Identity and Iranian Nationalism

Nationalism is a set of political movements arriving at particular times under specific leadership. Such description fits the historical accounts of Iran (formerly known as Persia) as it possessed a ‘national’ identity since the reign of King Cyrus in 550BC. Indeed, the characteristics of Iranian culture (aside from religion, as discussed above) have lasted for centuries and despite many conflicts and societal reforms in Iran, the Persian language, culture and traditions have endured.

When assessing national identity as a construct, in the context of Iran, tension between the centre and the periphery appears to be a constant thread between the five centuries of early modern and modern history of Iran, commencing with the state-promoted Shiism in the Safavid era, right up until the twentieth century, the discourse of identity is a perpetual theme in Iran’s history. In the Pahlavi era, conscious and largely homogenising national identity was underpinned by national sovereignty and ‘shared memories’ of the Persian Empire.  It is this history of the Persian Empire coupled with its ideology that both motivates Iran as a state to select certain regional policies, and influences the threat perception of Iran by regional states.

However, according to analysts ‘secularism is the twin brother of nationalism’ as a government founded on religion by default regards followers of other creeds and schools of thought as minorities, which prevents national unity. However, Shia Islam is an important component which galvanises an Iranian national identity, and since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the definition of being Iranian has been underpinned by a common faith as well as a broader shared culture and history. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is founded on a type of cultural hegemony, as well as Iranian nationalism. Arguably, the homogenising influence of religion acts as a safety-mechanism to override sub-ethnic and tribal loyalties, this certainly emerges as a key feature of the Arab Gulf regional structure and allegiances within this region. Religious ideology trumps ethnic and tribal loyalties, and this is evident in the Yemeni crisis and on a much larger scale, in the Syrian civil war. 

There is a frequent portrayal in Western scholarship of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (also known as the National Revolution of Iran or the 1979 Revolution) as ‘the ultimate defeat of nationalism at the hands of radical Islam’. However, some analysts regards such connotations as erroneous and explains that simplistic dichotomies and the contraposition of ‘Islamic identity’ and ‘national identity’, have presented nationalism in the Islamic Republic as a ‘deviation’ as opposed to an ‘integral part’ of the official doctrine. Islamo-nationalism became significant as a response to the evolving geopolitical scene of the late 1980s, and notably, in the case of Iran, nationalism did not emerge in opposition to religiosity and could arguably be regarded as a new form of religion in itself; thus, the amalgamated ideology is not self-contradictory, which it appears at first glance.

Indeed, ‘Khomeinism’ (a term coined after Khomeini’s influential ruling and continual doctrine of Iran) was a form of Iranian nationalism – a nativist response to essentially Western politics and culture. Indeed, influential Islamist intellectuals of the 1960s and 1970s such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Morteza Motahhari and Mehdi Bazargan argued that Iranians must, instead of submitting to the divisive and destructive nationalism that imperialist Western powers to disseminate in the Middle East, look inwards into their own history and religious traditions to formulate their own nationalism. In any revolutionary doctrine, there are generally three successive stages: mobilisation, legitimation, and consolidation; Khomeinism in Iran has fulfilled the first two stages with success but is facing difficulties with the third stage: consolidation. However, in the absence of any effective opposition forces, it is likely that the Islamic regime will continue to consolidate its power, albeit soften its ideology. This certainly appears to be the case when one looks at the Safavid empire due to the fact that Shia Islam was almost an act of defiance against the infiltration of their culture and nation by the Ottomans. Arguably, Shiism is a potent political weapon for Iran as a state, as much as a religious ideology (on a personal level). Thus, within the context of Iranian national identity, Shia Islam is not regarded as primarily a religion but as a historical movement opposing the forces perceived as undermining Iran’s power.

Religion plays a central role in the official ideology of the Islamic Republic; Shia religious doctrine exalts the suffering and martyrdom of the faithful, therefore, Iran is sometimes portrayed as an immoveable state driven by religious doctrine, rather than by the pragmatic concerns of statecraft. There has been quite of lot of focus about ideological clashes and ideology-based decisions taken by Iran, which itself indicates that Iranian authorities give greater priorities for ideological causes in comparison to other needs. According to most studies, Iran is considered as a state that upholds their ideology more than any other issue including political, economic and social. As a result of the strong affinity for the ideology and associated causes, the possibilities for major rifts at national and international levels based on ideological discrepancies are many and large.

In summary, the revolutionary ideology of Ayetollah Ruhullah Khomeini – one of the constituent elements of Iranian internal structuring and external positioning – started as a Shia scholars' opposition to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, who was perceived as collaborating with the Americans, British and suppressing Iran’s people. Indeed, Khomeini, attributes great importance to ‘anti-imperialist’ reflexes of the Shia scholars and claims that the scholars in Iran's history have always stood with the Iranian people and resisted the cultural and economic infiltration of Western powers; which, in Khomeini’s view, Pahlevi endeavoured to undermine. Arguably, due to its history, Shia ideology is more significant to Iranian national identity compared to the role of religious ideology to its neighbouring Sunni counterparts. Nevertheless, the question is, how long can Khomeini’s doctrine survive? In the event of any change, what impact will this have on the future of Iranian identity and nationalism?