 as per KPMG and have currently reached \$773 billion as per the latest figures published by SWF institute. So these SWF's are taking surplus revenue and are utilizing it to invest in international markets in order to create and increase wealth for the government.

I believe that SWF's will support the economic goal of the UAE and the GCC in safeguarding its wealth and therefore ensuring economic prosperity for future generations and safeguarding the nation from international and domestic financial crises that can have an impact on

these economies. It also ensures a steady investment stream for revenues generated from oil and gives the state and alternative to having to invest domestically which in turn can increase inflation. As SWF's are investing their money in the international market and in foreign countries the benefits created for GCC and these countries is helping to support and grow these foreign economies. SWF's are also very stable as they do not require taking loans from banks that they would have to pay at any point of time. Also there are no external investors or stakeholders that can threaten or jeopardize the decision making in these institutions either by trying to control the investment strategy or selling out their shares



to others. This makes SWF's secure and stable when it comes to external parties and outsider stakeholders especially during a time of crises or downturn. There are positive benefits for countries that deal with and allow SWF's to invest in their market as this creates interdependence between countries and opens up mutual interaction. This interdependence is beneficial as it minimizes conflict between states and makes them focus on future and long term trade relations. Another benefit is the exchange of knowledge and experience through these mutual trade relations from the interaction between the parties. This can be used by the UAE and GCC to influence decision making on a political level through financial assistance to weak economies that are desperate for capital injection in



order to grow, diversify and prosper. Today we see the SWF's are heavily relied on by the UAE and the GCC to fund the budget deficit as a result of fluctuating oil prices, financial crisis, or even war. UAE and the GCC economies are not immune to these global effects but at the same time are positioned quite well to ride out any downturn by reaching into surplus revenue that has been injected into their SWF's. It is important to remember that the UAE supported its domestic economy through capital injection during the 2008 financial crisis and assuring the public by guaranteeing deposits in the banking sector which in turn minimized the negative effect of the crisis.

Relying on SWF's as an instrument to achieve a goal that supports a national interest through economic statecraft will be something that will dominate the future of the UAE and the GCC in my opinion. I believe that the potential use of SWF's in reducing conflict and promoting exchange of mutual interest between countries will become vital to the UAE and GCC. As oil prices remain low many economies will have a hard time adjusting as they need to look for alternatives to fund their budget deficits. Other economies will be able to ride it out by relying on the wealth that was created and has been accumulated with the help of economic tools and strategies one of which is SWF's. I believe that the UAE and GCC today are willing to take a chance with low oil prices, financial crises, or even war as a result of their wise financial strategy that was set up more than three decades ago and will most probably continue to improve on the role of SWF's in supporting economic security, growth and prosperity. The threat of regional and global issues will continue to cast a dark cloud over the GCC and the UAE, but safeguarding the economy will help determine a bright future path for us.



The Crucial Water, Food and Energy Nexus In the United Arab Emirates



By:
Husain Al Ghafli

The imperative impact of the energy-water-food nexus is already taking a toll on global security, economic growth, and the well-being of countries around the world. The stress levels on energy, water, and food are increasingly compounding, owing to rising populations, economic expansion, industrialization, and an increasing demand for resources. In addition to the scarce availability of, and access to, these resources, a complicating factor resides in the interconnectedness of the water, food, energy - a nexus, which poses significant prioritization challenges as shown in Figure (1).

Many countries, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are faced with having to produce food at the expense of exhausting water

resources or producing water at the expense of heavy energy utilization rates. The focus must be on finding sustainable solutions that holistically tackle issues, such as boosting production, tempering demand, and allowing for greater access across the entire energy and resources spectrum. We must also commit to finding solutions that minimize our carbon footprint, and ensure resource security in a manner that is mindful of nations' sovereignty.

The UAE is no stranger to resource scarcity, and as such has the proven experience to support a global action plan. At home, while we have been blessed with one of the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world, the delicate balancing act we play centers around maintaining our leadership as a




Figure (1): Water, Food and Energy Nexus (Bizikova et al, 2013).



global energy exporter, while also meeting our increasing domestic energy demands. As one of the leading economies in the Gulf, the UAE has enjoyed average gross domestic product growth of more than six percent since 2006. As a result, the domestic energy demand rises by more than 9%. This robust and welcomed growth, juxtaposed against the backdrop of scarce water and food resources in the UAE, is our call to action as we transition to sustainably secure our resources.

The Nexus

Energy, water and food are connected to the inputs and outputs of every developing sector in the UAE. Energy, water and food are all connected, and this connection between them has come to be known as the energy, water and food nexus. The motive idea behind this nexus is that each of these three resources is connected to the others, because each requires some amount of the others to be produced or generated. In a sense, there is energy embedded in each drop of water, there is water embedded in each joule of energy, and there is water embedded in each calorie of food. In agriculture, all sectors producing food need water and energy. In the industrial sector, water and energy are needed to power, cool, and clean the production process. To produce water through desalination, water production, transfer and distribution all need power. Energy, water and food are critical for all other development sectors and businesses. Food is not a completed agricultural product, its use must include everything required to produce and sell it, including harvesting, raising livestock, processing agricultural products, and preparing the food items for sale; all of these need water and energy. The energy system is composed of everything that goes into power generation,

including creating electricity through turbines powered by water or steam, growing foodstuffs for bio-fuels, producing and refining fossil fuels, and distributing energy to consumers. The water system extracts freshwater, treats wastewater, supplies cooling in energy systems, and irrigates crops. It becomes apparent that energy, water and food are interconnected within the whole economic system.

Water Scarcity

Water is among the scarcest commodities in UAE. After the oil discovery in 1960s, the growth in population and other various developments such as expansion of the agricultural, forestry and industrial sectors created a huge demand for fresh water resources. Initially that demand was met from fresh groundwater reserves, but they are being depleted rapidly due to the limited natural recharge of the groundwater aquifer systems (World Bank 2007). To make up for the shortfall in the supply of natural resources, the UAE became increasingly reliant on non-conventional water supplies such as desalinated and reclaimed water to maintain economic growth and quality of life. Because investment in new water supplies was only demand-driven and water was essentially provided free or at very low cost to the consumer, per capita consumption of fresh water grew rapidly and is now among the highest in the world. In addition non-conventional water generation, primarily through thermal desalination, has significant negative environmental consequences both locally and globally. Finding ways of balancing the demands from human and economic development with prudent management of water and the environment is the major challenge for the UAE.

There are almost no fresh surface water bodies in the UAE. According to the UN, water poverty and the water stress line are defined as less

than 1,000 m³/capita/year, and 500 m³/capita/year consecutively. The UAE's per capita renewable fresh water is less than 150 m³/year (MOEW, 2010). There are many internal threats and challenges facing the limited and scarce water resources in UAE. These threats include: high per capita domestic water consumption, deterioration of groundwater aquifers, population growth, dependency on desalinated water, discharge of treated wastewater into the environment, and weak water use governance.

Food Scarcity

The pressures on food come through three growing trends as follows: increases in caloric consumption by individuals; increases in the use of foodstuffs to produce bio-fuel. (The world's production of bio-fuel in 2007 was 1.1 million barrels a day. In 2011, the world produced 1.9 million barrels a day), and increases in population growth. Recent studies indicate that at the Arab regional level, the food self-sufficiency ratio stood at about 71.7% in 2011. Table (1) shows that the UAE food self-sufficiency ratio is less than 18.6% in 2011 and did not change significantly from its level of about 21.1% in 2005. At country level, the food self-sufficiency ratio declined in all Arab countries in 2011 from its level in 2005, with the exception of Iraq, Algeria, and Somalia. This indicates that overall Arab countries did not make progress in the past years towards their pursued policy of enhancing food security based on domestically produced food, especially with regard to cereals, as shown in Table (2). Regionally, Arab countries were nearly self-sufficient in fish, fruits and vegetables but had a self-sufficiency ratio of 45.55% in cereals, 54.35% in fats and oils, and 36.85% in sugar in 2011 (AFED 2014).

With the given reality of water scarcity in the UAE in general, 87% of the food supply in the UAE depends on importing from

other countries, leaving about only 13% for local production. The high dependence of food supply on good importing has many economic and political implications and risks. On the other hand, food consumption expanded at a rate of 6.2% between 2004 and 2010. In 2011, the overall food self-sufficiency in UAE reached about 18.7% for all food products, and only 1.1% for cereals, one of the main crops in the food chain.

According to the UAE food supply profile published by the FAO in 2014, cereals, oil crops, sugar and sweeteners are the top food items that UAE imports. The local production share of these items reached only 5% for cereals and 0% for oil crops, sugar and sweeteners. Therefore, only relative food self-sufficiency could be achieved, while absolute or total food self-sufficiency is not viable or strategic to pursue. According to a report developed by the Arab Forum for Environment and Development, food self-sufficiency in UAE decreased from 21% in 2005 to about 19% in 2011 (FAOSTAT, 2014).

There are many challenges facing reaching the food security in UAE such as: limited agricultural lands, agriculture and industry, food waste, rising population, rising income and, changing diets, shortage of fresh water for agriculture sector, slowing irrigation, increasing soil salinity and erosion (desertification), climate

change, and a decrease in available fresh water reserves.

Energy Security

The UAE is one of the major oil and gas producers in the world. Energy fuels the growth and diversification of UAE economy. Oil and gas have underpinned UAE's economic development for more than 50 years. With its dry and arid climate (desert climate conditions), water is energy and agriculture and food production is energy. Any failure in power and energy supplies for a few hours would interrupt normal business and life, and if continued for just a few days would be a threat to economic security – if the UAE were unable to export its oil freely, for example, or if imported food or gas prices spiked. Fossil fuels enable transport, desalinate water and generate electricity for all demand centers. As the UAE economy grows, so does the demand for energy, with growth rate of about 9% annually according to the last estimates by Ministry of Energy (MOE, 2015). The country's power stations are almost entirely fuelled by gas, of which a quarter is imported from Qatar via the Dolphin pipeline, or as liquefied natural gas by Dubai, most of which, again, is of Qatari origin.

While oil and gas have historically been the dominate fuels powering the UAE economy, the UAE's energy

sector is undergoing a transformation targeting diversification of the UAE's energy mix. In the 2021 National Strategy, the UAE government plans to minimize the power generated by gas from 98% in 2012 to less than 76% in 2021 as clean energy from renewable energy sources. Nuclear power is planned to enter the mix as well, increasing energy efficiency efforts and initiatives. There many key factors driving the diversification of energy in UAE and driving this transformation including: the UAE government plans to increase its global energy leadership through pioneering new innovative technologies and creating a knowledge-based economy; the UAE is committed to a green economy and sustainable development with a focus on growing the UAE economy while reducing its environmental impacts and carbon footprints; and, the UAE government is aiming to secure and sustain its energy supply.

In the UAE, gas powered cogeneration power plants produce electricity and use the waste of steam for thermal desalination to produce freshwater from the Arabian Gulf and Omani Gulf. Desalination of seawater is mostly in combination with power generation, using the waste heat from gas combustion. Dubai increased its reservoir capacity substantially last

Oil (Million Barrels)	Proved Reserve (2013)	Total Oil Supply (2012)	Total Oil Consumption (2012)	Reserve to Production (%)
	97800	3213	618	95%
Natural Gas (billion Cubic Meter)	Proved Reserve (2013)	Natural Gas Production (2012)	Natural Gas Consumption (2012)	Reserve to Production (%)
	215025	1854	2235	116%
Electricity Sector)	Capacity (giga watts) (2013)	Generation (billion kwt/hr - 2012)	Consumption (billion kwt/hr - 2012)	Distribution Losses (billion kwt/hr)
	26.1	97.9	82.5	7.2

Table (1) UAE Energy Statistics (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013).



year, but it still represents only about two-and-a-half days' demand. Table (1) shows the UAE energy statistics.

The Water Food and Energy Nexus in UAE

The nexus between water, food and energy is very complex matrix in the UAE, as each of these sectors depends on the other two sectors as shown in Figure (2). Billions of dirhams are spent annually by the UAE government on investments intended to ensure that it is adequately addressed. The issue is complex; however, the sustainable development benefit of well-designed and implemented water and agricultural investment deserves careful review to ensure implementation of best practices and processes. To produce water from different resources available in UAE (groundwater, desalination and treated wastewater), energy is needed. The estimate of energy required to produce water is the first step in a larger concept to understand and compare the energy required for water withdrawals in UAE. Table (2), (3) and (4) show the




Figure (2): Water, Food and Energy Nexus in UAE.

relationship between water sources and end users. The agriculture sector is the main water user which uses about 1472 million cubic meters of groundwater which is about 63% of the total UAE available water supply and about 93 million cubic meters of desalinated water; at present no treated wastewater is used for food production in the UAE,

as shown in Figure (3). Agriculture is the largest water user in the UAE as it accounts for 34% of the total water use (about 1560 million cubic meters) in 2008. About 92% of the agricultural water supply is from groundwater resources. Agriculture also uses desalinated water and this use was about 93 million m³ in 2008. The majority of this (85 million

	Agriculture	Industry	Municipality	Total
Surface	0.218	0.030	n/a	0.25
Groundwater	2.80	n/a	n/a	2.80
Desalinated	0.00059	0.0349	0.915	0.95
Total	3.02	0.06	0.915	4.0

Table (2): Quantity of water withdrawn (km³)

Sources: Aquastat (2014)

	Agriculture (direct supply)	Industry (direct supply)	Municipality (treated)
Surface	0.027	0.027	n/a
Groundwater	0.355	n/a	n/a
Desalinated	20.839	16.685	18.263

Table (3): Energy required withdrawing a unit of water (kWh/m³)

	Agriculture	Industry	Municipality	Total
Surface	6	1	n/a	7
Groundwater	994	n/a	n/a	994
Desalinated	12	582	16,702	17,296
Total	1,012	583	16,702	18,297

Table (4): Total energy required to withdraw water.




Figure (3): Sector water resources uses in UAE.

cubic meters) consumption was in the Al Ain region of Abu Dhabi while limited volume (8 million cubic meters) was used in Dubai Emirate. Due to the government policy encouraging agricultural growth, the agricultural area has grown quickly since the 1990s. As most of the agricultural water resources were from groundwater, continuous unplanned groundwater abstraction affected the groundwater storage reserve, and caused a decline in groundwater level. This also caused water-scarcity on many farms, particularly after 2000. The agricultural water use was about 1,565 million m³ for the year 2008. The sector, as a whole, consumes about 1560 billion m³ of water that is provided to about 34,535 farms

in 2008.

Given the large and highly-subsidized use of water by agriculture it is important that any conservation strategy considers this sector in depth. This sector has an importance to the UAE economy for cultural/historical reasons and to support food security. The UAE has been long aware of its internal and external water threats, and has so far responded to its rapidly growing water needs and dwindling reserves with a policy of increased reliance on desalination. However, in addition to increasing supply through desalination, there is widespread realization at the political level that water management is required for further successful development of the country.

A Recommended Strategy of Resilience and Improvement

In addressing our challenges within a unique socio-economic context, the UAE has chosen an approach that focuses on addressing its immediate national concerns, without compromising its leadership on the global scene as a key energy exporter, and as a steward for greater environmental awareness. The global impact that we are continuing to make has been manifold. One way has been through sound investments in renewable projects worldwide; another, through creating platforms for dialogue that raise awareness and incentivize greater action around issues of resource scarcity. Energy, water and food policy



should be high on the UAE national agenda. The UAE government should start taking the following necessary actions including: Data collection and analysis for each of the three resources and their linkage; assessing the risk and opportunities of all three elements, planning for improving the energy, water and food nexus, enforcing the implantation of the nexus improvement plan, developing a collaboration and integration plan between all UAE government bodies to avoid fragmentation in responsibilities and avoid any gaps, and educating and increasing awareness to increase the public knowledge of the nexus and its importance. The following are key suggestions for the development of this strategy:

Development of a UAE water strategy

A unified water strategy should be developed, taking into consideration the proposed economy growth and should be in alignment with the agriculture policy. Economic-based approaches to water use management are needed. This strategy should deal with the existing gaps in the legal and instructional aspects of water sector. Such a strategy will minimize the conflict of interest and the fragmentation in responsibilities between different agencies and intuitions which lead to minimize the duplications in efforts and investment. This strategy needs to be supported by other measures to include: water sector legal and institutional reform, the creation of a strategic water reserve and water demand management.

Recommendations for Increasing Food Security

The share of the food cost in the UAE consumer price index is relatively low at 14.3% compared to 26% in Saudi Arabia and 18% in Qatar. However, lower income groups are particularly affected by food price inflation, as they spend a

relatively high share of their income on food supply. In an environment of growing global food prices, price controls alone are not viable in the long run. The UAE will need to introduce food subsidies like other countries in the region, if it wants to keep food prices within certain boundaries. Such subsidies can be sustainable and self driven if private markets can be involved in a formula where a self sufficient food program can be discovered on the basis of partnership creation between Government and the private market. More comprehensive policy to achieve food security is needed.

Recommendations for Increasing Energy Security

To secure the energy in UAE government should diversify its energy sources, such as: creating nuclear power, enhancing renewable energy, developing an energy-water roadmap, and enacting energy and water subsidies.

Conclusion

With the challenges faced by the UAE concerning water, food and energy, the curial nexus between these three fundamental resources highlights the importance of creating a strategic plan, which must be developed to achieve more efficient water, food and energy management, due to the impact of each of these resources on the others. Demand management must be instituted in each of these three pillars of the nexus and waste saving measures in all of them should also be adopted by the government to improve the future quality of life and sustainability of growth in the UAE. It is very important to consider restructuring of the agricultural sector and developing a new agricultural strategy that should take into consideration the physical settings of the UAE and determine the most appropriate crops, which could minimize crucial resource consumption, which will then have significant positive impacts on the

rational use of water and energy in the food production sector and at the same time could still increase food production.

The UAE government should enhance the diversification of national energy sources and also study other available alternatives and their economic feasibility., Land grapping and investment in the agriculture outside UAE should considered in the future taking into consideration that these investments should be in countries having political stability and security to ensure the safety of these investments and their sustainability on long term.

Despite the close relationship of water, food and energy resources, their funding and decision making are managed as separate issues across the spectrum of policy, planning, design and operation in UAE. Three actions are needed on the part of governments. The UAE government should strengthen the price signal to ensure productive and more efficient use of all available and scarce natural resources. This can be done by removing energy, agriculture and water subsidies. This will enable innovation and redesigning of property right regimes to empower co-management of common pool resources.

A fully integrated approach to all available natural resources planning, in line with the concept of integrated resources management, would be desirable for nexus-friendly policy making in UAE. Although such an integrated approach could be challenging, a useful starting point would be to analyze how the decisions taken for one specific resource affect the others. Without taking these actions focused on the crucial nexus among food, water and energy security, the future prosperity and continued economic growth of the UAE will be seriously threatened, thus the government must make fundamental changes now to have any chance of meeting its obligations to our children.

Developments and Changes in the Regional and International Environment


CLIMATE CHANGE




By:
Robert A. Sharp

Our planet is the resource we share and must protect. Greenhouse gases (GHG) prevent the atmosphere from dissipating heat. Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide, the most harmful GHG. Our planet has warmed over the last 250 years since carbon resources were first extracted and burnt to generate energy in support of the industrial revolution. Environmentalists are passionate to convince senior strategic leaders to take action.

Climate change might make parts of the world uninhabitable; it reduces rainfall, foster drought, crops fail, salination kills fishing stocks and increased winds mean disease spreads further and quicker. These destabilizing factors will displace people and drive conflict. Analysts suggest climate/resource wars are inevitable. The Middle East is already warm and is expected to rise a further 2 degree Celsius within 30 years and 4 degrees Celsius within 50 years.





Climate change is heavily politicized in America. The likely solution rests in carbon emission regulation and taxation, which some worry may force an economic collapse of the carbon business. Lobbyists act to prevent Americans doing much about the problem despite President Obama's initiatives and UN climate change economic development and legislative progress. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has asked world leaders to take urgent action; he seeks real measures for agreement at the November-December 2015 Climate Change Summit in Paris, France, building on the outcomes of the New York Summit in 2014. Climate change is a classic "tragedy of the commons." Individuals act independently and rationally according to their self-interest, but behave contrary to the best interests of the whole group by depleting a common resource; in this case, the planet's atmosphere, which no single country owns. The UAE ratified the Kyoto Protocol in January 2005, agreeing to reduce GHG emissions. The conundrum for the UAE is that exporting more oil has to be balanced by the Protocol to reduce climate change. With oil prices now around \$50 a barrel economists would press for more exports of oil. India and China are rising within the

Indian Ocean region and as their populations increase so will their demand for oil. Unfortunately, the UAE cannot expect to see any responsibility for carbon taxation in these countries despite the fact they are providing them a resource that might ultimately contribute to climate change. As an analogy, pharmacies may sell medicines but cannot prevent buyers from improperly using them and damaging their health. For the UAE, an increase to the volume of oil sales would help compensate for reduced oil revenue, but equally the burning of these fuels would contribute to climate change. UAE emergent reporting as early as 2008 indicated the implications and suggested that because UAE cities are densely populated and lie on the seashore, rising sea levels would impact and that, «The UAE is a hot spot that could see catastrophic and striking effects of climate change like extreme storms; an even hotter and drier subtropical desert a more acidic sea and damaged coral.» The UAE like Gulf neighbors will face these challenges together. Sound strategy and planning is needed now to analyze the implications to UAE national security and to determine, report and recommend whether or not the national security apparatus and the structure,

training, equipment, capacities and capabilities of the military are set right for climate change. If not, changes must be made.

The UAE's strategic leaders are committed to climate change including domestic reduction of carbon emissions and have stepped forward with respect to renewable energy and carbon-free technologies; such measures include the Shams 1 solar power plant, the peaceful civilian nuclear energy program and the environmentally friendly "green building" standard which commenced in 2006. Additionally Masdar City, Abu Dhabi, is now the home of the headquarters for the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The UAE is a respected climate change world leader and is taking the phenomenon seriously – we now all need to do our part.

Robert (Bob) A. Sharp is the associate dean for academic programs and quality assurance advisor at the UAE National Defense College, Abu Dhabi. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not represent the views and/or policies of either the National Defense College or the government of the United Arab Emirates.

Who Is Teaching Our Children Civics:

Revisiting Demography/ Identity Dilemma In The UAE



By:
Dr. Karima Al Mazroui



This paper attempts to describe the unenviable demography of the United Arab Emirates, and how it is foreseen as a threat to the country's national security. Even though analysts may believe terrorism or depletion of resources is more threatening to the UAE, I think the demographic imbalance in the country is a ticking time bomb that may explode anytime if not managed and controlled well. Having indigenous texture of population, as is the case in the UAE, may result in weakening and destroying the country from the inside and draining its resources. This imbalance conceals many ramifications not only on the safety of the country, but also on the ideological, social, cultural, and political aspects. The demographic dilemma cannot be solved in the near future; therefore relevant legislations and agreements need to be put in place. While the paper submitted to the previous course concentrated on the implications of this phenomenon on the ideological aspects, services, and employment rate in the country, the current paper elaborates more on demography imbalance figures in education, focusing on teaching civics as an identity shaping subject,

and its implications.

The Demography of the UAE translates to the percentage of non-national population in the UAE compared to the nationals. It comprises expatriates' nationalities, numbers, education level, and gender as well. It demonstrates how the UAE nationals are a minority in their own country who make up less than 5% of the total population. The demography dilemma in the UAE, from my view point, is worth discussing for two reasons: a small population of nationals and labor progression in the UAE.

According to Al Ittihad newspaper (5th April, 2011), expatriate workforce in the UAE occupy around 90% of the UAE jobs, which culminates the UAE status as the worst among GCC countries in this area. This imbalance certainly has negative implications on the UAE national identity. In order for the minority nationals to thrive, they have to communicate with the majority in a language other than their national language. In addition, fluency in English is mandatory to be enrolled in any national university and to find a lucrative job.



Language plays a very important role in shaping a person's identity. Language represents an individual's beliefs, values, and unique history. A few years ago in 2010, the public resentment was aroused when Emirates Palace Hotel hosted the most expensive Christmas tree in the world and entered Guinness World Record. The national public considered it as a stark depletion of national resources; especially that Christmas is not an official religious occasion in the UAE.

This imbalance has its shadow on education as well. If we take a look at the UAE public schools, we find out that national teachers are only 12% of the teaching force. This issue translates to the absence of national role models in some suburban areas and in particular, in boys schools, across all the emirates. Expatriates, with different backgrounds, are teaching the UAE students subjects like Religion, Social Studies, and Arabic language, which should be directed toward promoting the sense of allegiance and belonging to the country.

Both Ministry of Education (MoE), and Abu Dhabi Education Council (ADEC) aim to limit the teaching of Civics and National Education in public schools to UAE national teachers. National teachers are important role models for students, beyond their academic role, and are more apt to instill a sense of belonging and national pride among students. In year 12 / 13, Civics was taught in Abu Dhabi public schools by a total of 468 teachers out of which 67% were Nationals. As such, a total of 156 expat teachers should be replaced by UAE national teachers. It's worth to note that Emirati students make up 23% of private schools students, where Civics and National Education are taught by around 205 teachers across private schools out of which only 2% are nationals. This is consistent

with the overall representation of nationals among private school teachers; in fact, today only 39 Nationals teach in Abu Dhabi private schools across all subjects, mainly due to uncompetitive compensation packages compared to public schools.

Gender, and especially availability of male teachers, adds another layer to the challenge above, as the percentage of male national teachers is very low and stands at only 10.99%. Moreover, female national teachers are reluctant to teach in all boys public schools, as ADEC faces many difficulties in attracting National teachers to all boys schools.

Another challenge that faces Abu Dhabi education in terms of future Emiratisation of Civics and National Education teachers is the declining number of graduates from universities in Abu Dhabi which is expected to continue to decline due to the low interest of people in the teaching profession. The number of citizens graduating from teaching programs at universities in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi from year (05 / 06 to 11 / 12) has declined by 12% (the total number of teachers dropped from 449 to 229).

The demography dilemma in the UAE is not going to be balanced in the near future, including education. Meanwhile, this challenge has been identified in the ADEC's strategic plan 2013-2017- and multiple initiatives were developed in order to attract national teachers to private schools, mainly; Teacher Exchange Program between public and private schools, deployment of Emirati trainee teachers across high performing private schools, and facilitation of employment of Emirati teachers across private schools. Even though ADEC will continue to leverage its recruitment channels, ADEC alone cannot bridge the gap. Abu Dhabi Tawteen Council is to

make a contribution to tackle this issue by identifying and training additional candidates for the future. In addition, communication is to be established with higher education institutions to expand the pool of available candidates. As the majority of national candidates are females, one of the possible solutions is to offer financial incentives (e.g. stipends) to female nationals who are willing to teach in all boys schools in order to facilitate the replacement of expats in these schools. Another possibility is to train holders of Social Science degrees to teach Civics. Scholarships can be offered by higher education institutions and more teachers are to be recruited in this critical area. Although compensating nationals to work in private schools may place a burden on the government, having national role models who resemble national identity is most crucial to maintain national security. From my view, media should be heavily involved to elevate the public perception of the teaching profession as well.

To sum up, the UAE has become the new «dream land» for many expats. While the UAE continues to progress, it will offer more opportunities for nationals and expats alike. It's through establishing laws and legislations that we can maintain peace and preserve the identity of the UAE society. The real investment should be made in building a well-educated, young, and loyal generation in the UAE, mainly raised in the classrooms. Teachers are to be selected carefully among those who uphold the vision of protecting the national identity of the future generation. «Wealth is not money. Wealth lies in men. This is where true power lies, the power we value. This is what has convinced us to direct all our resources to building the individual, and to using the wealth which God has provided us in the service of the nation.» the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan said.

Yarmouk Battle: From a modern strategic perspective



By:
Mohammad
Ahmad Fraihat



After the death of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in 632 AD, the Caliph Abu- Bakr who succeeded Muhammad (pbuh) decided to expand the Islamic conquests in Iraq, so he sent Khalid bin Al-Waleed to open it through a series of successful campaigns against the Sassanid Persians. After Khalid established stronghold in Iraq, Abu-Bakr appealed the armament to invade Syria, and Khalid was sent from Iraq to Syria with reinforcements and as a leader of the Islamic army. Clausewitz thinking, «War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means», war can vary in its forms depending on the changing nature of policy and the society within which it is waged. Yarmouk battle was as a result of the change in Muslim's policy and society. Khalid Bin Al Waleed was a great

Islamist military leader, he was a leader of the war; he was a military genius, daring and courageous. He fought about eighty battles; he was not defeated in any one of these battles, because he had military mentality, a wide field of military experience. It was a military adviser to the Head of State; Clausewitz said "A certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy." Abu Bakr (head of the Islamic state) also was a military experienced, and he heard to military commanders and give them confidence. He was able to developed military plans, strategic components required, estimated position and combat capability, improves balance of the forces of his opponents, explore the battle environment ,used the method of surprise, strikes highly lethal to the heart of



the enemy army, made a shock to the enemy forces, and the heart breaking power of confrontation, he followed the implementation of his plan with great skill, he controlled the battle management, he directed the battle in his favor in first a few hours until defeated his enemy and dissipated his strength at the earliest opportunity. Clausewitz described the nature of «military genius» (involving matters of personality and character, beyond intellect), Khalid was an example of a genius commanders.

Battle of Yarmouk took place between Muslims and the Byzantine Empire in 636 AD. The battlefield area is about 65 km south-west of the Golan Heights between Syria and Jordan, where the battle on the plain of Yarmouk, Islamic armies leaders decided to withdraw from Jabiya, near Damascus, to the Yarmouk after the Roman army made progress toward Muslims army. Khalid Bin Al Waleed took the general command of the army after the waiver of Abu Obeida bin Aljah. This battle is considered by some historians to be one of the most important battles in world history, because it was the beginning of the first wave of victories for the Muslims outside the Arabian Peninsula, and led to the rapid progress of Islam in the rest of the world.

The council of war met in the Islamic army General Command headquarter, during a meeting

Abu Obeida (General Commander of the Army) decided to leave the command of the army to Khalid, because he knows that this battle would be decisive, and Khaled has the knowledge and military experience, strategic planning ability, and would command the army to victory. I think this is one of the reasons for victory, the army leaders do not seek personal glory, but seek to achieve the public interest. Khaled re- organized the army after he took command of the army as follows:

fourth Muslim army were horsemen, and they were about ten thousand horsemen, he divided the Army to 36 infantry battalions, and distributed to four brigades, each brigade had 9 companies, and reconnaissance group, to monitor the battlefield full, he kept the high-speed strong cavalry reserve under his command. (1)

The war continued for six days, the first four days were to repel the Roman's attack, on the fifth day Khalid refused to view the Roman request for a truce for three days and he said the famous saying "we are in hurry to accomplish our mission". On the sixth day Khalid transferred his strategy from defense to offensive, this going along with Clausewitz "The asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense" Khaled was convinced will not win the battle but the decisive attack, , and he was able to execute

venture attack against the Romans, and the use of a unique military style in that time to take advantage of the cavalry Mobility and high speed capability, which provided the flexibility to turn a quick defeat of the Muslims to an outright victory for them.

Battle of Yarmouk was one of the greatest Islamic battles, and most far-reaching of the movement of Islam, because the Roman army (the most powerful army in the world that day) had a severe defeat. Hercules (a head of roman's state) had realized the disaster that had befallen his nation, he left Syria forever, as a result of this great victory, and the Muslims continued their march to the North Africa. "The Muslim invasion of Syria was not an irresistible mass movement of tribes. It was a carefully planned, coordinated and organized series of military operations using strategy well able to deal with byzantine defensive measures". (2) Clausewitzian thoughts "The relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war" Political and military objectives were Quite similar in Yarmouk battle. Khalid strikes highly lethal to the heart of the enemy army, jomini's war Principals and this what jomini said "Strikes against the decisive points that achieve the defeat of the enemy". "Administrative Affairs, the military Intelligence. Reconnaissance, surprise, maneuver, mass, mobility, forces security, cooperation, from what was mentioned above, we note that Khalid use all jominian principles in the year 636 at the Battle of Yarmouk. "unified command, speed in entering the battlefield, superiority in the decisive point".

(1) Al Wasat, Thursday 9th September 2010 - 4th year - Issue No.1072.

(2) David Nicolle, Campaign series, Yarmuk 636 AD, osprey military, 1994, p88.

(3) Maps by Mohammad Adil Rais-Invasion of Anatolia and Armenia.

Challenges of Demographic Imbalance In UAE



By:
Staff Col.
Ahmed Al Mualla

Prosperity of the UAE requires development in all sectors of the nation. People in the UAE cannot have the desired prosperity depending only on local human resources; so development always requires foreign expertise. The number of expats has increased proportionally with the growth of the economy. Even with the growth of the UAE national population, the ratio of citizens to non-citizens has sharply decreased causing an imbalance in population. This has become one of most complex challenges that the UAE will have to address.

As a result of the scorching economic growth of the country since its inception that required a large number of foreign labor, expatriates accounted for 88 percent of the population in 2010. This is very high compared to the EU where people find it difficult to accommodate even an average 6.5 percent foreigners among the population plus 9.4 percent foreign-born citizens. In the period from 2005 to 2010, the average growth rate for citizens in the UAE was about 3 percent every year while non-national population has more than doubled from 3.3 m to 7.2 m, which confirms the statistics that UAE has seen the fastest growth rate in population in the world in the period from 1950s to 2005. These

figures are enough to illustrate how the UAE is a unique case in population imbalance.


Opportunity or threats

Expats are one of the main tools for development that contributes to construction, development programs, and the establishment of the basic infrastructure necessary for economic development. On the other hand, foreign labor led to numerous negative consequences. The presence of foreign labor in the UAE has turned from a development tool to a challenge that may end up as a threat to national security from different aspects. The challenges can be categorized into four aspects: culture, economy, policies, and security.

The impact of demographic imbalance on culture

The presence of more than 200 nationalities from different religions, heritage and traditions has led to a confluence of cultures in the UAE. This resulted in the transnational spread of ideas, values and information relating to differing ideologies, beliefs and even political orientations.

In 2012, Arab nationalities consisted of 28 percent of the population including citizens, while the Indian and Pakistani nationalities were above 50 percent, which makes



the Arabic only the third widely spoken language in the country after Urdu and English. This is true if we assume that all Arabs speak Arabic. Unfortunately, lots of young Emiratis are more comfortable with English than Arabic, they even text each other in English when using communication technology. Some elder citizens try to practice it too despite their weakness in speaking English. Moreover, names of residential complexes, streets and shop signs are dominated by English. In media, such as radio, more programs are presented in languages other than Arabic even though most of them are produced and broadcast in the UAE. People in many other countries like Turkey and Korea use only their mother tongue at home. So what makes new generation of Emiratis abandon their mother language is not only the need to exchange ideas with the majority foreign people, but also probably because of the weakness of the native culture that is influenced by foreign cultures which is a composite of language tradition, customs and values. Another challenge is the influence of domestic servants. UAE has a high presence of domestic helps who come from other cultures. Ninety-six percent of Emirati families employ expatriates as helps, personal servants, or nannies. Most of the



Emirati families rely on them to raise their children from a very young age; the kids spend more time with their domestic servants than biological family members. This weakens the bonds between mothers and children, as the kids are more drawn toward their care taker and they tend to learn various other languages instead of mother tongue. UAE ladies are followed by their domestic servants publicly in shopping malls, hospitals, and parks, which reflects their dependence on their helps publicly. The low cost of hiring has made people more dependent on domestic servants who perform

80 percent of parental tasks and responsibilities. The presence of a high number of foreigners in the UAE has created a lot of foreign academic institutions locally. When national students attend these schools, their identity gets diluted by the overwhelming presence of the foreign students. Normally, in other countries, foreigners tend to learn the national language for their own interest and for the possibility of getting citizenship of the host country, but in the UAE expatriates keep their culture and identity as it is difficult to get UAE citizenship.



The challenges of demographic imbalance on economy

Economy is the main driver for the influx of foreigners. As people's welfare is one of the main objectives to maintain prosperity, this welfare needs a strong economy which cannot exist without skilled human resources at all levels. This need for expats also contributes to demographic imbalance.

UAE's economy is expanding according to the strategy of economic diversification. To maintain the economic growth rate, industries create lot of jobs requiring skilled professionals and workers. The citizens cannot meet this demand. Thus, expatriates account for 95 percent in the private sector, far surpassing the agreed ratio for foreign labor in GCC which creates another challenge for political decision makers. Even the idea of Emiratization in such sectors will not be pragmatic due to the lack of skill among nationals as demanded by these industries.

Therefore, the role of foreigners is vital to maintain the prosperity of citizens, though sometimes that makes citizens relinquish some of their values to maintain their prosperity. Expatriates have the right to seek a better life too; however, by the time the older expatriates upgrade their lifestyle, more new expatriates also arrive, which adds more imbalance to the population. The majority of the expatriate workers are single males from various Asian countries. Salaries of these men are repatriated to their home countries with very limited material benefit to the UAE. This impacts the UAE economy and reduces opportunities in local human resource investments. As a result of this situation, the UAE

faces a significant financial drain: In 2014, remittances amounted to more than 140 billion dirhams, and the continuation of this financial drain would be damaging for the economy.

Impact of demographic imbalance on policies


The issue of foreign labor in the UAE has become a political issue at the global level, in the context of international labor agreements. Some of these agreements suggest that expat workers be given citizenship, which is evidence of political interference under the pressure of NGOs and the international community. Additionally, there is the possibility of foreign workers becoming a lobby. In fact, some Asian governments have demanded that the UAE government must review employment agreements for alleged lack of appropriate safety measures in the workplace. Whether this is true or an exaggeration, this demand has been raised by embassies which seek to put more pressure. For example, India, which has the largest community of expatriates, has the capability to put pressure on political decision-makers, in favor of its people. Furthermore, there are some concerns about the possibility of these communities demanding political rights in case a specific nationality becomes a majority. The expatriate communities in the UAE now have a second generation of immigrants who were born and brought up in the UAE. The concern is that they could initiate political movements that reflect their thoughts, aspirations, and demands.

Other political demands can be found in the US State Department

Annual Report on Human Rights. In 2013, the department issued a report which included workers' rights in several sections including the laws of freedom of association; the right to collective bargaining; prohibition of child labor; and minimum age for employment and acceptable conditions of work. However, many laws have already been framed as well as amended in the Ministry of Labor such as the Wages Protection System (WPS) that was introduced in 2010 and the prohibition of the use of children in camel races. These changes may be a fallout of the efforts international organizations in regard to foreign workers but they show the desire of the UAE government to improve the work situation for people and how they have used criticism as an opportunity to come up with new and better rules and regulations.

Several entities related to human rights have been founded including the Human Rights Department in the Ministry of Interior and Human Rights Association in Dubai. These organizations have been active in resolving many issues such as children abuse and human trafficking. Furthermore, reforms in the judicial system have rebuilt the reputation of the UAE that had earlier been sullied by some NGOs. In October 2013, the UAE obtained a recognition in the area of human rights. The UAE was ranked the first among Arab countries and fourteenth globally on the International Human Rights Rank Indicator (IHRRRI), published in 2013 by the Global Network for Rights and Development (GNRD).

Impact of foreign worker on security
The UAE has witnessed lots of demonstrations by expat workers, Asians in particular, demanding



improvement in their working conditions. In 2007 some 600 Chinese workers protested against a Chinese recruitment company demanding that the money they paid be returned. They took out a march in Sharjah and blocked some roads in the industrial area. Such a demonstration might become a security threat if it is no longer peaceful and leads to the destruction of public property. This happened in Ras al Khaimah in April 2015 when laborers wrecked and set fire to their building site and 17 cars after a worker fell to his death in an apparent suicide prompting the police to use force to break up the protest. Another demonstration took place in March 2015 when hundreds of workers from South Asia staged a rare protest in Dubai, and blocked one of the main landmark areas in Dubai.

The expats are also affected by conflicts between or within their countries. During the Arab spring, a lot of Arab communities demonstrated their support or opposition to their political actions. The conflicts in Libya and Syria have led to demonstrations by expatriates from these countries in the UAE. In 2011, Syrians demonstrated in front of their consulate in Dubai, condemning action of President Assad in their

homeland. The consequence of these demonstrations is not always positive, and can sometimes end up in riots which need to be suppressed by the security forces. Some foreign labor are involved in organized crime in various forms. UAE security services have succeeded over the years in busting networks involved in trafficking, theft of jewelry and bootlegging by expat labor, particularly Asians. More dangerously, some of these elements have links with some trans-border criminal gangs engaged in money laundering, currency counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and other illegal activity. In addition, this increases the expenditure to maintain internal security.

Other challenges of demographic imbalance

Many of the development strategies in the UAE have been adapted or revised by foreign experts who thus contributed to building the country, where the role of citizens was limited. Foreign consultants have the capability to manage most of the economic and strategic plans, and it may be noted, therefore, that most of projects, especially in real estate, have extensively attracted more foreign companies.

Institutions and organizations in the UAE have been developed

continuously. Government sectors which employ citizens are expanded yearly to absorb the requirements of other sectors that exponentially increase. Organizations have been under pressure to fulfill the employment demand and accommodate more citizens. The General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs is one of the departments that suffers from the imbalance; it is one of organizations that should expand in accordance with the population. Municipalities are another segment that suffers from this imbalance, the requirement for them increases every year not merely to take care of the interest of citizens, but the high number of expats. The high population of foreigners puts more pressure on water and energy sectors, and for all other services sectors. It is acknowledged that foreigners helped to develop the country but the surge in development did not allow enough time to preserve the local cultural identity in the new environment, as cited by Dubai Municipality.

Another challenge resulting from this imbalance is the structure of security forces organization in the UAE which was originally designed for the population of the UAE, but the presence of a high expatriate population in the country puts pressure on security services which mainly comprise nationals who are in a minority.

Conclusion

Expats in the UAE have greatly contributed to the economic growth in various sectors including, infrastructure and transportation, education, and health and social care. However, the rapid development has adversely impacted several aspects of culture, security, and policies. An equilibrium has to be achieved in the UAE between the need for economic growth and the increasing presence of expatriate workers to maintain a steady growth in the country.

UAE Defense Industry:

Ambition & Reality



By:
Dr Sterling Jensen
Ph.D.



During the 2015 International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) in Abu Dhabi, Homaïd al-Shemmari, CEO of Mubadala Aerospace and Engineering and Chairman of the

new Emirates Defense Industry Company (EDIC) reinforced a long-standing desire among the UAE's leadership to build a domestic defense industry. Al-Shemmari said the UAE leadership is not happy with the current business model of



merely buying its military capabilities from the East and the West. The model of dependence cannot continue. The UAE has embarked on a new business model of joint projects to have more independent sustainability in its defense market.

He also pointed out that defense industries rely on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) and that this new business model could help advance the UAE's strategic goal of economic diversification based on a knowledge-based economy. He

stated that by 2030 the UAE wanted 35 percent of its defense purchases to come from its own defense industry. Building an indigenous defense industry also makes political sense because it would give the UAE government more



muscle to its foreign policy. The UAE's regional allies lack defense industrial capabilities to meet security requirements and the UAE wants to be a leader in supporting its regional allies. The current Saudi-led coalition against Houthi rebels in Yemen highlights this regional need for more defense capacity without relying on the East or the West.

One way to achieve this is to have stronger and more capable defense industry. The December 2014 announcement that the UAE would unite its three top defense companies into the Emirates Defense Industries Company (EDIC) highlights the leadership's interest in having a more efficient vehicle to streamline purchases and develop the domestic industry. By coordinating and correlating defense purchases and requiring more joint projects in research and development (R & D), the UAE is taking the required steps to become more self-sufficient.

This article identifies and analyzes the challenges and opportunities to developing the UAE's defense industry. First, we will look at reasons for building defense industries and the UAE national

interests and policies involved in this undertaking and how the UAE has gotten to where it is. Then, it will identify challenges and compare them with the experiences of other nations that have gone through the process of building a domestic defense industry. Finally, the paper will summarize the UAE's strengths and weaknesses in building a defense industry and how it can address the challenges and seize the opportunities.

National Interests in a Defense Industry

Countries that want to build a defense industry need to know exactly what interests they are trying to advance by doing so. Generally, governments have two main objectives in developing a domestic defense industry: economic diversification and national security. Since defense spending is a large part of a government's budget, many countries do it because they want an indigenous capability to train, equip and supply its own security forces while stimulating its own economy. This is the basic principle behind an import substitution industrialization policy

that many developing countries have tried to use to build domestic industries. Being able to support national armed forces helps support local industrial and manufacturing companies, decrease the need for foreign currency to import defense requirements and helps governments gain domestic legitimacy by providing more local jobs. A successful domestic defense industry can also provide an opportunity for countries to diversify their economy and increase exports.

Some countries build a domestic defense industry primarily for national security purposes. If there is less dependence on foreign countries, then a country can develop its own defense capabilities based on its own needs and can do it without revealing state secrets. The Egyptian military, the largest in the Arab world, has been very secretive about its military industries and spending partly out of a desire to not reveal state strengths and weaknesses in the security sector. Egypt doesn't publish its defense spending numbers or its defense exports and outlaws news coverage of its military enterprises.



During the 1960s, Egypt accelerated development of its defense industrial complex due to Egypt's leading role in the rise of pan-Arabism and in 1975 entered into a partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE called the Arab Organization for Industrialization (though Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave their shares in the organization back to Egypt in 1993). Egypt's industrial complex, while not as active as it was in the 1960s and 1970s, still influences Egyptian civil-military relations and is an integral part of Egypt's economy. While a country, such as Egypt, may link geo-political goals to building its defense industry based on a certain regional or international environment, a change in the environment can often alter the original purpose of having the defense industry. South Africa built a defense industry during the 1960s and 1970s when it anticipated the international community would impose arms embargos on South Africa defend its apartheid policy. After apartheid was abolished in 1994, the new South African country had to decide how much it wanted to support the defense industry. In South America Brazil began building a defense industry in the 1960s when its military government wanted more autonomy to manage a security state. However, after a civilian government replaced the military regime in the 1980s, Brazil

decided to privatize its defense industry. Reasons for building a defense industry may change, so it is important to invest in fungible capabilities that can be easily adapted to other industries in case the political and security landscape changes.

Identifying why a state is pursuing a domestic defense industry will help prioritize expenditure of resources, improve efficiency and prevent the country from failure in its endeavor. States must understand and prepare for achievable goals in developing a defense industry before embarking on ambitious projects. If not, it is likely to have the fate of many states and companies that have failed to achieve their objectives because they were either too broad or too ambitious in their endeavor without linking their industry to achievable goals.

UAE Defense Industry and Main Assumptions

During the early 1990s, the UAE began to build its own indigenous defense industry. This was in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the UAE had been a central base to the naval and air components of the war. The initial intention of building domestic defense capabilities was to include the defense industry in efforts to diversify the UAE's economy and take advantage of the expertise of the many foreign

defense companies that worked through the UAE during the war. The UAE's defense industry started with the establishment of the UAE Offset Program (which turned into the Tawazun Economic Council in 2012) and it oversaw the first off-set joint venture with Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding Company (ADSC) in 1995.

Establishing the ADSC made sense because of the domestic shipping industry in the UAE and the use of UAE ports for commercial and defense purposes. After the ADSC was established, the defense industry expanded into guided missile productions, wheeled land systems, aerospace maintenance, repair and overhaul, naval construction and repair, engineering services, munitions and small arms.

The UAE's defense industry has evolved in the last twenty years to now focus on high-tech, small scale defense manufacturing and servicing. The reason for this strategy is that low-tech, labor-intensive industries are not in harmony with the intended direction of the UAE's indigenous work force and industrial base. The UAE has an interest in reducing its reliance on low-skill labor-intensive industries. By focusing on low-scale, high-tech products such as unmanned aerial systems, defense electronics, cyber warfare, night-vision systems and military communications, the UAE could link its large investments in the industrial and ICT sectors to its defense industry.

One of the vital components of developing a defense industry is the industrial and manufacturing base of the country. With a small population and limited human capital and industrial base, the UAE has to carefully choose which industries it can adapt to its defense needs and pursue economies of scale to be a competitive producer of its defense products. High-tech defense capabilities require large R & D investments and technology transfer. They also require cut-



throat innovation to remain competitive. The UAE's current high-tech, small-scale strategy relies on joint ventures with foreign firms and contractual requirements which ensure technology transfer and high-skill labor to the UAE. The key will be how to convince cutting edge international defense companies to partner with the UAE in joint ventures when many of these companies guard their intellectual property. One way to do this is to offer funding for future joint R & D projects in which the UAE plays a partner role in developing the new technology.

Opportunities

There are compelling opportunities for the UAE to build its defense sector. Gulf countries are lucrative clients for Western and Eastern defense companies. GCC defense



spending, accounts for 83 percent of the total defense spending of the Middle East. In 2014, the MENA region spent \$140 billion on defense purchases, which was a 30 percent increase from 2011. At nearly \$20 billion in defense spending per year, the UAE is the 15th largest defense spender and fourth largest defense importer in the world. With deep involvement in the international

in regional security, it would be safe to assume UAE defense spending will likely increase in the future. The logistics of such operations require high-tech maintenance services. With more indigenous defense capabilities, the UAE can be a hub not only for its own defense expenditure, but the expenditure of its allied partners in these regional and international coalitions. Without

a robust regional defense industry, much of the money spent by GCC countries and their regional allies such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, will end up in Western and Eastern countries. Increasing defense industry capabilities would recapture this money and expertise and give the UAE more independence and muscle in its foreign policy pursuits. It would also help diversify the domestic economy, which is a high priority for the UAE government. While government revenues may decrease due to fluctuations in oil prices, a local defense industry can help provide defense requirements during times of austerity and also provide high paying jobs to UAE nationals. Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development Ali Majid al-Mansoori



said the UAE's defense industry is the cornerstone of the country's economic diversification strategy. In fact, EDIC was established to create more opportunities for the defense industry to grow. By bringing the UAE defense companies under one umbrella and providing a one-stop shop for defense spending and development, the UAE will reduce redundant development, increase collaboration and share expertise on defense projects. Being able to build a defense industry from scratch is an opportunity for the UAE to build it on a solid foundation. Among the challenges faced by countries with established defense industries are duplication of efforts, entrenched institutional interests and inefficient spending. Consolidation will also give the UAE government more control over defense spending. For example, in the United States different branches of the armed forces develop their own defense requirements without significant cooperation with their sister branches. The Navy develops its own helicopters differently than the

Army, Air Force or even the Coast Guard. The logistics of developed weapon systems and other defense capabilities requires much R & D. Because the different services compete for government money, they have to invest in their lobbying capabilities to receive the required funding not only to do the R & D, but also to build and maintain the product. High cost defense projects, such as aircraft carriers, fighter-jets and missile defense, can lead to inefficient uses of state money. In order to improve this inefficient system of procurement, the US Congress, which funds the US government, passed a law in the 1980s (Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986) to force the military to improve coordination and inter-agency cooperation. However, the fact that a law is passed, doesn't really mean that its goal is realized. There are entrenched interests within the US Congress, the armed service institutions and their defense industry counterparts that prevent government efforts to consolidate and synthesize defense capabilities.

One clear example of this was in 2013 during the US government sequestration when the US Army Chief Raymond Odierno testified in front of the US Congress about the Army's defense budget. Knowing that he was expected to cut the Army's budget, he prioritized the Army's procurement requirements and told the US Congress that the Army didn't need as many M-1 tanks as the Congress had approved and that instead of producing more tanks, the Army needed the money for more high-tech unconventional weapons. A Congressman responded to General Odierno's explanation saying the military needed the tanks, contrary to the Army's professional assessment. Not surprisingly the M-1 tanks were produced in this Congressman's state, Ohio. Political realities and entrenched institutional interests can prevent governments from reforming their defense industries. Therefore, a state embarking on developing a new defense industry can learn the lessons from other's mistakes. By consolidating its defense industry,



the UAE will be better able to control its defense spending and increase efficiency.

Challenges

EDIC's Chairman Homaïd al-Shemmari admitted at the IDEX conference that success of the UAE's defense industry strategy relies on Emiratis being interested to gain the skills necessary to support the high-tech requirements. The UAE cannot rely on foreign labor to build a sustainable defense industry. Without Emiratis investing their own human capital into the industry, the UAE cannot achieve its goal. This presents the same challenge that other small nations have faced when they tried to build a defense industry: competition with the private sector for high-skilled labor. The UAE seeks to have a knowledge-based economy and recognizes the need to have more of its citizens leading in the private sector. With over 90 percent of Emiratis working in the public sector, there is a small pool of local human capital that supports the private sector, let alone be devoted to serving the defense industry. The private sector is an engine for innovation, as it is based on competition. However, building the private sector industry and building a defense industry require different business models and skill sets. While the private and public sectors can feed off of each other and cooperate in joint projects, countries with larger labor pools and industrial bases are able to cross-pollinate ideas easier as there is a larger market of human capital to choose from. However, with a very limited presence of UAE nationals in the private sector, the UAE will have to ensure that its defense industry does not hemorrhage the human capital needed to develop the private sector. The government will have to prioritize the orientation of its defense industry policy so that it can complement private sector development and not hinder it. If the government seeks more economic

diversity through its defense industry, as it has stated in the past, then it will need to adopt a business model that relies on competition, innovation and free-market capitalism. It will need to specialize in niche markets to gain and maintain a competitive advantage.

Another challenge to the UAE's defense industry is regional competition. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan have defense industries at different stages, and also intend to use their defense industries as a means for economic diversification. They are in a similar situation as the UAE, though the UAE is further ahead in its development. Those who leverage and maintain their comparative advantage will be able to benefit the most. The UAE's competitive advantage is that it has a more open business environment for off-set programs and other business development. It has the needed infrastructure and international presence to attract the type of partnerships needed for joint ventures in R & D. The UAE's free trading zones are attractive to potential foreign partners in defense development, research and manufacturing. However, Saudi Arabia has a larger indigenous labor base and has more potential for a broader defense industry that relies on domestic human capital. It also has more resources available to build an enduring infant industry if needed. Qatar's comparative advantage is similar to the UAE's, however, being a city-state, Qatar is better positioned to implement policies because of less bureaucratic and political hurdles. On the other hand, Jordan has been building its defense industry since 1999 with the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) and has a much more robust high-skilled labor pool to service its defense industry requirements.

GCC countries seeking to build their defense industries could learn lessons from the European Union and NATO. There is stiff competition

between EU member states that have different priorities for their defense industries and there is often duplication of effort. These countries have entrenched bureaucracies and it's difficult to reform them in a way that would give the EU a more unified and efficient defense industry. GCC countries could benefit from coordinating their respective defense interests so they can build off of each other's investments and competitive advantages. The current Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is an opportunity for GCC countries to study areas of cooperation and coordination in order to support and complement each other's defense industries. The challenge, though, is when allied countries have conflicts of interests that keep them from working together on joint projects. If the purpose of the defense industry is economic, this might cause more conflicts of interest. However, if the purpose is more defense and security and the GCC countries envision more joint operations in the future, then there might be more political will for regional integration of defense industry capabilities.





Despite its small population, the UAE can specialize in certain areas that can make it a formidable competitor in the global defense industry. But it will have to incentivize Emiratis to work in the defense sector without jeopardizing the private sector and it will have to maintain its competitive edge against countries in the region seeking to build their own defense industries.

On the Horizon

GCC countries still rely on the US for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance in the region. This has been illustrated by the recent Saudi-led operations in Yemen, with the US providing vital intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance support. When asked at IDEX where the UAE should invest in its future defense capabilities in order to protect its border along the Arabian Gulf, Executive Vice-President of Lockheed Martin Patrick Dewar said he would give more priority to intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities rather than more expensive and fixed missile defense systems. While the advice

of a large defense contractor with significant interest in selling the UAE defense products should be received with caution, it is also worth serious consideration. Correctly assessing the international and regional environment is essential for protecting the UAE, whether through border security or financial markets. Continual critical analysis of threats to and opportunities for advancing the UAE's national interests is fundamental to determining the direction of the UAE's national defense industry.

The UAE is already making strides in the maintenance, repair and overhaul sector, but the next step will be to determine how the UAE's private and public sector efforts can complement each other rather than compete for resources in developing its low-scale, high tech defense industry. The UAE could also coordinate more with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and other Arab countries developing defense industries to benefit from their respective strengths. Joint ventures between Arab allies rather than just with Western and Eastern

allies would set the stage for future cooperation and coordination in establishing a regional defense industry that benefits from the strengths of each member. The GCC is already in talks about decreasing trade barriers and having more economic integration. The defense industry could be an important part of future trade between GCC countries.

Education is also a vital part of having a sustainable defense industry. The link between research institutions, higher education and the public and private sectors helps facilitate effective innovation. The UAE National Defense College (NDC) in Abu Dhabi is a prime location to help develop the country's defense industry. NDC participants represent the majority of UAE federal and local national security related ministries, agencies and companies. The NDC is the intellectual embodiment of the whole-of-government approach to achieving national interests. The critical thinking skills and national security education integrated into the NDC's curriculum provides the UAE government an education tool to help link the UAE defense industry to complementary, not competing, national objectives. Whether the objective is achieving a diversified knowledge-based economy or a more autonomous defense strategy, the UAE must be able to correctly assess and prioritize the interests and objectives and the trade-offs involved in building a national defense industry. The UAE has been leading the region in developing its defense industry capabilities, but now is the time for more concentrated efforts to consolidate, synthesize and synergize efforts so that the UAE can avoid the fate of other countries and companies that have done well at the start of their ambitious defense industry experience, but could not make it sustainable when they failed to adapt it to national and international realities.





By:
Hashem Al Hashemi

Do Economic Sanctions Compel States to Comply or are they ineffective?

Various approaches have been used throughout history to enforce policies and sanctions in other states. One such approach is the use of economic sanctions. International organizations or States impose economic sanctions to force compliance with certain requirements (Haass, 1998). Different research studies consider economic sanctions to be an ineffective tool for states to comply with international community treaties. According Marcus (2010), states are less likely to comply with the international community when economic sanctions are used as the only means of compliance. Historical accounts of economic sanctions reveal that they have not been effective in compelling individual states to abide by international treaties.

Historical Overview of Economic Sanctions

As a blunt tool of diplomacy, the concept of sanctions has been around since the civilizations of ancient Greeks, when Athens imposed a trade embargo on its neighbor, Megara. Since then, there has been a history of countries blockading their enemies

in their quest to compel a change in behavior (Paulson, 1999). Economic sanctions have increased tremendously during the twentieth century (Evans, 2011). For instance, the number of economic sanctions increased steadily from two cases during the 1920s to about twenty cases in the 1980s (Paulson, 1999). Despite the widespread use of economic sanctions, the traditional scholarly perception of economic sanctions is that sanctions are unsuccessful in terms of achieving their intended policy objectives.

Throughout history, economic sanctions are an important form of the maritime barrier, with an intention of weakening the adversary state. In America, during the First World War, economic sanctions were first considered by President Woodrow Wilson, who sought alternatives to war. According to President Woodrow





used economic sanctions against states perceived to be perpetuating practices that offend or are harmful to human (Haass, 1998).

United States Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions have a number of objectives. The term economic sanction is the intentional withdrawal of state support, the retraction of accustomed business or economic affiliations between states (Haass, 1998). In this case, the term accustomed refers to the position of a business or commercial enterprise that in all probability could have taken place in the absence of a sanction. Many countries and organizations find economic sanctions as an effective strategy for the achievement of political goals. The motive behind the employment of economic sanctions is parallel to the three fundamental reasons for civic deplorable laws: to deter, to punish and to rehabilitate (Haass, 1998).

Exclusive States as well as several ad hoc coalitions quite often impose sanctions in a bid to gain a vast array of alien objectives even when the credibility of compelling a conversion in the aiming policy of the country is minimal. Economic sanctions are aimed to demonstrate firmness and an indication of anger to the instant trespasser.

Members of Congress influence economic sanctions, arguing they are acting for their devoted balloters. For instance, the Americans, Europeans, and the British imposed Commonwealth sanctions on South Africa between 1985 and 1991. The

American, European, and Japanese sanctions against Burma in 1988, were principally designed for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons were: to alleviate devoted electors, to form upright as well as historical statements and also to caution forthcoming trespassers of the cosmopolitan order (Haass, 1998).

The effects of the economic sanctions in South Africa were effective in compelling the South African white regime relinquish power to the blacks and put an end to apartheid. The sanctions played a conservative role in the termination of apartheid in South Africa (Haass, 1998). The economic sanctions, as well as the political conditions within the South African nation, were quite significant in influencing the end results. At first, the sanctions did not in any way compel the National party in South Africa to terminate apartheid, but by the increased cost of economic sanctions hastened the urge to end apartheid.

Scholars have frequently concluded that the preferences to imposing economic sanctions were not satisfactory. For instance, military intervention would be too expensive, and the diplomatic protest would be immense. Sanctions can give a successful theatrical display and yet prevent the expenses of conflict. This, however, does not mean that sanctions are not expensive; they are somewhat cheaper, hence preferable as compared to their alternatives (Haass, 1998).

Institutionally endorsed sanctions were very rare prior to the 1990s. The League of Nations imposed economic sanctions in the 1920s and the 1930s in four incidents. The League of Nations was successful in two events such as the Ethiopian conquests and the cold war. However, the league reversed the use of economic sanctions from antiquity when its ineffective reaction ceased to divert the conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936. Liberated from the constraints of superpower

Wilson, economic sanctions would be effective coercive measures against aggressive states (Paulson, 1999). The economic sanctions were then adopted as effective strategies of compulsory law for the composite protection arrangements that had been established during the twentieth century. Consequently, economic sanctions were used by the League of Nations during the First World War and the Second World War, and between the United Nations after the Second World War (Haass, 1998).

The greatest economic sanctions were imposed by the United Nations against Iraq during the period of 1990 to 2003. Furthermore, the United Nations economic sanctions, and major powers such as the United States (US) continue the deployment of unilateral economic sanctions (Haass, 1998). Since the 1990s, economic sanctions have had specific targets such as state leaders, drugs cartels, and radicals in society (Paulson, 1999). These economic sanctions aim to restrain the beneficent fallout, due to comprehensive sanctions. For decades, powerful nations, such as the U.S., have consistently

rivalry, the United Nations was involved in taking up a bigger role in cosmopolitan affairs (Haass, 1998). Nevertheless, in various instances, the new sanctions did not have a significant impact on the central powers and therefore only failing advocated arms restrictions were employed (Haass, 1998). For these reasons, the successes of the United Nations sanctions were short lived. Examples of failed economic sanctions include; those imposed upon Libya to counter attacks from the radicals (Griswold, 2000). Overall, most of the United Nations sanctions have failed in the achievement of their objectives.

In various scenarios, penalties are mainly imposed for signaling purposes. Imposing sanctions is for the advantage of the accomplices, various other parties or the devoted audience. However, it is significant to note that the intended message of sanctions is not received at all times. In some cases, sanctions are faced with intense complaints from domestic alliances that may have

been injured, and this compels for the cancelation of the policy even before it matures. Sanctions that are intended to alter the administration of a target nation are much more involved when it comes to their design (Griswold, 2000). In such scenarios, countenances have to be imposed quite fast and in a manner that is comprehensible. One mean of proposing some alterations is taking the time to get accustomed to different suppliers or merchandise. This is achieved through the formation of fresh alliances and also by activating domestic ideas in abutment of their policies (Marcus, 2010).


The approach of imposing economic sanctions on the US as a tool for compelling compliance needs reform. This is because too often the laudable goals of America are ill-served by the independent efforts to constrain alterations in procedures and tactics of alien administrations. Quite often, the economic effects of economic sanctions in America are imposed by different suppliers of products and capital to administrations that comply with the American interests.


However, there are procedures for achieving punishment goals. In most cases, America does not make any preparations

for the revamping of the weakened economies after the imposition of economic sanctions.

Economic sanctions are effective means used by the US. Through a combination of diplomacy and sanctions, the American state tries to resolve and express outrage, alter the behaviors of an unfriendly nation, and deter other countries from emulating similar actions in the future. Economic sanctions do not achieve their objectives in isolation; rather, other measures are used by the US. These sanctions should maintain consistency when applied to the targeted nation and also should be incorporated into the general procedural response of the American government (Marcus, 2010). It is also important that sanctions be designed in such a way that they achieve the expected objectives.

The interests of the US while imposing sanctions vary in different states. As such, sanctions should be directed to the targeted regimes for effectiveness. It is, however, important to note that in the past years, the imposition of economic sanctions has evolved into a militant power (Marcus, 2010). Sanctions that are not effective have led to the American armed intervention in nations such as Iraq, Haiti and Somalia among others, in trying to strengthen the response of the US or in a bid to force alien administrations





to alter their procedures. For instance, in Iraq, President George W. Bush saw the quick distribution of military troops quite urgent in countering the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990.

During the past ten years, the United States have applied a number of foreign sanction laws against states perceived unfriendly. However, these sanctions are not always applied in a consistent manner and, therefore, send mixed signals of the US intent. For example, the threat of the American sanctions did not dissuade India and Pakistan from building atomic weapons (Haass, 1998). This is because both nations explained that they had national safety concerns at stake. Based on failed experience of the US economic sanctions, countries such as Iran are not bothered by the US sanctions and have continued with their nuclear program.

Iran's Response to Economic Sanctions

In response to the continued illicit nuclear activities committed by Iran, the US and other nations have employed unprecedented countenances to lock Iran out and curb its further development in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons.

It was further a way to address the concerns that the international community had with regards to its nuclear program (Gloria-Cente.org, 2015).

The US sanctions on Iran have terminated all trading ties between the two nations. Iran has had a history of being quite rebellious towards the U.S. administration (Heard, 2013). However, during the Cold War, Iran was a close ally of the U.S. in deterring the proliferation of communism in East Asia.

Economic affiliations between the two nations have been constrained further by a series of investment sanctions that have had an adverse effect on the Iranian economy. Iran has continued to produce close to three-quarters of the low-enriched uranium (LEU) that can build an atomic bomb. Iran's production of LEU is against the UN Security Council resolution that required Iran to cease all activities aimed at LEU enrichment. Iran has also taken the option of ignoring several other international legal treaties. For instance, the brutal response by the Iranian regime on post-election protests was against the international responsibility of human rights.

In addition, Iran has continuously supported terrorist groups across the Middle Eastern region. As previously illustrated, different states respond differently to economic sanctions. Iran's increased rebelliousness is one such case (Haidar, 2015). Iraq was another state that responded harshly to economic sanctions imposed by the U.S.

Iraq's Response to Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions that have been imposed upon Iraq by the US, have caused the untimely deaths of more than one million children who are less than five years of age (Wilson, 2015). In reacting to these economic sanctions, Iraq has used different strategies. For example, Iraq threatened to destroy U.S. oil

tankers in the Arabian Gulf in a bid to retaliate. This forced the U.S. to dispatch a naval force to secure the shipping lanes. Iraq has also invaded Kuwait in 1990, which called for the U.S. to offer protection to other nations during the war (Wilson, 2015). Indeed, Iraq's response to the U.S. economic sanctions was different from Iran's (Wilson, 2015). Similarly, Iraq's response to the U.S. economic sanctions were different to that of the Libyan regime, which will be examined next (Wilson, 2015).

Libya's Response to Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions that were imposed on Libya by the U.S. involved the freezing of Libya's all assets abroad, despite the fact that they had very little economic impact for Libya (Armscontrol.org, 2015). The U.S. strongly condemned the violent crackdown on protesters by the Libya government after the disputed presidential election. Furthermore, the U.S. also closed its embassy in Tripoli. Libya was perceived by the U.S. as a state sponsor of terrorism. Therefore, some of the sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Libya included the prohibition of arms exports and the termination of the department of defense contracts (Armscontrol.org, 2015).

Additionally, international loans to Libya have been opposed by the international financial institutions such as IMF. Furthermore, other sanctions were imposed on export controls on dual-use items. However, there was a decision to lift the sanctions in a bid to try and improve relations with Tripoli. Tripoli pledged to give up its nuclear weapons, as well as the chemical weapons and the longer range missiles. However, the U.S. sanctions have always been met with challenges, especially due to diverse diplomatic relations with other Arab countries. For instance, while the U.S. has strong diplomatic relationships with the UAE, Libya



has religious links with the UAE. This makes U.S. sanctions on other Arab countries face challenges.

The UAE Link and Its Impact

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has a very stable economy through exhibitions, conferences and trade shows. The UAE attracted over three million visitors in the year 2010, contributing millions of dollars to the local economy while the multitude of events in the region continues to grow. The UAE is the eighth largest oil producer in the world, and it maintains a free market economy. It is also one of the most politically stable and secures countries in the region. Economic growth in the UAE is quite steady despite a short-lived financial crisis that impacted the whole world (Evans, 2011).

The recovery was greatly supported by high prices of oil, increased government spending and resurgence in tourism, transport and trade. In addition, there was the successful restructuring of debt that was owed by high profile corporate firms, solidarity among the emirates and accommodative monetary and fiscal policies. All these factors played a significant role in bringing great economic stability to the market.



The gross domestic product in the UAE rose to over 400 billion dollars and the International Monetary Fund predicts that the gross domestic product will continue to grow at a rate of about four to five percent for the duration of the next seven years. Despite the high economic performance, the rates of inflation are expected to remain between two and three percent (Evans, 2011).

Oil is the primary source of economic growth in the UAE. The economic diversification in the UAE has non-oil sectors accounting for sixty-nine percent of the gross domestic product, with oil supplying the remaining third (Evans, 2011). The UAE has effective economic strategies to increase investment in the industrial sector as well as in other export-oriented industries. The non-oil sectors include; the heavy industry, transport, petrochemicals, tourism, information communication and technology, renewable energy, aviation and space, and oil and gas services (Evans, 2011). Quite a lot has already been achieved in these fields, especially in satellite and telecommunications, the aviation sector and in renewable energy (Heard, 2013). Despite the fact that short-term priorities have been altered to create room for the changing realities, the long-term strategies remain the same.

Trade has played quite a significant role in the UAE's economic life

for so many decades since the industrialization period. One of the factors that have greatly favored trade in the United Arab Emirates is the strategic geographical position of the country. The UAE investments in airports, ports, and services, as well as an enabling business environment, have made the United Arab Emirates an important trading hub that connects regional markets to the outside world (Heard, 2013). Even more so, the steady recovery of most economic sectors has led to the increase of foreign trade. This economic stability makes the UAE a favorable financial investment and leveraging ground for U.S. foreign policy in Middle East (Khan, 2013).

Economic Impacts on UAE

The UAE economy is the most carefully integrated with all the Arab economies. The stability of the UAE economy integrates the Arab countries economies into the global economic system (Khan, 2013). The results have been a friendly business environment for the country in as more efforts are implemented on trade and attract the inflow of foreign direct investment. These efforts will play a great role in the achievement of a balanced and sustainable development. This process continues through the signature of many bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements.

From a local point of view, UAE economic stability efforts have embraced reforms and the updating



of legislation. These reforms are inclusive of new free markets and were implemented in the year 2014. The new law regulates economic activities and exploitation of intellectual property rights. This is expected to promote competition as well as contribute to efforts that meet the objectives of building a future economy that is based on knowledge. UAE economic impact is far reaching. In particular, the stability of UAE makes it a favorable state of facilitating economic and political stability in other Arab countries (Khan, 2013).

UAE National Security and Iran's Nuclear Program

The United Arab Emirates UAE has significantly expressed its commitment to protecting the Middle East from building atomic weapons (Khan, 2013). In particular, the UAE has shown commitment by compelling Iran to abide by the United Nations regulations. Despite the international fear that Iran is building up nuclear weapons, Iran has repeatedly reiterated that its atomic program is solely for power energy production (Khan, 2013). However, Iran is dishonest in its nuclear plans and consistently denies the Security Council Agency permission to assess its nuclear programs (Khan, 2013). Therefore, the UAE's stability is significant in supporting international efforts on compelling Iran to desist from its nuclear production as part of enhancing security in the Middle East region. The UAE is also an important player in compelling Iran to recede its nuclear program especially after decades of U.S. failed economic sanctions (Evans, 2011).

The ineffective use of economic sanctions clearly shows the kind of massive damage that countenances may cause. Therefore, there is a high probability in influencing the character of the country that is in the spotlight. The costs of such countenances are often not acceptable, and they make

international support quite unlikely.

Alternative tools/instruments adopted

There are alternative tools or instruments that may be adopted in place of economic sanctions. For instance, incentives could be used as one alternative. Scholars argue that incentives should be combined with sanctions, or they can just be employed on behalf of economic sanctions (Evans, 2011). The use of incentives as an alternative tool or instrument makes possible the opportunity of preventing violent wars and also settling on a civic objective. Incentives convey the message of hope and that nations involved can cooperate for the purpose of good will.

Sanctions carry the message of antagonism and are therefore met with worry, apprehension and animosity (Evans, 2011). Incentives could be viewed as a bribe because they do not come with the kind of force and pressure that economic sanctions come with. That is the reason incentives once used as an alternative instrument have had a very little chance of provoking stubborn behavior (Haass, 1998). When different sectors of the community are excluded as the target of economic sanctions, incentives relieve the negative implication. Therefore, incentives boost the support of significant alterations in various sectors of the community through conceivable advantages if and when the administration is willing to cooperate.

Conclusion

Historically, sanctions have proven to be a rather ineffective means of forcing states to comply and abide by certain requirements. The imposition of economic sanctions shows that most countries are threatened by such actions and thus try to find other ways to overcome them. However, this could make a country resilient or vulnerable to other threats. Therefore, it is important that states imposing

sanctions to ascertain the indirect effects and the costs to be incurred through sanctions on the victim states. Sanctions make some states rebel and result in other retrogressive ways such as terrorism.

References

- Armscontrol.org. 2015. "U.S. Lifts Remaining Economic Sanctions Against Libya." Arms Control Association. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Libya.
- Evans, Gareth (29 June 2011). "Middle Power Diplomacy." Retrieved 26 April 2015.
- Haidar, J.I., 2015. "Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran," Paris School of Economics, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, Mimeo
- Haass, Richard N. 1998. Economic sanctions and American diplomacy. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press.
- Heard, David. 2013. From Pearls to Oil. Motivate (UAE). pp. 413-416.
- Gloria-center.org. 2015. "A Study of Iran's Responses to U.S. Economic Sanctions," <http://www.gloria-center.org/199909/estelami-199905-09/>.
- Griswold, Daniel (200027-11-). "Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes | Cato Institute". Cato.org. Retrieved 201526-4-
- Marcus, Jonathan. 2010. "Analysis: Do Economic Sanctions Work? - BBC News". Bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2015-04-26.
- Paulson, Michael 1999. "US: History of U.S sanctions shows most have not worked." Corp Watch. Retrieved from <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14581>
- Khan, Taimur. 2013. "UAE Is Committed To Keeping Middle East Free Of Nuclear Weapons." The National . <http://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-is-committed-to-keeping-middle-east-free-of-nuclear-weapons>.
- Wilson, Brian S. 2015. "U.S. Aggression against Iraq: Historical and Political Context". <http://www.brianwillson.com/u-s-aggression-against-iraq-historical-and-political-context/>.



By:
Samuel R. Greene
Ph.D.

&
Misha Dauphinais-
Matheson

From Princes to Paupers:

Lessons from Nauru for Resource-Reliant States



The rise and fall of the micro-state of Nauru has important lessons for other resource-reliant states. Nauru's export of phosphates made its citizens some of the richest in the world in the 1970s and early 1980s. But upon exhausting its natural resource wealth, Nauru had unsustainable debts that forced it to liquidate its financial reserves. Today, Nauru's impoverished population relies on revenue for housing refugees seeking asylum in Australia and foreign aid. This paper highlights three lessons from Nauru's fall. First, it explores the challenges of sustainability of investments and of managing prestige spending. Second, it examines the importance of meaningful economic diversification and sustainable spending. Third, it reviews the consequences of the absence of high-quality

management practices. As resource-reliant states consider the future of their citizens after the depletion of their natural resource reserves, learning from Nauru's failures can help such states secure a prosperous future for their people.

Nauru: An Overview

The Republic of Nauru is a raised coral island in Micronesia. It measures just 21 square kilometers and has a population of about 10,000 (Central Intelligence Agency 2015). When Nauru gained independence in 1968 from a joint mandate shared by the UK, Australia, and New Zealand (Tate 1968, 177179-), natural resource wealth was expected to provide the basis for long-term development and prosperity (Connell 2006, 49). The island's soil held over 50 million tons of one of the world's highest-grade deposits of phosphate (Tabucanon and Opeskin 2011, 339).



Between 1968 and 2002, Nauru is estimated to have mined over 43 million tons of that phosphate, earning a total income of \$3.6 billion (Connell 2006, 54; Robinson 2010). Its GDP per capita was among the highest in the world in the 1970s (McQuade 1975, 133). Moreover, throughout those years of prosperity, resource rents were invested for the future in a variety of assets through the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust (NPRT). At its peak in the 1980's, the trust had reached capital reserves of over \$1 billion and owned assets worth billions more (The Economist 2001).

By 2006, the island's primary phosphate deposits had been exhausted (Connell 2006, 54). With its main source of revenue gone, per capita income dropped drastically (Asian Development Bank 2000, 3). Far from providing for the future, the NPRT became insolvent, had most of its assets seized by international creditors, and was later liquidated for a fraction of its peak worth (Government of Australia 2014, 2). Nauru now relies on revenue for housing refugees seeking asylum in Australia as well as on other forms of assistance from Australia and the Asian Development Bank (Government of Australia 2014, 3; Asian Development Bank 2014, 1). As resource-rich states contemplate life after hydrocarbons and minerals, Nauru's failure provides important insights.

The Nauruan Failure

The reasons for Nauru's failure to secure a prosperous future for its people are threefold. First, Nauru's prestige investments lacked high-growth potential and could not secure positive returns. Second, the Government of Nauru engaged in unsustainable public spending and did not foster economic diversification or citizen education. Third, there was a manifest absence of high-quality management practices of the nation's natural resource wealth.

The Weakness of Prestige Investments

Nauru primarily invested its resource rents in two areas: property markets and the transportation sector. It acquired and constructed office buildings, hotels, a shopping center in Melbourne, a brewery in the Solomon Islands, and it made large investments in land and real estate in the US and Britain. Despite assumptions that prestige investments would lead to high returns, the property investments proved unsustainable in the long-term, providing neither high-growth potential nor positive returns (Connell 2006, 52; Robinson 2010). Nauru also invested heavily in the creation and expansion of Air Nauru. At its peak, Air Nauru boasted a fleet of five 737s, but it flew extremely unprofitable routes with very low passenger loads (Robinson 2010; CAPA 2014; The Economist 2001). Realistic assessments of its business model showed little promise of financial return or potential for growth. In fact, until the 1990s, the airline operated at substantial financial losses of about a third of the national budget (Connell 2006, 52). Air Nauru was insolvent by 2005, forcing a one-year hiatus of operations (Export-Import Bank of the US 2005; Marks 2008). It was a manifestly unsustainable prestige investment. Nauru's assumptions that property markets and transportation would be profitable were based on the inaccurate supposition that prestige projects would necessarily provide high returns rather than the soundness of the investment.

Prestige projects are tempting investments, but as states look to a future with limited resource returns, they should seek to make sure projections are rooted in clear economic logic rather than optimistic assumptions. Both Oman and Bahrain, for example, have invested heavily in state airlines and airports, and have subsidized years of losses for their state-owned carriers with the expectation of future profits



despite a crowded regional market (CAPA 2012). Given the limited time horizon of natural resource wealth, states should ensure that such projections are truly based on sound economic reasoning rather than the seduction of prestige.

Economic Diversification and Sustainable Spending

Unsustainable public spending and the absence of economic diversity in the form of private sector involvement in the economy also contributed to Nauru's fall from prosperity. There are three salient examples of this. First, services and utilities in Nauru were either subsidized or provided at no cost by the government. Second, Nauru's citizens desired well-paying, prestigious employment that could support high living standards, which the public sector offered (Connell 2006, 50-51). Third, there were no minimum education requirements for employment in the public sector (Asian Development Bank 2000, 3). As a result, Nauru failed to develop a skilled workforce and skilled workers were simply imported from elsewhere in the region (Connell 2006, 51; Asian Development Bank 2000, 3). These practices stifled economic diversity and private sector involvement in the economy. In sum, Nauru's failure to prepare its population for a post-resource age



points to the importance of fostering economic diversification, citizen education, and sustainable public spending and budgeting practices. While all of the Gulf states have invested in economic diversification and promoted citizen work in the private sector through programs such as Emiratization and Omanization, many assessments point to only “modest” gains to date in both the development of industries that are profitable without subsidies and in developing human capital among citizens. In particular, it is imperative that citizens pursue education in fields that will allow employment in the private sector and in critical skilled positions, as well as an economic model that incentivizes this work (Hvidt 2013; Callen et al 2014).

At the same time, Gulf States should carefully balance spending obligations with their need to invest in the future and create a sustainable social order. Most states heavily subsidize basic goods and services and provide an ample social safety net from national revenue coupled with no taxation of income. Public sector jobs, which are funded from

resource rents, offer higher pay and fewer hours than private sector work (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011). Balancing public spending and the provision of subsidies with the imperatives of diversification and investment for the future will be a central challenge for many Gulf States.

Absence of High-quality Management Practices

While natural resource wealth demands “superior economic management” to maximize returns, in Nauru, much of the resource rents were lost as a result of poor management and lack of oversight (Chand 2006, 1415-). Nauru’s investment suffered from both corruption and incompetence. Both NPRT workers and financial advisers engaged in numerous instances of fraud and embezzlement (Seneviratne 1999; Connell 2006, 5253-). Nauru’s government contracted investment advisers to carry out the country’s investment decisions; today they are recognized for having systematically mismanaged the nation’s natural resource wealth that was not

misdirected by graft (Connell 2006, 50-51). Indeed, the Centre for Independent Studies estimated that if Nauru’s phosphate profits had been conservatively invested in long-term investments, the nation would have earned about \$8 billion instead of actual estimated profits of around \$3.6 billion (Robinson 2010).

Strong institutions and horizontal accountability can protect against this fate. In the Gulf, only the UAE and Qatar perform well in assessments of levels of corruption and institutional quality (TI 2014). States with medium and high levels of corruption and weak institutions should prioritize the strengthening of institutional performance, as this will safeguard against profiteering and corruption. States that have developed quality institutional performance should prioritize their maintenance. Even in states with strong institutional safeguards against corruption, oversight of the management of national investments can help avoid the disastrous divisions made by Nauru’s advisers. One way to accomplish this is via recursive horizontal





accountability, which describes cross-departmental oversight of key decisions: "A is accountable to B, who is accountable to C, who is accountable to A again (Schedler 1999, 26)." Strong supervision of investments across government will help states avoid Nauru's fate where investment managers faced little scrutiny from the rest of government until much of Nauru's wealth had evaporated from poor management and corruption.

Conclusion

As resource-rich states contemplate their future beyond the extraction of resources, Nauru's failings can be avoided. By emphasizing investments with strong returns rather than unproven prestige projects that promise uncertain results, pursuing economic diversification and establishing sustainable practices of living and spending, and developing strong institutions and inter-governmental oversight of investment, resource rich states can pass on their current prosperity to future generations after natural resources are exhausted.

Bibliography

Asian Development Bank. 2000. Country Assistance Plan, 2001-2003: Republic of Nauru. Manila: Philippines.

Asian Development Bank. 2014. Nauru: Fact Sheet. Manila, Philippines.

Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2014. Aid Program Performance Report 2013-2014: Nauru. Canberra: Australia.

CAPA Centre for Aviation. 2012. "Oman Air reports record passengers, but also record losses" Wed. 1 April 2015.

CAPA Centre for Aviation. 2014. "Nauru Airlines begins new chapter with new brand & rapid growth despite world's smallest home market". Web. 20 March 2015.

Callen Timet al. 2014. "Economic Diversification in the GCC: The Past, the Present, and the Future" IMF Discussion Note December

Chand, Satish. 2006. "Economic growth in Forum Island Countries (FICs): Lessons of the past decade and opportunities ahead". International and Development Economics 06.08: 138-.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2015 "World Factbook: Nauru". Web. 16 March 2015

Connell, John. 2006. "Nauru: the first failed pacific state?". The Commonwealth Journal of International

Affairs 95.383: 4763-.

Forstenlechner, I. and Rutledge, E.J. 2011. "The GCC's 'Demographic Imbalance': Perceptions, Realities and Policy Options" Middle East Policy 18.4: 25-43.

Hughes, Helen. 2004. "From Riches to Rags: What Are Nauru's Options and How Can Australia Help?" Centre for Independent Studies Issue Analysis No. 50, Sydney.

Hvidt, Martin. 2013. "Economic diversification in GCC countries: past records and future trends", Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States. London: London School of Economics.

Marks, Kathy. 2008. "South Pacific tragedy: The island that had (and lost) everything". The Independent, 21 February.

McQuade, W. "The smallest richest republic in the world". Fortune, 92.6 (1975): 132-140.

"Paradise well and truly lost". The Economist 20 December 2001.

Robinson, Natasha. 2010. "Resurgence in sight but Nauru remains a sitting duck". The Australian 25 October.

Schedler, Andreas. 1999. "Conceptualizing Accountability" In The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. ed. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1328-.

Seneviratne, Kalinga. 1999. "Nauru turns to dust". Asia Times 26 May.

Tabucanon, Gil Marvel, and Opeskin, Brian. 2011. "The Resettlement of Nauruans in Australia". The Journal of Pacific History 46.3: 337-356.

Tate, Merze. 1968. "Nauru, Phosphate, and the Nauruans". Journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 7.3: 177-192.

Transparency International. 2014. "Corruption Perceptions Index" Web. 1 April 2015

United States. Export-Import Bank of the United States. 2005. Australian Courts Order Air Nauru to Surrender Aircraft to Export-Import Bank of the United States. Washington.

